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ABSTRACT 
“First of All You Need a Good Foundation:” The Ford Foundation’s Program for 
Symphony Orchestras 
 
Ben Negley 
 
 
In 1966, the Ford Foundation began an ambitious ten-year program to support 
North American symphony orchestras. Through a total investment of $80.2 million to 
sixty-one orchestras in the United States and Puerto Rico, the Ford Foundation sought 
to improve the economic conditions of orchestral musicians and assure the financial 
stability of individual orchestral institutions. Toward this goal, the Ford Foundation 
issued both expendable funds, distributed during the first five years of the program, 
and endowment funds, which were released at the end of the program and contingent 
on the orchestras matching the foundation’s contributions. Building on heightened 
public interest in symphonic music, the Ford Foundation’s Program for Symphony 
Orchestras contributed to the growth and success of American orchestras in the 1960s 
and 1970s. In not only enhancing the level of standing associated with orchestral 
musicians and orchestral institutions, but also encouraging orchestras to develop and 
improve fundraising mechanisms, the Ford Foundation made an unprecedented bet on 
the success of orchestral music in North America.  
This dissertation investigates the Ford Foundation’s support of orchestras in 
the 1960s and 1970s within postwar American culture, and examines how the Ford 
Foundation’s Program for Symphony Orchestras intertwined with local factors to 
transform individual orchestras. I focus on two divergent grantees: the Oakland 
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Symphony Orchestra, which eventually declared bankruptcy in the late 1980s, and the 
Minnesota Orchestra, which raised more endowment matching funds than any other 
grantee orchestra. Based on interviews and archival research, these case studies show 
how the efficacy of the Program for Symphony Orchestras depended greatly on local 
factors. Furthermore, I consider the longer-term effects of the program, and the 
prospects for a similar program today. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Act II of Stephen Sondheim’s 1984 musical Sunday in the Park with George 
is set in an 1980s-era art gallery, where an emerging artist named George displays his 
avant-garde light “sculpture:” “Chromolume #7,” a reflection on George Seurat’s 
celebrated Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte. A coterie of revelers, critics, 
collectors, and philanthropists hover as George grumbles: “Art isn’t easy / even when 
you’re hot / advancing art is easy / financing it is not.” George imagines a simpler 
time—presumably the French fin de siècle—when artists could focus on their art 
instead of fundraising. Introduced to a glad-handing philanthropist, George laments: 
“First of all you need a good foundation / otherwise it’s risky from the start.” 
 Sondheim’s double entendre nimbly articulates a verity about making art in 
the United States: it requires not only artistic ability, but also a certain knack for 
fundraising and self-promotion; George’s “good foundation” is more than just a 
grounding in the techniques of visual art. It is also an institutional web of financial 
support—in this case a charitable foundation—that makes his art possible. 
Sondheim’s fictional George is certainly not the first creative person to understand or 
comment on the financial pressures of a life and career in the arts. But this George—
an artist of the 1980s in America—unlike the real George Seurat of late-20th century 
Paris, faces a unique sphere of private charitable foundations with divergent goals and 
priorities.  
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Since the incorporation of the Carnegie Corporation of New York in New 
York in 1911, private charitable foundations have played an increasingly important 
role in American life, not only as funders of art exhibitions, concerts, and libraries, 
but also as underwriters of hospitals and medical research and bankrollers of public 
policy. Incentivized by the federal government—via tax deductions for charitable 
contributions—foundations are thus publicly subsidized but privately administered, 
with minimal required disclosures and lax oversight. Although they are required to 
give only to nonprofit organizations registered with the Internal Revenue Service, 
foundations support a large variety of causes both in the United States and abroad, 
with varying results. 
 In the realm of the arts, arguably no foundation has been as influential or as 
active as the Ford Foundation, which grew to be the largest philanthropic 
organization in the United States in the 1950s. Of all of the Ford Foundation’s 
activities in music, dance, drama, and elsewhere, no single action in the arts was as 
large as the $80.2 million Program for Symphony Orchestra of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Aimed not at a single artist or organization, the program was intended to transform 
the entire business of symphonic music in the United States. But as the Ford 
Foundation learned, oftentimes even the best foundation cannot transform an 
organization’s own stubborn foundation; in most cases the Ford Foundation’s grants 
subsidized the directions in which the orchestras were already going.  
In Chapter 1 I discuss how orchestras are funded in the United States, with 
comparisons between the U.S. model of indirect government subsidy, via tax 
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deductions for charitable contributions to qualifying organizations, and 
characteristically Western European models of direct government subsidy, in which 
governments make regular sustaining grants to arts organizations. In addition, I 
outline several common organizational structures of orchestras in the United States, 
as well as the constellation of funding sources that nourish orchestras, including 
private foundations. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the germination of the Ford Foundation in the 1930s and 
its rapid expansion in the 1950s. I argue that the Ford Foundation’s nascent Program 
in the Humanities and the Arts evolved from the foundation’s broader postwar 
objectives of the early 1950s through the adept leadership of executive W. McNeil 
Lowry. Furthermore, I show how the Ford Foundation’s great financial windfall in 
1956 as a result of the first public offering of Ford Motor Company stock created new 
opportunities, and how Lowry navigated the foundation’s bureaucracy in support of 
the arts and artists. 
The Program for Symphony Orchestras itself is the subject of Chapter 3. I 
identify the specific objectives of Lowry’s orchestra program, as well as the extensive 
research and development that preceded the program’s announcement in late 1965. In 
addition, I discuss some early results and reactions to the program, from sources 
within and without the Ford Foundation. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are case studies of the Oakland Symphony Orchestra and the 
Minnesota Orchestra. Based on archival research as well as interviews with orchestra 
members, conductors, managers, and other stakeholders, these chapters illustrate how 
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results widely diverged from orchestra to orchestra. The Oakland Symphony’s 
internal problems were exacerbated by the Ford Foundation’s efforts, and the 
orchestra became the first of its size to declare bankruptcy, in 1986. By contrast, the 
Ford Foundation’s arrival on the scene further strengthened the Minnesota Orchestra, 
an organization with an unusually robust foundation already in place. 
Thus, this dissertation is an attempt to understand not only this singular 
program for orchestras in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, but also to 
examine the efficacy of top-down philanthropic efforts like the Ford Foundation’s 
Program for Symphony Orchestras. In addition, adding to a growing body of 
literature questioning the role of private foundations in American society, I ask 
questions about the value of the Ford Program, and the utility of such a program in 
relation to other arguably more pressing problems in the United States and abroad. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
 
How Orchestras are Funded in the United States 
  
 
Introduction 
  
On January 8, 1995, Washington Post columnist George F. Will published a 
diatribe on the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and the National Endowments for 
the Arts and the Humanities, provocatively titled “Give Them the Axe: Government 
Doesn’t Owe Big Bird.”1 Writing in the wake of Newt Gingrich’s ascension to 
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1994, and the Republican Party’s 
Contract with America platform, Will argued that the NEA, NEH, and PBS not only 
failed to perform adequate federal functions, but also spawned “lobbying 
infrastructure” in the form of state arts councils and swaths of pro-public subsidy 
letter writers. Gingrich’s revolt would only truly matter if the three agencies were 
defunded completely: “If Republicans merely trim rather than terminate these three 
agencies they will affirm that all three perform appropriate federal functions and will 
prove that the Republican 'revolution' is not even serious reform."2 
 The congressional appropriation for the National Endowment for the Arts 
represents a miniscule federal outlay; it only accounted for about .01 percent of 
                                               
1 George F. Will, "Give Them the Ax," The Washington Post, January 8, 1995. 
2 Will, "Give Them the Ax." 
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federal expenses in 1995.3 Nonetheless, the role of the government—and the subsidy 
that governments provide—has been extremely controversial since before the outline 
of the NEA began to take shape in the early 1960s. For many fiscal conservatives like 
George Will, government involvement in the funding of artistic enterprise represents 
a misappropriation of taxpayer money, as well as a federal intrusion into the cultural 
behavior of its citizens. To its supporters, by contrast, the national arts bureaucracy 
represents a negligible government expense that nourishes U.S. cultural institutions 
and artists. Encapsulated in the debate is the question of government subsidy, and 
more broadly, the question of how the arts should be funded in the United States. 
 This chapter seeks not to answer the question of how artistic endeavors should 
be financed in the United States, but rather to recognize the uniquely American non-
profit funding model in this country and the successes and failures of this policy 
model in supporting the arts in the context of a relatively small central arts 
bureaucracy. 
 
The Non-Profit Model 
  
In the United States nonprofit corporations are incorporated at the state level, 
and each state has its own particular registration requirements, involving filing a 
certificate of incorporation, forming a board of directors, holding a board meeting, 
                                               
3 See “Fiscal Year 2016 Historical Tables: Budget of the U.S. Government,” Office of Management 
and Budget, Executive Office of the President of the United States, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2016-TAB/pdf/BUDGET-2016-TAB.pdf#page=32. 
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adopting by-laws, and paying a statutory registration fee. Once approved by its home 
tax state, a nonprofit can apply for exempt status with the IRS, which exempts the 
organization from federal income tax and also allows for the organization to accept 
donations that can be deducted on individual income tax filings. 
 The exempt purposes set forth in section 501(c)(3) of the United States Code 
are charitable, religious, educational, scientific, literary, testing for public safety, 
fostering national or international amateur sports competition, and preventing cruelty 
to children or animals.4 But the IRS is extremely generous in granting exempt status. 
During fiscal year 2017 (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2017) the IRS approved 
85,669 of the 91,975 applications it received; only sixty-eight completed applications 
were disapproved because they did not embody a charitable purpose.5 A report 
authored by Stanford Political Science Professor Rob Reich (not to be confused with 
UC Berkeley economist and former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich) in 2009 
highlights the ease of achieving exempt status and notes a variety of “eccentric” 
public charities approved by the IRS in 2008. One such organization approved in 
2008 is the International Society of Talking Clock Collectors (ISTCC), an 
organization described by Reich as a “private collection of talking clocks held in the 
home of the collector made into a nonprofit museum by taking photographs of the 
clocks and posting them online.”6 
                                               
4 Internal Revenue Service, “Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Status,” Publication 4220, 
Washington, DC, March 2018. 
5 Internal Revenue Service, Data Book, 2017, Publication 55B, Washington, DC, March 2018, 55. 
6 Rob Reich, Lacey Dorn, and Stefanie Sutton, “Anything Goes: Approval of Nonprofit Status by the 
IRS,” Stanford University Center of Philanthropy and Civil Society, Draft Report of October 25, 2009, 
20. 
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 Although exempt status provides several major benefits, principally 
exemption from income tax, it also disallows nonprofits from distributing excess 
earnings—beyond reasonable remuneration—to shareholders.7 Thus, although 
nonprofits can sometimes pay salaries comparable to those in the for-profit sector, 
they cannot reward shareholders with dividends. The term “nonprofit” does not 
suggest that exempt organizations cannot or will not be profitable but that any 
profits—revenues in excess of expenses—cannot be distributed to stakeholders as 
they might be in a for-profit context. 
 Achieving a surplus of revenues over expenditures can be extremely difficult 
for performing arts nonprofits in general, though. This fact is particularly true when 
comparing the financial performance of a nonprofit to that of a for profit. Although 
the most basic metric used to measure the economic performance of a business—net 
profit, the bottom line on the income statement—is useful in non- and for-profit 
contexts, it delivers unique challenges in non-profit applications. In both contexts the 
bottom line can be deceiving because it can mask all kinds of inefficiencies or 
unusual aspects of the business. A positive net income—being “in the black”—is not 
necessarily a sign that a business is being run effectively, and vice versa. 
 In orchestras, a surplus of revenue over expenses can suggest that an orchestra 
is being run efficiently, but a deeper dive into the sources or revenue and expenses is 
needed to truly understand the financial picture of the organization. Key to 
                                               
7 Paul J. DiMaggio, Nonprofit Enterprise in the Arts: Studies in Mission and Constraint (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1986), 21. 
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understanding this financial picture is the fact that orchestras generally derive less 
than half their revenue from ticket sales and other earned income sources, including 
recordings and broadcasts, and retail merchandise. Over the course of the twentieth 
century earned income sources covered less and less of the operating budget of 
American symphony orchestras. Although in the first half of the twentieth century 
ticket sales and recording revenue typically covered more than 50 percent of total 
expenses, this figure has fallen consistently in the subsequent years. 
Concert attendance, performance quality, and revenues have all grown over 
the course of the twentieth century, but expenses—particularly since the 1960s—have 
grown at an exponentially faster clip. In 1966, economists William J. Baumol and 
William G. Bowen described how wages—expenses—increased in orchestras at a 
rate exceeding increases in productivity. They called this process the “cost disease.” 
Stanford economist Robert Flanagan summarizes the cost disease thus: 
Labor productivity is simply output divided by labor input—output per 
employee or output per hour of work…. If both pay and output per employee 
in the goods-producing sector increase at 3 percent each year, labor costs per 
unit of output remain constant…. But if pay increases at 3 percent per year in 
an industry with no productivity growth, labor costs per unit of output will 
increase at 3 percent per year, creating pressure to cover the increased costs 
with higher prices.8 
 
In industries like manufacturing and mining, wage growth has historically 
accompanied technological improvements that led to increases in productivity. In 
auto manufacturing, for example, it is not difficult to separate the output (the car) 
                                               
8 Flanagan, Robert L, The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras: Artistic Triumphs and Economic 
Challenges (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 9. 
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from the labor input (the worker); the average car buyer cares about factors such as 
affordability and reliability, but not necessarily the number of labor hours (input) that 
went in to the car’s production. By contrast, in the performing arts, a performance—
and thus the performer’s labor hours —often is the product. According to Flanagan, 
“There is no way to separate output (a performance) from labor input. The 
performance (‘output’) and the performer (‘labor input’) are one and the same. So low 
productivity growth in the performing arts is not anybody’s ‘fault’; it is inherent in 
the nature of performance.”9 Baumol and Bowen offer an elegant summary of the cost 
disease: “Human ingenuity has devised ways to reduce the labor necessary to produce 
an automobile, but no one has yet succeeded in decreasing the human effort expended 
at a live performance of a 45-minute Schubert quartet much below a total of three 
man-hours.”10  
A similar assessment was made by American Symphony Orchestra League 
executive Helen Thompson in a 1964 discussion with Ford Foundation official 
Edward F. D’Arms; she noted that in the nineteen largest-budget American 
orchestras, between the 1947–48 and 1962–63 seasons, gross expenditures—driven 
by wage growth—grew 83 percent but the number of concerts played only increased 
24 percent.11 Although this fact may appear obvious—there are only so many days in 
                                               
9 Flanagan, The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras, 10. 
10 Forty-five minutes multiplied by four musicians equals three man-hours. See William J. Baumol and 
William G. Bowen, Performing Arts: The Economic Dilemma; a Study of Problems Common to 
Theater, Opera, Music, and Dance (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1966),164. 
11 "Interview with Mrs. Helen Thompson, Executive Vice President, American Symphony Orchestra 
League," October 8, 1964, box 37, WML. 
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the year—it is emphasized here to reinforce the limits on productivity growth that 
foster an environment of cost disease in orchestras. 
Relatively low productivity growth in the performing arts coupled with 
expansive wage growth elsewhere in the economy means that expenses in orchestras 
and other arts organizations will rise relentlessly if the arts sector is to retain its 
employees. This rise in expenses—absent a relative rise in revenues—has created a 
situation where professional orchestras in the United States operate under consistently 
widening structural deficits, in which performance revenues fall short of performance 
expenses. 
Michael G. Mauskapf, a musicologist and professor at Columbia University 
Business School, notes that from 1990 to 2012 performance income (earned income 
without investment-related gains i.e. endowment income) has remained relatively 
stagnant, while expenses have more than doubled. Thus, the percentage of total 
expenses covered by ticket sales has fallen from 50 percent in 1990 to 40 percent in 
2012, indicating a greater reliance on endowments and contributions: “From a 
financial perspective, orchestras have transformed from service to fundraising 
organizations, becoming increasingly reliant on private contributions and overinflated 
investments to subsidize ever-growing operating costs.”12 
 This transformation did not occur overnight. Rather it is emblematic of how 
orchestras and orchestral musicians have adapted to local factors throughout history.  
                                               
12 Michael G. Mauskapf, “Enduring Crisis, Ensuring Survival: Artistry, Economics, and the American 
Symphony Orchestra” (Ph.D diss., University of Michigan, 2012), 266. 
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European Roots 
 
 The orchestra was born in Western Europe in the period between 1650 and 
1750. As John Spitzer and Neal Zaslaw articulate in their exhaustive The Birth of the 
Orchestra: History of an Institution, 1650–1815, the birth of the orchestra involved a 
transformation of the meaning of the word “orchestra” from a place to an ensemble: 
At the beginning of the period [1650–1750] ‘orchestra’ was an archaic, 
unfamiliar word that referred to a place in the theater where instrumentalists 
occasionally sat. By the end of the period the word had become familiar in all 
European languages, referring not only to the place but also to the 
instrumentalists themselves and to their identity as an ensemble…. By the last 
half of the eighteenth century the word had acquired general currency because 
by then the orchestra had emerged as an acknowledged, distinctive social 
institution.13 
  
Although the history of the orchestra in Europe is typically described in terms 
of courtly patronage, à la Haydn at Esterházy, the courtly Kapelle orchestra, like 
Haydn’s, was just one of several modes in which orchestras were financed in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Spitzer and Zaslaw outline three basic models 
of orchestras in the eighteenth century. The first, like Haydn’s, is the Kapelle model, 
in which the orchestra and its musicians are members of the household of a king, 
prince, or other ruler. In Kapelle orchestras musicians generally signed year-long or 
multi-year contracts and often serve the same patron(s) for their entire lives. 
Musicians were often restricted from performing outside of the patron’s household 
                                               
13 John Spitzer and Neal Zaslaw, The Birth of the Orchestra: History of an Institution, 1650-1815 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 18. 
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without prior approval, but enjoyed many of the fringe benefits of courtly patronage, 
including housing, meals, medical care, and long-term stability. 
Spitzer and Zaslaw argue that as European nation-states congealed, the state 
itself became a metaphor for the human body as well as the world of nature, and that 
orchestras similarly played into the myth-building of monarchs and statehood: “Kings 
raised standing armies, they commissioned clocks, automatons, and other mechanical 
contrivances, they assembled and maintained orchestras. All these things signified, 
advertised, and magnified the state and its ruler.”14 
By contrast, musicians in many larger European cities served as civil servants 
with varying musical responsibilities. These musicians typically held their positions 
as official offices, usually for life, and formed ensembles as needs and numbers 
permitted. Particularly in London, many musicians worked as freelancers, hired for 
various engagements on a contractual basis. Importantly, in the free market system, 
Spitzer and Zaslaw contend: “The instrumentalist sells his labor, not his person. 
Music and music performance are commodities; patrons are consumers.”15 
Despite this operational connection between autocrats and their orchestras, 
Spitzer and Zaslaw push back against the simplified teleology that orchestras were 
born into courtly patronage in the seventeenth century and evolved into a middle-
class institution in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In fact, early orchestral 
ensembles thrived in cities without kings or courts in the late seventeenth century, 
                                               
14 Spitzer and Zaslaw, The Birth of the Orchestra, 526. 
15 Ibid., 404. 
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including in Rome, Hamburg, Lübeck, and Venice. Nonetheless, especially in 
Germany, aristocratic patronage remained essential to many orchestras into the 
eighteenth century. Thus, “during most of its history the orchestra has functioned, 
indeed it has thrived, in several different social situations and milleux 
simultaneously.”16 
In Western Europe public subsidies—a legacy of courtly patronage—often 
provide the sustaining income source for theaters, museums, orchestras, dance 
companies, and other arts organizations. Due to many factors—including monarchical 
histories, stronger central bureaucracies, and vastly different tax codes—European 
orchestras, opera companies, theaters, and individual artists traditionally have been 
nourished by a combination of government subsidies and ticket sales. In addition to 
subsidies provided by individual European countries and cities, the European Union 
also supports cultural projects for its member states. The EU currently is investing 
nearly €1.5 billion in cultural projects for the years 2014–20; this investment alone, 
although spread over a larger population than that of the United States, easily dwarfs 
the contributions of the National Endowment for the Arts during any six-year period 
in its history.17 
These differing funding models endure to the present day. The following table 
describes how orchestras are supported in countries with strong central arts 
bureaucracies: 
                                               
16 Spitzer and Zaslaw, The Birth of the Orchestra, 34. 
17 The European Commission, “The European Union Explained: Culture and Audiovision,” 
http://europa.eu/pol/cult/ index_en.htm (2014), accessed 22 August 2016. 
  
15  
 
 
Table 1.1: Income Sources as Percentages of Total Income by Country18 
  
Earned 
Income 
Public 
Subsidy 
Private 
Donations Other 
 
Australia 2003 28.0% 61.0% 9.0% 2.0% 
Canada 2005–06 32.0% 41.0% 26.0% 1.0% 
Finland 2006 12.0% 87.0% 0.0% 1.0% 
Paris (Orchestre de Paris) 1986–87 28.0% 72.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Netherlands 2006–07 21.0% 75.0% 4.0% 0.0% 
United Kingdom 2012–13 48.0% 34.0% 18.0% 0.5% 
United States 2011–12 43.7% 4.6% 46.7% 5.0% 
 
When making decisions about whom to fund and how much to give, publicly 
funded grantors—like the national and local arts councils—must consider how best to 
spend public money for the greater good. Grantees are afforded the stability that 
comes with consistent government support, but at the same time are beholden—at 
least theoretically—to the artistic and political priorities of local and national 
governmental funding bodies. The poet Dana Gioia, who chaired the NEA from 2003 
to 2009, writes: “These systems [of direct government funding] provide smooth and 
stable planning for arts organizations, but they run the risk of dividing the cultural 
world into insiders and outsiders. The insider institutions tend to be well subsidized 
with large annual grants while the outsiders survive on the margins of the culture, if 
they survive at all.”19 
                                               
18 All figures from Flanagan, The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras, except for the UK and US 
figures. The UK figures are from The Association of British Orchestras, “The State of Britain’s 
Orchestras in 2013,” accessed http://www.abo.org.uk/media/32152/ABO-The-State-of-Britains-
Orchestras.pdf; US figures from The League of American Orchestras, “U.S. Orchestra Facts,” accessed 
http://www.americanorchestras.org/images/stories/adv_gov_pdf/QOF2015.pdf. 
19 Flanagan, The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras, 167. 
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 The contrasts articulated by Gioia are exemplified by the fact that 
bankruptcies are extremely rare for subsidized European orchestras but that musicians 
in top U.S. orchestras can earn wages that dwarf those of their international peers:
  
 
 
 
Table 1.2: Annual Pay of Symphony Musicians and Orchestra Managers. 
Source: Flanagan, The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras.20          
Country Year Average (a) Range (b) Percentage of Mean Income (c)          
Australia 2003 
       
Minimum 
 
 $   28,990   $  24,325   —   $   41,728  65%  —  111% 
10 Years Experience 
 
 $   36,390   $  30,475   —   $   50,075  81%  —  134% 
Finland 2005 
       
Section Principal 
 
 n.a.   $  30,840   —   $   52,440  105%  —  178% 
Deputy Principal 
 
 n.a.   $  27,180   —   $   48,960  92%  —  166% 
Musician 
 
 n.a.   $  25,500   —   $   42,660  87%  —  145% 
Netherlands 2007 
       
Minimum 
 
 n.a.   $  35,820   —   $   41,196  84%  —  97% 
10 Years Experience 
 
 n.a.   $  46,140   —   $   53,040  109%  —  125% 
United Kingdom 1998–99 
       
Independent Contract 
 
 $   38,930   $  36,005   —   $   41,845  137%  —  160% 
BBC 
 
 $   41,426   $  37,195   —   $   49,200  142%  —  188% 
United States 2003 
       
52-week schedules 
        
Minimum 
 
 $   86,315   $  57,720   —   $  104,520  137%  —  248% 
Average 
 
 $  100,480   $  63,700   —   $  127,556  151%  —  303% 
30 largest orchestras 
        
Minimum 
 
 $   71,497   $  28,000   —   $  106,000  67%  —  252% 
Average 
 
 $   84,168   $  33,280   —   $  134,514  79%  —  319%          
a. All salaries have been converted into U.S. dollars using the average interbank foreign exchange rate for each period. 
b. Data are for the six state orchestras in Australia, fifteen orchestras reporting to the association of Finnish Symphony Orchestras, 
eight orchestras in the Netherland, and six orchestras in the UK. 
c. Adjusted for differences in purchasing power. 
n.a. = not available. 
      
                                               
20 Flanagan, The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras, 162. 
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 Table 1.2 shows that although members of fifty-two-week U.S. orchestras 
earn considerably more than their European counterparts, musicians in smaller U.S. 
orchestras can make well below mean U.S. income. The wide range of pay in the 
thirty largest U.S orchestras exemplifies the disparities between U.S. musicians, and 
the boom or bust atmosphere that leads to relatively frequent orchestra bankruptcies. 
Gioia describes the disparity in U.S. orchestra finances as a uniquely American 
feature/bug: “The dynamic nature of the system means that one decade’s high-flying 
leader can suffer huge reversal in the next—just as in corporate America.”21 
 
Funding Orchestras in the United States 
 
The historical lack of government subsidy in the United States means that 
U.S. orchestras and other performing arts organizations are uniquely vulnerable to 
market fluctuations and the whims of donors. Early symphonic activities in the 
American colonies existed primarily in the free-market model, and orchestras in the 
American colonies were similar to those in smaller English towns and provinces, with 
series of subscription concerts existing in larger cities like Charleston, Philadelphia, 
and New York by the early eighteenth century. Starting in 1766, the St. Caecilia 
Society of Charleston, South Carolina sponsored subscription concerts featuring 
orchestras of professionals recruited from Europe. Philadelphia, the largest city of the 
American colonies, with 17,000 residents in 1760, had theaters, pleasure gardens, 
                                               
21 Flanagan, The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras, 105-106. 
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subscription concerts, and amateur musical societies by the end of the eighteenth 
century.22 
The oldest continuously operating orchestral organization in the United States 
is the Harvard-Radcliffe Orchestra, which traces its history to 1808, when six Harvard 
students founded an organization called the Pierian Sodality. Although in much of its 
early years the organization did not resemble a contemporary symphony orchestra—
in 1832 the organization had only one member, a flutist who, according to Time 
Magazine, held meetings with himself in his chair and paid himself dues until he 
found another flutist to join him in duets—the organization persists to the present 
day.23 
Musicologist Mark Clague describes six basic models of U.S. orchestras 
started in the nineteenth century that endure to the present day. These are: club, co-
op, entrepreneurial, conservatory, society, and corporate.24 Under the club model, 
musicians are typically amateur volunteers who support the organization by paying 
membership fees, organizing concerts, securing venues, and attracting audiences. 
Most of the community orchestras in this country fall under the club model, with 
musicians rehearsing during the evening to accommodate their other non-musical 
careers. 
Under the cooperative model, orchestras are organized with the dual purposes 
                                               
22 Spitzer and Zaslaw, The Birth of the Orchestra, 301. 
23 “The History of the HRO,” The Harvard-Radcliffe Orchestra, 
http://www.harvardradcliffeorchestra.org/about-hro/, accessed September 2018. 
24 Mark Clague, “Building the American Symphony Orchestra,” in American Orchestras in the 
Nineteenth Century, ed. John Spitzer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 27. 
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of making both music and money. The musicians generally assume organizational 
responsibilities and split the profits at the end of the season. The original New York 
Philharmonic, founded in 1842, followed this model, and several major U.S. 
orchestras—notably the Colorado Symphony and the Louisiana Philharmonic—
recently reorganized under co-op principles. The Louisiana Philharmonic was formed 
in 1991 after the bankruptcy of the New Orleans Symphony in 1990 and began with 
musicians assuming most administrative and governing roles. Eventually the 
musicians hired an administrative staff and brought community members onto the 
Board of Directors, with a musician serving as Board President. Today the 
organization is governed by a two-president model—a musician president for the 
orchestra and a community president for the board, suggesting that despite its co-op 
roots the organization now resembles a more typical, corporate style structure.25 
The entrepreneurial model is idealized by impresarios like Theodor Thomas 
and P.T. Barnum. Entrepreneurial leaders exercise full control over artistic and 
administrative matters and receive full benefits from the endeavor’s success and 
accept full liability for its failures. Although entrepreneurial efforts in the orchestra 
business are uncommon today because most cities have fine resident orchestras and 
because consumers have many options for entertainment, there are still a variety of 
entrepreneurial endeavors in the performing arts. Exemplifying this model currently 
is Dutch violinist André Rieu, who tours internationally with his Johann Strauss 
Orchestra. Drawing large crowds around the world in stadiums and large venues 
                                               
25 Flanagan, The Perilous Life of Symphony Orchestras, 88. 
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typically reserved for popular music events, Rieu is an outlier in the orchestral world, 
but proof that in the right context orchestral performances can be popular and 
profitable. 
Clague’s fourth model is the conservatory, in which an orchestra is connected 
to an educational institution like an independent school of music—such as the Curtis 
Institute of Music, the San Francisco Conservatory of Music, the Cleveland Institute 
of Music, etc.—or a public or private college or university. Because many research 
universities and liberal arts colleges maintain fine student orchestras, such as the 
Oberlin College Conservatory, the University of Rochester’s Eastman School of 
Music, and the Jacobs School of Music at Indiana University, among many others, 
Clague’s conservatory model encompasses all collegiate orchestras, not just 
orchestras housed at dedicated music conservatories. Almost all universities, and even 
most community and junior colleges, have student orchestras, and these orchestras are 
supported by a combination of tuition, ticket sales, state funding—in the case of 
public colleges and universities—and endowment income. Although these orchestras 
are not professional, top student orchestras often surpass professional groups in terms 
of quality, make recordings, go on tours, and feature world-class guest conductors 
and soloists. 
The fifth model, the society orchestra, is one in which volunteer leadership 
supports a professional ensemble through a combination of ticket sales and 
membership dues. Any revenues from concerts are used to pay expenses and 
reinvested in the society; the concerts sponsored by the St. Caecilia Society of 
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Charleston in the eighteenth century exemplified this model. A more modern example 
is the Bohemian Club of San Francisco, a private men’s club founded in the late 
nineteenth century that commissions private operatic productions every summer at its 
wooded retreat in Sonoma County, CA. Although the enjoyment of these 
performances, called “high jinx,” is restricted only to Bohemian Club members and 
their guests, the club also accepts artists and musicians as members at greatly reduced 
membership rates who compose and produce the various musical performances.26 
Clague’s corporate model is embodied by the premier modern orchestras in 
the United States. Corporate orchestras are led by a generally well-to-do board of 
non-musicians, are supported by a combination of ticket sales and donations, and are 
owned by a non-profit corporation. Musicians in these orchestras are paid according 
to collective bargaining agreements established between management and the local 
chapter of the American Federation of Musicians, and generally earn their livelihood 
through orchestral playing and sometimes instrumental teaching. Corporate orchestras 
are run by dedicated managers and administrative staff, sometimes own their own 
performance and rehearsal spaces, and employ a professional conductor or music 
director from outside the corpus of regular orchestra members. Because authority is 
spread among conductor, manager, board, musicians, and the union, corporate 
orchestras, like businesses organized as for-profit corporations, are built to withstand 
changes in leadership and weather economic uncertainty.27  
                                               
26 See Bill Domhoff, Who Rules America? (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2013). 
27 Clague, “Building the American Symphony Orchestra,” 29. 
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Although the top U.S. orchestras are run in the corporate model, there are 
numerous incorporated orchestras in the United States, and only the top twenty or so 
are as a good or better than the top tier conservatory orchestras. The range of quality 
in corporate orchestras is as wide as the range in quality of conservatory and 
university orchestras; both models denote distinct organizational principles rather 
than a salient musical capability among individual ensembles. 
The corporatization of orchestras—and other arts organizations in the United 
States—represents an institutionalization and homogenization of professional 
orchestras; the corporate orchestra represents stability and the diffusion of power. 
Whereas the future of an entrepreneurial orchestra is uncertain after the death of its 
leader, a corporate orchestra, such as the Philadelphia Orchestra or the Phoenix 
Symphony Orchestra will survive the death of its conductor or one of its star 
musicians by hiring someone to fill his or her place.  
Entrepreneurs like Theodor Thomas ruled the orchestra business in the 
nineteenth century United States, but the twentieth century was a transitional period 
in which non-profit management—alongside for-profit management—became an 
academic and professional discipline. The first collegiate business school—the 
Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania—was founded in 1881, and in 
1900 the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College began offering a Master of 
Science in Commerce degree, the predecessor to the ubiquitous modern Master of 
Business Administration. As the science of business administration grew, so did the 
profession of arts manager. In the first half of the twentieth century the position was a 
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thankless administrative task, comprised of the duties of hiring musicians, organizing 
tours, and executing the mission of the board of directors. Orchestras were ruled 
either by domineering conductors—like George Szell, who exerted dictatorial 
influence over the Cleveland Orchestra from 1946 to 1970—or by singular sustaining 
patrons, such as Henry Higginson in Boston, Elbert L. Carpenter in Minneapolis, and 
William Andrews Clark Jr. in Los Angeles.28 
By the 1950s, the power centers in many U.S. orchestras had begun to shift. 
Sociologist Paul J. Dimaggio notes that between 1950 and 1980 the U.S. population 
underwent important changes that altered the business of the performing arts. First, 
the baby boom increased the size of the population. Second, a massive increase in the 
attainment of higher education created a dramatic increase in the numbers of college 
graduates. Finally, incomes continued to rise, and the changing economy increased 
the number of professional and managerial positions while the demand for blue-collar 
jobs waned: “During the 1960s and 1970s, demographic and social forces increased 
the market for the arts, enlarging the number of Americans who fit the arts consumer 
profile (affluent, educated, and white-collar workers) and decreasing the proportion of 
those who did not.”29 These developments contributed to the ascendancy of arts 
                                               
28 The tyrannical exploits of some conductors, like Szell and Fritz Reiner of the Chicago Symphony are 
described in many scholarly ad popular sources. Former Minnesota Orchestra musician describes the 
antics of these conductors in the context and labor relations in her informative 2005 book More Than 
Meets the Ear. See Julie Ayer, More Than Meets the Ear: How Symphony Musicians Made Labor 
History (Minneapolis, MN: Syren Book Company, 2005). 
29 Paul DiMaggio, “The Nonprofit Instrument and the Influence of the Marketplace on Policies in the 
Arts,” in The Arts and Public Policy in the United States, ed. W. McNeil Lowry (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 68. 
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administrators, who were increasingly needed to manage the infusion of new wealth 
and interest enjoyed by orchestras: 
Unlike his impresario counterpart, whose style was based on flattering and 
cajoling the affluent elite, while dominating performers and employees by an 
autocratic imposition of his will, the successful arts administrator relies on the 
ability to apply evenhandedly technical knowledge to obtain the best possible 
results for the arts organization and all interested parties.30 
 
DiMaggio further describes the “institutional revolution” that began in the 
1960s in U.S. orchestras as a transition in emphasis from individual patrons to several 
sources of patronage: “Where the private patron once reigned supreme, the 
contemporary executive director or fund-raiser must know how to raise money from 
three local levels of government, private foundations, and corporations as well as the 
individual donor. Indeed, arts support has undergone an institutional revolution.”31  
 
Sources of Patronage: Individuals 
  
In 2011, individual taxpayers donated approximately $13 billion to nonprofit 
organizations in the arts and humanities. Individuals account for about three-quarters 
of all charitable giving in the United States, with bequests, foundations and 
corporations providing the balance. Individual contributions accounted for 20 percent 
of revenue of not-for-profit performing arts groups and museums from 2006–10.32  
                                               
30 Paul J. Dimaggio, Nonprofit Enterprise in the Arts: Studies in Mission and Constraint (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1986), 166. 
31 DiMaggio, Nonprofit Enterprise in the Arts, 74. 
32 National Endowment for the Arts, "How the United States Funds the Arts, 3rd edition," 
(Washington, DC: National Endowment for the Arts, 2012), 1. 
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 Most individual patrons support orchestras in a sustaining fashion, in that their 
gifts support the year-to-year operations of the organization and occasional capital or 
endowment drives. Gifts can range from single gifts of negligible amounts to regular 
multi-million-dollar gifts. Donations from individuals sustain orchestras when ticket 
sales and other earned income cannot, and top professional orchestras employ large 
development staffs to cultivate and nourish sustaining patrons. Several especially 
large gifts merit particular attention as examples of two other modes of individual 
patronage: foundational and transformational. 
 The most famous foundational patron was Major Henry Lee Higginson (1834 
– 1919), a banking magnate who founded the Boston Symphony Orchestra in 1881, 
and the Boston Pops in 1885; in addition, he built Boston Symphony Hall, which 
opened in 1900. This venue was the first orchestral hall built in the United States with 
acoustical guidance from a scientist, Harvard’s Wallace Sabine. Higginson publicly 
retired from his role as patron and patriarch of the BSO in 1918, weeks after 
conductor Karl Muck was accused of anti-American sentiment for not conducting 
“The Star-Spangled Banner” during a concert in Providence, Road Island. Muck, 
whom Higginson considered “indispensable,” was arrested by U.S. marshals, despite 
Higginson taking the blame publicly for failing to communicate the audience’s wish 
to hear the anthem to Muck.33 As a result of Higginson’s singular commitment, the 
Boston Symphony became the first world-class American Orchestra.34 
                                               
33 “Maj. Higginson Absolves Dr. Muck,” The Washington Post, November 6, 1917. 
34 Joseph Horowitz, “Henry Lee Higginson,” in Grove Music Online, 2013. 
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 Higginson’s patronage of the Boston Symphony was foundational, in that his 
efforts created and sustained the orchestra in its early years. Several more recent gifts 
to established organizations fall into the transformational category. The Cincinnati 
Symphony, founded in 1885—only four years after the Boston Symphony—struggled 
greatly during the “great recession” of 2007–09. Facing staff, wage, and 
programming cuts, longtime subscriber and patron Louise Dieterle Nippert (1911–
2012) established the $85 million Louis Dieterle Nippert Musical Arts Fund. A 
longtime owner of the Cincinnati Reds baseball team along with her late husband, an 
heir to fortune of James A. Gamble (of Proctor & Gamble), Nippert designed her gift 
to principally benefit the Symphony (75 percent of annual distributions), Cincinnati 
Opera (12 percent annual distributions) and Cincinnati Ballet (5 percent), with the 
remainder going to several smaller institutions, including the Cincinnati May Festival, 
Matinee Musicale, the Linton Chamber Music Series and Chamber Music Cincinnati, 
among others. 
 Coupled with a stabilization plan that included modest staff wage cuts and 
layoffs and an 11 percent pay cut to musicians, Nippert’s gift not only helped the 
orchestra navigate the financial crisis, but also endowed the Cincinnati Symphony 
with an additional steady income stream that has grown alongside the surging, post-
recession stock market.35 The orchestra cannot invade the endowment principal, 
because it is managed and administered independently by Nippert’s Greenacres 
                                               
35 Janelle Gelfand, “Nippert Gives $85M to Cincinnati’s Arts,” Cincinnati Enquirer, December 11, 
2009. 
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Foundation. Nonetheless, during the 2016 season Nippert’s endowment contributed 
$3.7 million to the Cincinnati Symphony, covering approximately 12 percent of the 
orchestra’s expenses for the season.36 
Few orchestras have felt the ups and downs of the orchestra business quite 
like the San Diego Symphony, which ceased operations in 1987 to pay off creditors, 
and then in 1996 declared bankruptcy. It returned in 1998, and then in late 2001 
received the largest single pledge ever made to a single American orchestra: $100 
million. Contributed by San Diego billionaire Irwin M. Jacobs, founder of 
telecommunications company Qualcomm, $50 million was immediately given to 
establish an endowment, and the remaining $50 million will be released to the 
orchestra upon Jacobs’ death.37 The endowment earns several million dollars in 
income each year; for the 2015 tax year, the Jacobs endowment distributed $3 
million, covering more than 12 percent of the orchestra’s total expenses for the year 
($25 million).38 The annual disbursement will only increase when Jacobs’ estate is 
distributed and the endowment is doubled. 
Several metrics encapsulate the transformation of the orchestra since the 
announcement of Jacobs’s gift in 2001. Musician salaries in the San Diego Symphony 
have risen dramatically, from a minimum of $25,950 in 2001 to $45,750 in 2006, and 
                                               
36 See Greenacres Foundation Inc., 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, 2016, 18; 
and Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra, 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, Fiscal 
Year September 1, 2016 to August 31, 2017 2016, 1.  
37 Diane Haithman, “How to Save a Symphony,” Los Angeles Times, June 9, 2002. 
38 See San Diego Symphony Foundation, 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, Fiscal 
year July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016, 13; and San Diego Symphony Orchestra Association, 990 Return 
of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, (2015 San Diego Symphony Foundation 990, Fiscal year 
July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016, 1. 
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the season has grown from twenty-six weeks to forty-one.39 The most recent 
collective bargaining agreement, signed in 2016, raises the minimum salary from just 
under $70,000 to $80,000 at the end of the five-year deal. Thus, in the twenty years 
since the announcement of the Jacobs gift and the last year of the current contract, the 
annual base salary in the orchestra will have risen from $25,000 to $80,000.40   
 
Sources of Patronage: Government 
 
Table 1.1 above shows that federal, state, and local funding bodies provide 
relatively little direct subsidy to orchestras in the United States. This dearth of direct 
government support is emblematic of the individualistic, free-market roots of the 
American system. But the lack of formal subsidy offered by governmental agencies is 
not indicative of a lack of governmental support for arts organizations in the United 
States. Instead, federal and state governments subsidize the arts indirectly through tax 
provisions that allow for the deduction of charitable contributions from taxable 
income. 
The subsidization of charitable giving in the United States is popular and well 
regarded, in that it encourages donating to noble causes that might not survive 
otherwise. In addition, Libertarian economist Tyler Cowen contends that U.S. indirect 
subsidy encourages a healthy competition for funding: “The genius of the American 
                                               
39 Haithman, “How to Save a Symphony.” 
40 George Carga, “San Diego Symphony Musicians Sign New 5-year Pact,” San Diego Union-Tribune, 
September 1, 2016. 
  
30  
 
system is to get most arts support off the direct public books. Instead it encourages 
competition for funds and the proliferation of the intermediate institutions that 
constitute civil society.”41 
Although all charitable donations benefit the recipient, for tax purposes they 
only provide monetary benefit to taxpayers who itemize their annual deductions. 
These taxpayers are generally upper middle class or wealthy because their total 
itemized deductions—comprising medical expenses, state and property taxes paid, 
home mortgage interest, gifts to charity, and other miscellaneous deductions—must 
surpass the standard deduction of $12,000 filing single or $24,000 married filing 
jointly for the 2018 tax year.42 The tax benefits of charitable donations are 
overwhelmingly reaped by wealthier taxpayers because the greatest incentive to 
donate is also placed on these taxpayers; the wealthy have the most to gain via a 
lower tax liability. Thus, the U.S. mode of indirect subsidy via the Internal Revenue 
Code is inextricably linked to the outsized individual patronage of people like Louise 
Dieterle Nippert and Irwin M. Jacobs. 
Through their contributions, wealthy individuals like Nipper and Jacobs exert 
a great deal of influence on the culture of their communities, using a publicly-
                                               
41 Tyler Cowen, Good and Plenty: The Creative Successes of American Arts Funding (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), 31. 
42 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 changes many aspects of the U.S. Tax Code for both 
corporations and individuals, beginning with 2018 tax year filings. Although there are notable changes 
in the Act that will impact charitable giving, the basic concept of the charitable deduction remains 
intact, and because the individual tax cuts were not made permanent in the 2017 Act and may be in 
flux as the political situation evolves, I have chosen not to engage in an in depth discuss of the 
differences between the new and old tax regimes. See Internal Revenue Service, Form 1040, 2018 Tax 
Year.  
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subsidized means, although they have not been elected through any sort of democratic 
process. There is considerable discussion about whether or not unelected and 
unaccountable leaders should be allowed to divert money that otherwise would have 
ended up in the U.S. Treasury for their own interests. Rob Reich argues that the 
charitable deduction “establishes a plutocratic element in public policy,” because the 
deduction “supplies a greater subsidy to the wealthy, who are, of course, already 
likely to possess a more powerful voice in associational life and the political arena 
without any subsidy whatsoever.”43 
It is difficult to imagine a scenario where there is too much private support for 
symphony orchestras, creating deleterious reverberations throughout society. But 
applied to other types of charities that the wealthy patronize, like think tanks that 
influence public policy, one can imagine how Reich’s thesis that “we get not 
egalitarian citizen voice in civil society but plutocratic citizen voice, underwritten by 
tax policy,” could be concerning.44  
The U.S. system—in which donors give directly to charitable organizations 
and then claim deductions on their personal income tax filings—is elegantly simple 
compared to the British Deed of Covenant and Gift Aid Systems. Under the former 
system, which was phased out in the early 2000s, a donation from an individual to a 
charity involved the original donation as well as the taxes forgone on the income 
donated to the charity.  
                                               
43 Rob Reich, Just Giving: Why Philanthropy is Failing Democracy and How it Can Do Better, 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2018), 132. 
44 Reich, Just Giving, 132. 
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J. Mark Schuster describes the complicated nature of the Deed of Covenant: 
“The deed of covenant separates the flow of money into two streams: the donor’s 
private contribution, flowing directly from the donor to the charity, and the forgone 
taxes, flowing first to the government and then reclaimed by the charity.” Compared 
to the U.S. charitable deduction, this British system is complex: “the most lasting 
impression of the deed of covenant must be its administrative complexity. British 
charities struggle with this problem constantly as they try to explain the tax 
implications of charitable giving to potential donors. The system is not an 
immediately transparent one, and it requires quite a bit of donor sophistication to be 
used effectively.”45 
The gift aid scheme, which was introduced in the United Kingdom in 1990, is 
also intricate in that it involves repayments from Her Majesty’s Revenue & 
Customs—the UK equivalent to the Internal Revenue Service—to the charity based 
on the taxes withheld on the donated income. Although these tax repayments to 
charities amounted to £1.27 billion generated from nearly £3 billion in total gift aid 
donations during the 2015–16 tax year, this form of direct charitable contribution—an 
indirect government subsidy—is considerably less popular than its U.S. counterpart.46 
The closest U.S. analog to the centralized arts bureaucracies of Europe is the 
National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), founded in 1965 by Congress and President 
                                               
45 J. Mark Davidson Schuster, “Tax Incentives as Arts Policy in Western Europe,” in Nonprofit 
Enterprise in the Arts: Studies in Mission and Constraint, ed. Paul J. DiMaggio (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1986), 327-329. 
46 See “UK Charity Tax Relief Statistics: 1990–91 to 2017–18,” HM Revenue & Customs, June 28, 
2018. 
  
33  
 
Lyndon B. Johnson. Notable precursors to the NEA were the subsidies to artists 
during the Depression in the 1930s. Arts-oriented New Deal government programs, 
like the Federal Arts Project and Federal Writers’ Project in the 1930s were created to 
employ jobless artists and writers during a national economic crisis. The Emergency 
Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, signed by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on 
April 8, 1935, was a first step in this direction: it designated $4.88 billion dollars for 
unemployment mitigation. Roosevelt subsequently established the Works Progress 
Administration (WPA) via executive order, which provided jobs for approximately 
8.5 million Americans from 1935 until its dissolution in 1943.47 Out of this WPA 
bureaucracy emerged several projects dedication to employing unemployed 
musicians, artists, writers, and actors; New Deal administrator Harry Hopkins 
justified federal support for artists by remarking, “Hell, they’ve got to eat like other 
people.”48 
The NEA differs fundamentally from WPA-era projects in that it was not 
intended to mitigate unemployment or to bolster a political vision of how the nation 
would regroup after economic devastation.49 Rooted in the early 1960s, in an era of 
economic prosperity and political optimism, the NEA is indebted to the leadership of 
President John F. Kennedy, and his special consultant on the arts, August Heckscher. 
Heckscher’s May 1963 report, “The Arts and the National Government,” frames the 
                                               
47 Mark A. Davidson, "Recording the Nation: Folk Music and the Government in Roosevelt’s New 
Deal, 1936-1941" (PhD diss., University of California, Santa Cruz, 2015), 10. 
48 Mark Bauerlein and Ellen Grantham, eds., National Endowment for the Arts: A History, 1965–2008 
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need for federal involvement in the arts in terms of a rising national interest in 
cultural pursuits (as he put it, “a recognition that life is more than the acquisition of 
material goods”) as well as a national interest in projecting cultural affluence. 
Heckscher wrote that “the United States will be judged—and its place in history 
ultimately assessed—not alone by its military or economic power, but by the quality 
of its civilization.”50 
As a result of Heckscher’s report, President Kennedy issued an executive 
order in June 1963 establishing the President’s Advisory Council on the Arts, with the 
purpose of studying the funding of the arts in the United States and identifying and 
evaluating existing federal policies affecting the arts and artists, submitting reports 
and recommendations to the President, encouraging and facilitating the effective use 
of resources, and promoting the importance of the arts and cultural institutions to U.S. 
welfare and international interests.51 
Simultaneously, in Congress, a bipartisan push led by senators Jacob Javitz 
(R-NY), Joseph Clark (D-PA), Hubert Humphrey (D-MN), and Claiborne Pell (D-RI) 
was made to create a federal endowment in the arts. Although the White House’s 
progress was slowed because of President Kennedy’s assassination in November 
1963, President Lyndon B. Johnson continued Kennedy’s momentum by hiring Roger 
L. Stevens as the first full-time presidential arts adviser; by contrast, Heckscher’s role 
under Kennedy was part-time and temporary.  
                                               
50 August Heckscher, "The Arts and the National Government: Report to the President," (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 1. 
51 Ibid., 35. 
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By September 1964, the Congressional efforts to establish a National Council 
on the Arts had passed the Senate, and on September 3, President Johnson signed the 
National Arts and Cultural Development Act of 1964, establishing a council with 
twenty-four members to “recommend ways to maintain and increase the cultural 
resources of the nation…and encourage and develop greater appreciation and 
enjoyment of the arts by its citizens.”52 In addition to noted writers, actors, architects, 
visual artists, and dancers, the first National Council on the Arts included musicians 
Marian Anderson, Leonard Bernstein, Isaac Stern, Rudolph Serkin, and Duke 
Ellington.53 
Finally, on September 29, 1965, President Johnson signed the National 
Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Acts, establishing the National 
Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities. With 
language reminiscent of Heckscher’s 1963 report, the 1965 Act argued that “the 
world leadership which has come to the United States cannot rest solely upon 
superior power, wealth, and technology, but must [also] be founded upon worldwide 
respect and admiration for the nation’s high qualities as a leader in the realm of ideas 
and of the spirit.”54 
Almost immediately, the NEA provoked resistance by Congress, with the first 
critical Congressional review of its programs in 1968, when the endowment’s budget 
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stood at $7.2 million (only .004% of total federal outlays).55 An early locus of 
controversy was a project undertaken in collaboration with the Rockefeller 
Foundation: the Theatre Development Fund (TDF), now known for its discount 
Broadway TKTS booths in New York City. Because the TDF helped stage 
productions that were unprofitable on Broadway, some critics in Congress castigated 
the program as a subsidy for unpopular esoterica. Representative Frank Bow (R-OH) 
alluded to the Vietnam War in his criticism of the program: “We cannot have guns 
and butter. And this is guns with strawberry shortcake covered with whipped cream 
and a cherry on top.”56 
Despite relentless attacks on its legitimacy—most notable during the 1990s 
during the aforementioned Gingrich revolution—the NEA has continued to garner 
financial support with an annual congressional appropriation of about $150 million 
per year.57 Although this outlay results in a small subsidy relative to private 
donations, endowment income, and ticket sales, the NEA has devoted more than $250 
million to U.S. orchestras since its founding.58 
Additional governmental dollars flow to orchestras via the state arts councils, 
George Will’s so-called “lobbying infrastructure;” since 1986, total annual state 
appropriations for the arts have actually surpassed NEA appropriations. In 2012, state 
                                               
55 “Fiscal Year 2016 Historical Tables: Budget of the U.S. Government,” Office of Management and 
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legislative appropriations totaled $260 million, whereas the congressional 
appropriation for the NEA was only $150 million.59  
The New York State Council on the Arts (NYSCA), founded in 1960, is the 
largest state agency with $36.2 million appropriated in 2012. Several states surpassed 
New York on a per capita basis, including Minnesota, Hawaii, Rhode Island, and 
Maryland. In 2012, total state legislative appropriations totaled $260 to state arts 
councils. This figure was augmented by $32.9 million from the National Endowment, 
for a total of more than $290 million, almost exactly twice the entire National 
Endowment congressional appropriation of $146 million.60 
The Minnesota State Arts Board is one of the oldest and most influential state 
arts councils in the country, and can trace its founding to 1903. During fiscal year 
2017, the Minnesota State Legislature appropriated nearly $38 million to the 
Minnesota State Arts Board. Of this amount, $30 million came from the state’s Arts 
and Cultural Heritage Fund, a product of the Clean Water, Land and Legacy 
Amendment to the Minnesota Constitution, passed in November 2008. The Clean 
Water, Land and Legacy Amendment created a miniscule state sales tax, with 19.75 
percent of the total sales tax received devoted to the Arts and Cultural Heritage Fund. 
The fact that the people of Minnesota voted for a tax increase benefitting the arts 
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during the height of the most recent economic recession is a testament to the state’s 
exceptional support for the arts and artists.61 
For 2011, Minnesota’s legislative appropriation was augmented by a 
comparatively small block grant from the NEA of $770,000. Of the State Arts 
Board’s $39 million in revenue, approximately $25 million was distributed to 
individual and institutional grantees and $11 million was allocated via block grant to 
Minnesota’s eleven regional arts councils to further decentralize and localize the 
federal and state funds.62 A large portion of the $25 million statewide grants go to 
theatre companies, orchestras, art museums and other institutions; the Guthrie Theatre 
in Minneapolis was the largest single grantee, with operating support of $1,053,958, 
while the Minnesota Orchestra received $697,185.63 
 Thus, although the NEA is the most visible source of direct government 
support, in most states, state and regional councils are the primary gatekeepers of tax 
dollars for arts organizations. But despite unusually large state outlays for the arts in 
Minnesota and several other states, direct tax support provides a negligible subsidy 
for most orchestras in the United States. 
 
Sources of Patronage: Corporations 
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 Like individuals, corporations may deduct all or some of their donations to 
charity against taxable income. Until the 2018 tax year and the passing of the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Acts (TCJA) tax reform in 2017, the United States had the highest 
statutory tax rate of all Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) member nations at 39 percent (35 percent federal plus the average of state 
corporate income tax rates). The TCJA lowers this amount to 25.7 percent (federal 
plus average state), moving the United States to an average rate compared to its 
OECD peers.64 
 But the pre-TCJA effective tax rate for corporations in the United States—the 
amount of tax a corporation pays divided by its income—way only about 29 percent, 
according to a 2012 study by the Congressional Budget Office.65 This drop—from 39 
percent to 29 percent—was the result of various deductions, including the charitable 
deduction. Thus, like individual taxpayers, corporations are strongly incentivized to 
make charitable deductions for purposes of tax mitigation. 
 Although the new lower corporate tax rate may lead to fewer and/or smaller 
corporate charitable contribution because the lower marginal rate could de-incentivize 
tax mitigation strategies, corporations make charitable contributions for many 
different reasons. A 2016 study of 125 U.S. corporations suggests that businesses 
consider the arts “to be important in building quality of life, stimulating creative 
thinking and problem solving, and offering networking opportunities and the potential 
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to develop new business and market share.”66 
 Although monetary gifts on behalf of a corporation or a corporation’s private 
foundation are most common, some companies also support the arts by maintaining a 
corporate art collection or presenting concerts or exhibitions in the workplace. Many 
larger businesses also offer employee matching programs wherein employee 
donations of cash, stock, or time are matched monetarily by the employer. An 
organization called Double the Donation collects information about corporate 
matching programs, and reports that 65 percent of Fortune 500 companies offer 
matching gift programs and that an estimated $2 to $3 billion is donated through 
matching gift programs annually.67  
Many of these matching programs exist alongside a corporate foundation. For 
example, the 3M Company—makers of post-it notes, dental drills, caution tape, and 
thousands of other products—operates the 3M Foundation, a charitable foundation 
that gave $73 million in 2017.68 Through its foundation, 3M is one of the top 
corporate sponsors of the Minnesota Orchestras, giving between $100,000 and 
$249,000 annually.69 In addition, 3M offers a gift matching program for all 
employees and retirees until the five-year anniversary of their retirement. The 
company matches employee gifts 1:1 and retiree gifts .5:1 for gifts to colleges and 
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universities up to $5,000 per calendar year. In addition, 3M will donate $500 for 
every 25 hours of volunteer service contributed by an employee to a nonprofit 
organization.70 These matching grants and volunteer hours contributed to a total 
contribution of $73.5 million and nearly 300,000 volunteer hours donated by 3M in 
2017.71 
Although corporate support for nonprofits often occurs at the intersection of 
the interests of employees and the needs of the community, corporations may also use 
charitable giving as a form of public relations and political lobbying as well. A 2018 
study by economists from the University of Chicago, the University of British 
Columbia, and Boston University found strong connections between foundations set 
up by large U.S. corporations and nonprofits connected to prominent national 
politicians. Specifically, the researchers found that a nonprofit with a politician sitting 
on its board is more than four times more likely to receive grants from a corporate 
foundation. Corporate foundation grants are even more likely if the politician happens 
to sit on a congressional committee being lobbied by the corporation.72 
The researchers estimate that over 7 percent of corporate charitable donations 
are used to influence politicians: “Applied to $18 billion worth of corporate 
philanthropy in 2014, that would amount to $1.3 billion, almost four times as much as 
total political action committee contributions that year and 40 percent more than the 
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corporations’ lobbying expenditures.”73 Although these findings do not suggest that 
all corporate donations are tainted by inconspicuous or opportunistic motives, they do 
color the importance of big-time corporate philanthropy. Sponsorship of major arts 
organizations, such as museums, symphony orchestras, and opera companies, can 
position corporations squarely in elite and/or politically connected circles.  
The 2018–19 San Francisco Opera season is sponsored by Wells Fargo, the 
banking giant trying to overcome a massive fraud involving millions of savings and 
checking accounts created on behalf of customers without their consent. By 
sponsoring the San Francisco Opera, Wells Fargo not only appears beneficent in the 
public sphere, but also may gain favor with the influential coterie of operagoers, such 
as current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, who regularly 
attends the season-opening San Francisco Opera Ball. Connections like these—
between corporations and politicians—suggest to some that corporate charitable 
donations represent a form of campaign finance law subterfuge, paid for by tax payers 
(via tax deductions), and brokered by nonprofit recipients.74 
Nonetheless, corporate donations provide a wealth of needed support to U.S. 
arts nonprofits. A 2012 study by the National Endowment for the Arts found that for 
the years 2006–10 corporate donations accounted for 8.4 percent of all revenue for 
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nonprofit performing arts groups and museums in the United States.75 Since at least 
the late 1980s contributions to orchestras from all private sources have increased, 
both as real dollars (inflation adjusted) and as a proportion of total orchestra revenues. 
But this increase has been largely due to growth in individual giving, while business 
giving has stagnated. In 1987 corporate donations to orchestras accounted for 29 
percent of all private support for orchestras but in 2005 business contributions 
accounted for only 16 percent of private support. By comparison, individual support 
shifted from 38 percent to 50 percent during the same span.76 
 
Sources of Patronage: Foundations  
  
Charitable foundations and trusts have existed since the birth of the United 
States. One of the first notable charitable trusts in the United States was established 
by Benjamin Franklin in 1790 to loan money to “married apprentices of upright 
behavior.”77 The Magdalen Society of Philadelphia, established in 1800 to help 
“unhappy females who have been seduced from the paths of virtue and who are 
desirous of returning to a life of rectitude,” was reorganized in the 1910s as the 
White-Williams Foundation with the broader mission to offer counseling to high 
school students. The name was changed again in 1994 to White-Williams Scholars to 
reflect its mission of supporting high school students; one of the oldest philanthropic 
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organizations in the United States, the organization exemplifies how charitable 
organizations iterate to adapt to current needs.78 
 A report prepared by the Twentieth-Century Fund in 1932, several years 
before the creation of the Ford Foundation, lists 129 charitable foundations in the 
United States, with assets ranging from $3,168 (the Princeton, NJ Community Trust) 
to $161,302,363 (the Carnegie Corporation of New York). The listed foundations 
gave between $127 (the Princeton Community Trust) and $15,876,403 (the General 
Education Board, a now defunct Rockefeller-adjunct charity) in grants, for a total of 
more than $50 million during the year. Fifty-five of the 129 foundations were based 
in New York City, representing nearly 80 percent of total U.S foundation capital.79 
 Of the top twenty largest foundations in terms of total assets in 1932, five 
were directly related to the fortune built by industrialist Andrew Carnegie in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although the Carnegie Corporation of New 
York was the largest foundation in the U.S. in 1932, Carnegie’s wealth also funded 
the Carnegie Institution of Washington ($35,413,454), the Carnegie Foundation for 
the Advancement of Teaching ($31,824,500), the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace ($11,720,978), and the Carnegie Hero Fund ($5,750,000). Taken 
together, these Carnegie institutions accounted for nearly $250 million in charitable 
capital in the early 1930s, equivalent to more than $4 billion in purchasing power in 
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2018.80 
 Although the Carnegie Corporation of New York was founded in 1911, and is 
the oldest of the modern grant-making foundations, Andrew Carnegie’s mission had 
first been expressed publicly twenty-two years earlier, in a June, 1889 article titled 
“Wealth” in the North American Review. In “Wealth,” Carnegie noted that the 
industrial revolution had brought not only great change, but also a new degree of 
inequality: “The contrast between the palace of the millionaire and the cottage of the 
laborer with us to-day measures the change which has come with civilization.”81 As a 
proud millionaire, Carnegie outlined the questions of what to do with his fortune: 
“What is the proper mode of administering wealth after the laws upon which 
civilization is founded have thrown it into the hands of the few?” Carnegie discussed 
three possibilities for the disposal of wealth: it can be left to families of the decedents, 
bequeathed for public purposes, or administered during life by its possessors.  
Carnegie argued that the first option was least desirable: “I would as soon 
leave to my son a curse as the almighty dollar.” He found the second to be lazy and 
unambitious: “It may fairly be said that no man is to be extolled for doing what he 
cannot help doing, nor is he to be thanked by the community to which he only leaves 
wealth at death.” Finally, Carnegie argued that the third option—the distribution of 
wealth during life—was the “true antidote for the temporary unequal distribution of 
wealth, the reconciliation of the rich and the poor—a reign of harmony.”82 
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 Although “Wealth” is typically cited as an elegant argument for the efficacy 
of philanthropy, it is also simultaneously a rebuke of socialism and government 
intervention. Carnegie argues that the free-market system—the one that he 
acknowledges made him exceedingly wealthy—is the best mode of human 
organization: “To those who propose to substitute Communism [as proposed by Karl 
Marx] for this intense individualism the answer, therefore, is: The [human] race has 
tried that. All progress from that barbarous day to the present time has resulted from 
its displacement. Not evil, but good, has come to the race from the accumulation of 
wealth by those who have the ability and energy that produce it.”  
Carnegie contends that the accumulation of wealth in the hands of producers 
like him is an intrinsically good thing, but he also pleads that attempting to change the 
system is a fool’s errand anyway, because the free-market system is the natural result 
of human nature and evolution: 
Even if we admit for a moment that it might be better for the race to discard 
its present foundation, Individualism—that it is a nobler ideal that man should 
labor, not for himself alone, but in and for a brotherhood of his fellows, and 
share with them all in common…this is not evolution but revolution. It 
necessitates the changing of human nature itself a work of eons, even if it 
were good to change it, which we cannot know. It is not practicable in our day 
or in our age.83 
 
Thus, in “Wealth” Carnegie offers not only a template for a new way of 
distributing money, but also a guide to the interlocking contours of capitalism and 
private philanthropy; the idea that the large-scale private distribution of wealth could 
serve as an antidote to societal ills as well as a bulwark against socialist government 
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interference would endure long past Carnegie’s death in 1919.  
Another enduring theme articulated in “Wealth” is the notion that 
philanthropy is most effective when it identifies and assists those individuals and 
organizations that are prepared to help themselves: “In bestowing charity, the main 
consideration should be to help those who will help themselves; to provide part of the 
means by which those who desire to improve may do so; to give those who desire to 
use the aids by which they may rise; to assist, but rarely or never to do all.”84  
In Carnegie’s mode of helping “those who will help themselves,” the first 
annual report of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1913 describes the Rockefeller 
Sanitary Commission’s massively successful efforts to eradicate hookworm in the 
southern United States not only in terms of curing the carriers of the disease, but also 
of engendering local understanding in how to battle the illness without Rockefeller 
intervention. “The work, if properly conducted, teaches the people by demonstration 
what the disease is, and what it means to them as a menace to health and working 
efficiency; it teaches them how they get it and how they may prevent it, and thus 
enlists their interest in carrying out the sanitary measures which are necessary for the 
control of the infection.”85 
The Rockefeller Foundation’s hookworm programs were expanded beyond 
the United States in ways that not only created awareness of the disease, but that also 
produced new local public health infrastructure. The 1913 report notes that in British 
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Guiana—now the country of Guyana—local authorities “have so thoroughly realized 
the benefit obtained from the expulsion of hookworm, and have so carefully realized 
the principles of reinfection, and the necessity of its prevention, that they have 
subscribed the necessary amount to maintain a Sanitary Inspector to devote his full 
time.”86 
 The 1932 report from the Twentieth Century Fund, a think tank founded in 
1919, found that private foundations overwhelmingly contributed to the areas of 
medicine and public health (31.4 percent of total foundation grants) and education 
(24.9 percent). The field of aesthetics—encompassing grants supporting arts 
education, research, and performance—encompassed 1.8 percent of total grants made 
in 1931, totaling $982,124.87 A report compiled in 2014 by the Foundation Center, an 
American organization that gathers data on U.S. foundations, notes that for the 2012 
calendar year U.S. foundations devoted an equal amount of aggregate total grants to 
health and education (22 percent to each), and 10 percent to arts and culture, 
suggesting that the bulk of philanthropic resources in the United States—as in 1931—
are still devoted to health and education.88  
In the 1930s, the Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Corporation partnered 
with the Public Works Administration—the large-scale construction agency created 
by the New Deal—to build new theater and art facilities at the University of Iowa. 
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The foundations contributed a combined $132,500 for construction and support of the 
theater department, which was headed by Edward C. Mabie. During his thirty-five-
year career, Professor Mabie, who also served as a regional director of the Works 
Progress Administration’s Federal Theater Project, managed to develop the 
University of Iowa into a center of graduate education in theater.89 
On a much larger scale than the support for the University of Iowa, the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s work with the Louisville Orchestra from 1953–58 
established the City of Louisville as a locus of contemporary orchestral music.90 
Wholly unique in scope and scale, the Louisville Orchestra commissioned and 
recorded hundreds of new pieces during the 1950s and 1960s with the support and 
encouragement of Charles D. Farnsley, who served as mayor of Louisville from 1948 
to 1953. Despite a lack of any formal training in music, Farnsley believed in the 
power of music as an educational tool, and invested public funds in a variety of 
projects that promulgated music for edifying purposes. 
Under Farnsley’s leadership, a nightly music history program aired on Radio 
Louisville and public libraries acquired thousands of LP records, which could be 
borrowed or enjoyed with audio equipment available at the individual branches. 
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Farnsley’s principal interest, though, was the Louisville Orchestra, founded in 1936. 
The first American orchestra to start its own record label, the Louisville Orchestra 
began commissioning new works in the late 1940s at an expense of $750 to $1,000. 
Composers could earn an extra $500 if they agreed to come to Louisville to conduct, 
and thus Louisville became an unlikely hotbed for new music.91   
A savvy proselytizer for Louisville and its orchestra, Farnsley leveraged his 
connections with composers Virgil Thomson and Otto Leuning to gain an audience 
with the Rockefeller Foundation. In a 1952 meeting with Edward F. D’Arms, the 
associate director of the Rockefeller Foundation’s humanities program, Farnsley 
emphasized the importance of the orchestra in the community: 
EFD [Edward F. D’Arms] found F[arnsley] a most engaging and imaginative 
person who is sincerely convinced of the importance and value of music and 
the arts. F believes that the people of Louisville are beginning to acquire a 
strong liking for music and particularly contemporary music and referred to 
the fact that these programs have helped Louisville to obtain new business 
firms. A General Electric plant, for example, was finally located in Louisville 
recently largely because of the cultural opportunities available in the 
community.92 
 
In response to Farnsley’s compelling pitch, which included giving D’Arms a 
miniature Louisville flag designed by Farnsley himself, the Rockefeller Foundation 
intensified the Louisville orchestra’s commissioning efforts with a $400,000 grant in 
1953. Noting the exceptional nature of the proposal, the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
grant approval noted: 
Startling as this proposal may seem on first acquaintance, it proves to have 
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surprising cogency. That Louisville should be its location is due to the 
initiative of the Louisville Philharmonic Society, first in having developed a 
fifty-piece orchestra capable of high-quality performance of such music as is 
now being written, and, second, in having established the practice of 
commissioning and performing such compositions on the more limited scale 
that now prevails…. By encouraging such an imaginative and artistically 
creative project in Louisville, a medium-sized interior city of our country, a 
tangible stimulus should be given to the decentralization of the musical life of 
this country.93 
 
In addition to the importance of stimulating musical appreciation in 
Louisville, the Rockefeller Foundation also understood the impact the Louisville 
recordings had on the perception of American society abroad. Upon granting an 
additional $100,000 to the orchestra in 1955, the foundation noted that the project 
“Was intended to be a demonstration that the United States, contrary to a widely 
prevalent opinion, maintains an interest in and provides a healthy environment for the 
arts.”94 
The Rockefeller Foundation’s support enabled the orchestra to commission, 
perform, and record dozens of new works per year by composers like Norman Dello 
Joio, Arthur Honegger, Heitor Villa-Lobos, Darius Milhaud, Paul Hindemith, Lou 
Harrison, and Virgil Thomson. Recordings were distributed to domestic radio outlets, 
such as the Voice of America and the National Association of Educational 
Broadcasters as well as international broadcasters, including Radio Free Europe. In 
addition, the recordings were sold as part of a subscription service by the Louisville 
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Orchestra’s in-house record label.95 
As the following ad from a December, 1955 issue of the New Yorker 
describes, for $32.50 (equivalent to about $300 in 2018) subscribers received six bi-
monthly new releases throughout 1956, plus a bonus record from the 1955 season:  
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Figure 1.1: A Full-page Advertisement for the Louisville’s Orchestra’s Contemporary Music 
Subscription Program in the December 10, 1955 edition of the New Yorker96 
The New Yorker, Dec 10, 1955 http://archives.newyorker.com/global/print.asp?path=/djvu/Con...
17 of 27 6/27/16, 9:59 AM
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Although many composers accepted the Louisville Orchestra’s commissions, 
some leading composers did not, despite the orchestra’s best efforts. Samuel Barber, 
Leonard Bernstein, Benjamin Britten, Carl Orff, Francis Poulenc, Edgard Varèse, and 
William Walton were all too busy to accept new commissions. Ralph Vaughan 
Williams, Arthur Honegger, and Ernest Bloch died before responding to the 
orchestra’s requests, and Carl Ruggles agreed to a commission but then stopped 
responding to the orchestra’s letters. Although the Rockefeller grants allowed the 
orchestra to offer most of the composers commissions in the range of $1,000 to 
$1,500, (about $8,800–$13,000 in 2018), Igor Stravinsky, when approached by the 
orchestra in 1950, agreed to accept a commission only if he was paid $7,500 for the 
work, $1,500 to conduct it in Louisville, and an extra $500 for expenses (the 
equivalent of $100,000 in 2018). This extraordinary offer was not accepted by the 
Louisville Orchestra.97  
Despite the artistic successes of the Louisville Orchestra, and the 116 
commissions completed from 1948 to 1958, the Louisville project ultimately failed to 
find commercial traction; the subscription sales of the recordings did not cover the 
associated expenses, and the orchestra never managed to achieve its record sales or 
attendance goals. By the mid-1950s it became clear that the project would not 
approach profitability, with fewer than a hundred subscriptions sold by the end of 
1954. The results were dismal locally as well, with only ten records purchased by 
                                               
96 The New Yorker, December 10, 1955, 87. 
97 "Louisville Philharmonic Society - Commissioning Project," September 30, 1955, box 372, RG 1.2, 
Rockefeller Foundation Records, RAC. 
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Louisville residents.98 
In an October 1955 article, Harold Schonberg, music critic for The New York 
Times, noted artistic successes and financial weaknesses of the Louisville project: 
Louisville has a problem. Any sales representative of a major record company 
would have laughed out loud at the mere possibility of selling enough sets of 
modern music, at $65 a set, to begin to approach the sum of money desired. 
To say that the Louisville officials were a little naïve would be the 
understatement of the year.... On the other hand—and when discussing 
modern music there always is another hand—the actual merit of the music in 
question is less important than the fact that the composer has had a forum.... 
Whatever the final result, Louisville can glory in a stand well taken. Those 
responsible for the idea have fought the good fight, breaking away from the 
oppressive stagnation that has enveloped so many musical organizations.99 
  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter demonstrates the complex patchwork of funding sources that 
support U.S. arts organizations. A constantly shifting balance between earned income, 
contributions, and direct government grants nourish U.S. symphony orchestras and 
other nonprofits. But no single piece was as influential to U.S. nonprofits as the Ford 
Foundation’s emergence in the early 1950s as the most important philanthropic force 
in the United States and abroad.  
Although the Rockefeller and Carnegie organizations dominated the large-
scale Foundation philanthropic activity in the first half of the twentieth century, the 
                                               
98 Mauskapf, “Enduring Crisis, Ensuring Survival,” 188. 
99 Harold C. Schonberg, “Noble Effort: Louisville Does its Best for Modern Music,” The New York 
Times, October 15, 1955. 
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nascent Ford Foundation, founded in 1936, redefined the possibilities of foundation 
support for the arts beginning in the mid-1950s. Unlike the Carnegie and Rockefeller 
programs in Iowa and Louisville, the Ford Foundation’s Program in the Humanities 
and the Arts emerged from the foundation’s broader agenda to influence the entire 
orchestra business in the United States. Subsequently, it transformed the role of 
private support for orchestras and served as a blueprint for the National Endowment 
for the Arts. 
In the following chapter I describe the development of the Ford Foundation 
from its modest roots in the 1930s to its world-historical influence in the mid-1950s 
and seek to situate the genesis of the Program in the Humanities and the Arts within 
the foundation’s broader activities and objectives. 
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CHAPTER 2.  
The Ford Foundation and the Program in the Humanities and the Arts 
  
 
Introduction 
 
 The Ford Foundation was created in 1936 in Detroit to administer and execute 
the Ford family’s charitable activities. Founded in 1903, the Ford Motor Company 
controlled 55 percent of market share in the U.S. automotive industry by 1923, 
making Henry Ford (1863–1947) one of the wealthiest people in American history.100 
Although the Ford Motor Company initially included investors outside the Ford 
Family, Henry Ford bought out the outside shareholders and reorganized the company 
into a family-owned and managed corporation in 1919.101 
Ford’s only child, Edsel Ford (1893–1943) joined the Ford Motor Company’s 
board of directors in 1915 and gradually took over leadership of the company from 
his father; by 1919 he owned 41.7 percent of the company stock. In addition to their 
profitable automotive pursuits, both father and son served in various nonprofit 
capacities in Detroit and elsewhere.102 Henry Ford Hospital was founded by the Ford 
Family in Detroit in 1915, and subsequently evolved into the Henry Ford Health 
                                               
100 A 2007 ranking of the wealthiest Americans in history places Henry Ford’s total fortune at $54 
billion in 2007 dollars behind both Andrew Carnegie ($75 billions), and John D. Rockefeller ($192 
billion). See Tom Jackson and others, “The Wealthiest Americans Ever,” New York Times, July 15, 
2007. 
101 Brittany Lynn Kienker, "The Henry Ford: Sustaining Henry Ford's Philanthropic Legacy" (PhD 
diss., Indiana University, 2013), 27. 
102 Kienker, "The Henry Ford: Sustaining Henry Ford's Philanthropic Legacy," 28. 
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System, one of the largest health care systems in Michigan. Henry Ford was 
particularly interested in education and historical preservation and he founded a small 
experiential school system in 1929 that primarily educated the children of Ford Motor 
Company employees and their neighbors; part of this education involved teaching 
trades—such as how to fix Ford cars.103 
 Central to the Ford family’s early philanthropic efforts was the Edison 
Institute, an umbrella organization encompassing Henry Ford’s educational and 
historical preservation efforts. Henry Ford was a voracious collector of American 
antiques, particularly watches and clocks. As his personal collection grew, Ford used 
his company’s resources to house and maintain the artifacts he accumulated, 
including an empty tractor warehouse and assembly plant building attached to the 
company’s engineering facility.104 Ford’s restoration efforts evolved into the 
sprawling nonprofit Edison Institute in Dearborn, Michigan, now known as the Henry 
Ford, encompassing museums, exhibits, historic re-enactments, as well as Henry 
Ford’s childhood home and the one-room schoolhouse he attended as a child.105 
 Incorporated in 1929, the Edison Institute embodied Henry Ford’s interest in 
teaching people about history, particularly as it related to agriculture, transportation, 
and industry.106 But the institute also evolved into a romanticized showcase of the 
transition from the agrarian world in which Ford was born to the industrial world in 
which he ruled. Although the institute continues to serve an educational purpose, it 
                                               
103 Ibid., 29. 
104 Ibid., 31. 
105 See https://www.thehenryford.org/visit/greenfield-village/districts, accessed October 15, 2018. 
106 Kienker, "The Henry Ford: Sustaining Henry Ford's Philanthropic Legacy,” 42. 
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tells a story in which Henry Ford is the key protagonist, the world-historical figure 
who created the automotive age. 
 Furthermore, the institute provided a means to mitigate the Ford family’s 
federal tax burden. In the early years of the Edison Institute, Ford was able to deduct 
up to 15 percent of his annual income for charitable donations, while also using the 
staff of the Ford Motor Company to administer the institute’s day-to-day operations. 
Prior to 1936, Henry Ford’s personal contributions to the Edison Institute totaled 
more than $33 million (approximately $500 million in 2018 dollars).107  
Initiated with a $25,000 gift from Edsel Ford, the Ford Foundation’s early 
activities supported hometown organizations, like the Detroit Symphony, Henry Ford 
Hospital, and the Edison Institute.108 As shown in Table 2.1, tax law changes in the 
early 1930s raised the marginal income tax rate while maintaining the charitable 
deduction up to 15 percent of net income.
                                               
107 Kienker, "The Henry Ford: Sustaining Henry Ford's Philanthropic Legacy," 50. 
108 Patricia Rosenfield and Rachel Wimpee, "The Ford Foundation: Themes, 1936-2001," (Tarrytown, 
NY: The Rockefeller Archive Center, 2015), 3. 
  
 
 
Table 2.1: Individual Income Tax Rate Changes from 1925 - 1940 and Approximate Tax Liability for an Individual Earning $10,000,000109 
Year 
Charitable 
Deduction 
Normal 
Tax Surtax ($) 
Top Surtax 
Net Income 
($) 
Top Surtax 
Rate ($) 
Tax Liability After 
Charitable Deduction 
($) 
Effective 
(Average 
Rate) 
        
1925 15% 6% 170,020        500,000  40%     3,880,020  38.80% 
1926 15% 5% 11,660        100,000  20%     2,116,660  21.17% 
1927 15% 5% 11,660        100,000  20%     2,116,660  21.17% 
1928 15% 5% 11,660        100,000  20%     2,116,660  21.17% 
1929 15% 5% 11,660        100,000  20%     2,116,660  21.17% 
1930 15% 5% 11,660        100,000  20%     2,116,660  21.17% 
1931 15% 5% 11,660        100,000  20%     2,116,660  21.17% 
1932 15% 8% 491,460     1,000,000  55%     5,296,460  52.96% 
1933 15% 8% 491,460     1,000,000  55%     5,296,460  52.96% 
1934 15% 4% 533,000     1,000,000  59%     5,298,000  52.98% 
1935 15% 4% 533,000     1,000,000  59%     5,298,000  52.98% 
1936 15% 4% 3,591,000     5,000,000  75%     6,556,000  65.56% 
1937 15% 4% 3,591,000     5,000,000  75%     6,556,000  65.56% 
1938 15% 4% 3,591,000     5,000,000  75%     6,556,000  65.56% 
1939 15% 4% 3,591,000     5,000,000  75%     6,556,000  65.56% 
1940 15% 4% 3,597,780     5,000,000  75%     6,562,780  65.63% 
                                               
109 The normal tax is the normal tax rate multiplied by total income less the charitable deduction. The total surtax is the top surtax amount, plus the 
top surtax rate times the amount of total income less the charitable deduction over the top surtax net income. The total of the normal tax and the 
surtax is the total tax liability. For example, for 1925, the formula is thus: (6% * ($10,000,000 - $1,500,000)) + ($170,020 + (40% * (($10,000,000 - 
$1,500,000) - $500,000))) = $3,880,020. The effective tax rate is the average taxation rate. It is calculated by dividing total tax liability by income. 
See Internal Revenue Service, Form 1040, Years 1925–1940, irs.gov. 
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The creation of the Ford Foundation had two main tax ramifications. First, in 
the short-term, donations to the foundation were deductible up to 15 percent of net 
income, like the earlier donations to the Edison Institute and elsewhere. But second, 
and more importantly, the establishment of the family foundation mitigated the effect 
of transfer taxes (estate taxes) from Henry Ford to his heirs. 
In the first decade of the twentieth century, when there was no permanent 
federal income or estate tax in the United States, President Theodore Roosevelt 
advocated for a progressive income tax—in which the tax rate increases as taxable 
income increases—as well as an inheritance tax on large estates.110 This political 
atmosphere—in which new taxes aimed at curbing income inequality seemed 
imminent—contributed to the establishment of the Carnegie Corporation of New 
York (1911) and the Rockefeller Foundation (1913). In 1913, the sixteenth 
amendment the U.S. Constitution was passed, giving Congress the power “to lay and 
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment 
among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”111 
Furthermore, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1916, creating a tax on the transfer 
of wealth from an estate to its beneficiaries: 
  
                                               
110 Darien Jacobson, Brian Raub, and Barry Johnson, “The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting,” 
Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income Bulletin, June 22, 2007, 120. 
111 U.S. Const., amend. XVI. 
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Table 2.2: Estate Tax Exemptions and Rates112 
    
Year(s) Exemption Top Rate Top Bracket 
1916  $           50,000  10%  $   5,000,000  
1917  $           50,000  25%  $ 10,000,000  
1918–1923  $           50,000  25%  $ 10,000,000  
1924–1925  $           50,000  40%  $ 10,000,000  
1926–1931  $         100,000  20%  $ 10,000,000  
1932–1933  $           50,000  45%  $ 10,000,000  
1934  $           50,000  60%  $ 10,000,000  
1935–1939  $           40,000  70%  $ 50,000,000  
1940  $           40,000  70%  $ 50,000,000  
1941  $           40,000  77%  $ 10,000,000  
1942–1976  $           60,000  77%  $ 10,000,000  
1977  $         120,000  70%  $   5,000,000  
1978  $         134,000  70%  $   5,000,000  
1979  $         147,000  70%  $   5,000,000  
1980  $         161,000  70%  $   5,000,000  
1981  $         175,000  70%  $   5,000,000  
1982  $         225,000  65%  $   4,000,000  
1983  $         275,000  60%  $   3,500,000  
1984  $         325,000  55%  $   3,000,000  
1985  $         400,000  55%  $   3,000,000  
1986  $         500,000  55%  $   3,000,000  
1987–1997  $         600,000  55%  $   3,000,000  
1998  $         625,000  55%  $   3,000,000  
1999  $         650,000  55%  $   3,000,000  
2000–2001  $         675,000  55%  $   3,000,000  
2002  $      1,000,000  50%  $   2,500,000  
2003  $      1,000,000  49%  $   2,000,000  
2004  $      1,500,000  48%  $   2,000,000  
2005  $      1,500,000  47%  $   2,000,000  
2006  $      2,000,000  46%  $   2,000,000  
2007–2008  $      2,000,000  45%  $   1,500,000  
2009  $      3,500,000  45%  $   1,500,000  
2010  $      5,000,000  35%  $      500,000  
2011  $      5,000,000  35%  $      500,000  
2012  $      5,120,000  35%  $      500,000  
2013  $      5,250,000  40%  $   1,000,000  
2014  $      5,340,000  40%  $   1,000,000  
2015  $      5,430,000  40%  $   1,000,000  
2016  $      5,450,000  40%  $   1,000,000  
2017  $      5,490,000  40%  $   1,000,000  
2018  $    11,180,000  40%  $   1,000,000  
 
                                               
112 The exemption amount is the amount of the transfer that is exempt from estate taxes; any amount 
above the exemption is subject to estate taxes. The top rate is the marginal rate paid on income above 
the exemption and the top bracket. See Jacobson, Raub, and Johnson, “The Estate Tax: Ninety Years 
and Counting,” 122; and Internal Revenue Service, Form 706, Years 2008–2018, irs.gov. 
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Under the original estate tax, transfers of wealth over $50,000 were taxed at a 
marginal rate ranging from 1 percent to 10 percent. From the early 1940s to the mid 
1970s however, 77% of transfers over $10 million could be payable in estate taxes, 
representing a colossal burden to extremely high wealth individuals.113 With Henry 
Ford’s health declining in the mid-1930s, it became apparent that formal action was 
needed if he were to circumvent Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s estate tax hikes; the 
deaths of Henry and Edsel would trigger hundreds of millions in estate taxes if they 
transferred their wealth directly to their heirs.114 The Ford family elided these taxes 
by transferring 90 percent of their shares to the newly-formed Ford Foundation. In 
addition, to retain control of voting power over the company, two share classes of 
stock were created, with 95 percent of the company stock functioning as non-voting, 
and 5 percent as voting. The voting shares were held by the family members while the 
non-voting shares were given to the foundation.115 Because the majority of Henry and 
Edsel’s wealth consisted in Ford Motor Company stock—which was not publicly 
traded until the late 1950s—hundreds of millions of dollars in stock would have 
needed to be sold to satisfy the estate tax bill, and control of the Ford Motor 
Company would have escaped the control of its founder and his direct heirs.116 
Thus, by leaving their Ford Motor Company holdings to the Ford Foundation, 
                                               
113 See Jacobson, Raub, and Johnson, “The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting,” 122. 
114 Kienker, "The Henry Ford: Sustaining Henry Ford's Philanthropic Legacy," 62. 
115 Ibid., 63. 
116 For a concise summary of the estate tax planning implications of charitable foundations owning 
private companies, and proposed tax legislation in the early 1950s intended to curb this practice, see 
Francis W. Sams, “Control of Closely Held Family Corporations Through Charitable Foundations,” 
American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 42, No. 3 (March 1956), 278-279. 
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Henry and Edsel guaranteed that control of the company was maintained by the Ford 
Foundation and the foundation’s chairman, Henry Ford II, Edsel’s son. Furthermore, 
the estate tax savings for the Ford family amounted to approximately $280 million 
(about $5 billion in 2018 dollars).117  
The original bequest of Edsel Ford allowed for the Ford Foundation to tackle 
various issues in Detroit, but with such a small endowment, the foundation was not 
among the larger foundations in the United States. In 1937, when the Ford 
Foundation’s endowment totaled only $25,000, at least twenty-five U.S. foundations 
had assets of at least five million. In the 1930s and early 1940s the Ford Foundation 
was not even the largest foundation in the state of Michigan, and was dwarfed by 
national institutions such as the Rockefeller ($184 million) and Carnegie ($164 
million) Foundations, as well as defunct organizations such as the Le Tourneau 
Foundation ($12 million), and highly specialized organizations such as the Juilliard 
Musical Foundation ($12 million).118  
Upon Edsel’s death in 1943 and Henry’s in 1947, the foundation received 
Ford Motor Company stock valued privately at $417 million. But because the stock 
had been held entirely by Henry and Edsel since 1919 and had no established market 
value, its worth was purely an estimate. Nonetheless, because of these bequests, by 
the end of the 1940s the Ford Foundation’s endowment stood at more than three times 
the size of its closest competitor, the Rockefeller Foundation.119 
                                               
117 Kienker, "The Henry Ford: Sustaining Henry Ford's Philanthropic Legacy," 64. 
118 The Large Foundations," 1960, box 3, Ford Foundation records, Office of the President, Office 
Files of Henry T. Heald, RAC. 
119 Valued at $417,137,580 ($3.8 billion in 2017) in 1952, the Ford Foundation’s endowment has 
  
65  
 
In 1948 the foundation formed a committee made up of “men widely known 
and respected in such fields as education, medicine and public health, the natural 
sciences, political science and government, the social sciences, the humanities, and 
modern business and industry,” to “block out in general terms those critical areas 
where problems were most serious and where the Foundation might make the most 
significant contributions to human welfare.”120  Headed by H. Rowan Gaither, an 
attorney and banker who would later become president of the Ford Foundation, the 
committee proposed five broad areas on which the foundation should focus its efforts: 
1. The Establishment of Peace 
2. The Strengthening of Democracy 
3. The Strengthening of the Economy 
4. Education in a Democratic Society 
5. Individual Behavior and Human Relations121 
 
To sum up the overall mission, then-President of the Ford Motor Company 
and Chairman of the Ford Foundation Henry Ford II, grandson of Henry Ford, 
outlined the newly wealthy foundation’s mission:  
The people of this country and mankind in general are confronted with 
problems which are vast in number and exceedingly disturbing in 
significance. While important efforts to solve these problems are being made 
by government, industry, foundations, and other institutions, it is evident that 
new resources, such as those of this Foundation, if properly employed, can 
result in significant contributions.122 
                                               
generally mirrored the performance of the U.S. stock market, rising through the 1950s and 1960s, 
stagnating in the 1970s, rocketing upwards through the 1980s and 1990s, and then falling during the 
dot-com crisis of the early 2000s, and the great recession of 2007-2009. For an in-depth financial 
history of the Ford Foundation and the performance of its endowment, see Appendix 1. 
"The Large Foundations," 1960, box 3, Ford Foundation records, Office of the President, Office Files 
of Henry T. Heald, RAC. 
120 The Ford Foundation, Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program (Detroit: 
The Ford Foundation, 1949), 10. 
121 The Ford Foundation, Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program, 49. 
122 Report of the Trustees of the Ford Foundation: September 27, 1950, (Detroit, MI: The Ford 
Foundation, 1950), 4. 
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 The five program areas of the Gaither Report would shape the evolution of the 
Ford Foundation from its provincial origins in the late 1940s to its complex 
international efforts in the late 1950s. Although these five areas for action eventually 
merged into a more general social justice approach in the late 1960s, I discuss them in 
detail here because they set the tone for the engagement of the Ford Foundation for 
years after their obsolescence as discrete organizational categories.  
 
Program Area 1: The Establishment of Peace  
 
“The Ford Foundation will support activities that promise significant 
contributions to world peace and the establishment of a world of law and 
justice.”123 
 
In 1951—the first year in which financial figures were published in an annual 
report—the foundation awarded fewer than fifty grants for a total of just over $22 
million. Governmental and non-governmental organizations in India and Pakistan 
were allocated millions for projects supporting education in agriculture and 
engineering, as well as training in “home economics” for rural Pakistani women.124 In 
support of the organization’s mission in South Asia, the Ford Foundation established 
its first international office in New Delhi in 1952. Built at the invitation of Jawaharlal 
Nehru, India’s first post-independence Prime Minister, the Delhi office is a palatial 
space in the historic Lodi Gardens, which at its apex employed hundreds of staff 
                                               
123 Report of the Trustees of the Ford Foundation: September 27, 1950, 19. 
124 See the Ford Foundation: Annual Report for 1951 (Pasadena, CA: The Ford Foundation, 1951). 
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members, maintained a private guesthouse for visiting dignitaries and consultants, 
and kept two private jets available for staff transportation.125 
After establishing independence and ratifying a democratic constitution, India 
was the perfect laboratory for the Ford Foundation to work toward establishing peace 
in a country with untested democratic institutions. In accordance with the 
foundation’s enduring mission to help people help themselves, educational programs 
formed the core of modernization efforts, both by the Indian Government and the 
Ford Foundation: “Through the village development projects, the villagers learn 
improved methods in agriculture, public health, and social education, and are assisted 
in adapting better practices to their own situation.”126  
In addition to the New Delhi office and its headquarters in New York City, the 
foundation gradually opened outposts in Nairobi, Cairo, Johannesburg, Lagos, 
Beijing, Jakarta, Santiago, Rio de Janeiro, and Mexico City. Consistent with the 
Marshall Plan—which was administered by Paul G. Hoffman before he became 
president of the Ford Foundation in 1950—the newly international foundation 
initially heavily supported German institutions, most notably the Free University of 
Berlin, which received $1.3 million “for the improvement of its plant and the 
extension of its work.”127 The result of Soviet control over the original University of 
Berlin (now known as the Humboldt University of Berlin), the Free University of 
Berlin was established in 1948 as a contrast to the “un-free” former institution. The 
                                               
125 See Larissa MacFarquhar, “What Money Can Buy: Darren Walker and the Ford Foundation set out 
to Conquer Inequality,” The New Yorker, January 4, 2016. 
126 The Ford Foundation: Annual Report for 1952 (Pasadena, CA: The Ford Foundation, 1952), 16. 
127 The Ford Foundation: Annual Report for 1951, 15. 
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most visible result of the foundation’s support is the Henry Ford building, which 
houses the university’s library and is protected by the City of Berlin as an historic 
monument.128 
The East European Fund, an independent nonprofit created by the Ford 
Foundation in 1951, received millions for projects related to helping exiles from the 
Soviet Union become acclimated in the United States. It also created a company 
called the Chekhov Publishing Company to 
print in Russian some of the classics of Russian and Western literature and 
other books by Russian that are not now available in the Russian language. In 
this way it is hoped that Russian people may resume touch with the common 
spiritual and cultural heritage of the world.129 
 
Until its closure in 1956, the Chekhov Publishing Company published, in 
Russian, pre-Soviet Russian literature, works by Soviet writers that had been 
suppressed in the Soviet Union for political reasons, and translations of books about 
the United States and U.S. history. For example, Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We, published 
in English in 1924, describes a dystopian futuristic communist society. Immediately 
banned by Soviet authorities, the text was not published in Russian until the Chekhov 
Publishing Company released it in 1952.130 An undeniable inspiration for more 
famous dystopian classics like Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1931) and George 
Orwell’s 1984 (1949), We was not available in the Soviet Union until 1988. 
Russian-speaking emigrants interested in U.S. history and culture could read 
                                               
128 “Henry Ford Building of Freie Universität Berlin,” http://www.fu-berlin.de/en/sites/hfb/, accessed 
October 14, 2018. 
129 The Ford Foundation: Annual Report for 1951, 12. 
130 Michael Karpovich, “The Chekhov Publishing House,” The Russian Review, 1957. 
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biographies such as Herbert Agar’s Abraham Lincoln, and George Kennan’s The 
Realities of American Foreign Policy. Winston Churchill’s epic The Second World 
War was also translated into Russian. In total more than one hundred and fifty titles 
were published by the Chekhov Publishing Company and the East European Fund 
between 1952 and 1956.131 
The Ford Foundation sustained criticism from the early 1950s for its activities 
at home and abroad, particularly regarding those perceived as socialist. In 1965, 
under the headline “U.S. Has 2 Faces in Regard to Reds, Italian Discloses” the Miami 
Herald reported that: 
Renato Guttuso, a Roman painter, member of the top-level Central Committee 
of the Communist Party, has revealed that Luigi Nono, a Milanese composer, 
was offered a $20,000 grant by Ford last summer for a year’s study in West 
Berlin. Nono refused the alleged offer and reported his renunciation in writing 
to Guttuso, his party superior.132 
 
The article alleges that Nono, despite his communist sympathies, was offered 
a visa to enter the United States because he was a favorite of the Ford Foundation. 
After receiving threats of boycotts, Ford Motor Company executives wrote to Ford 
Foundation president Henry T. Heald requesting an investigation. Ford Foundation 
staff quickly concluded that Nono had never been offered a grant, and that the 
foundation had never contacted the State Department concerning Nono’s visa 
status.133  
                                               
131 Karpovich, “The Chekhov Publishing House,” The Russian Review, 1957. 
132 George Weller, “U.S. Has 2 Faces in Regard to Reds, Italian Discloses,” Miami Herald-Chicago 
Daily News Wire, February 20, 1965. 
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Suggesting not only that the Ford Foundation offered a grant equivalent in 
2016 dollars of more than $150,000 to an Italian communist, but also more 
insidiously that the Ford Foundation had the power to influence the U.S. Department 
of State concerning visa applications, the Herald article confirmed to many cynics 
that the Ford Foundation held an at best leftist, at worst anti-American objectives. An 
institution with seemingly inexhaustible resources, an opaque organizational 
structure, and sometimes contradictory objectives, the foundation has constantly been 
the locus of suspicion both domestically and internationally. 
 
Program Area 2: The Strengthening of Democracy  
 
“The Ford Foundation will support activities designed to secure greater 
allegiance to the basic principles of freedom and democracy in the solution of 
the insistent problems of an ever-changing society.”134 
 
In 1951 the foundation allocated $15 million to found the Fund for the 
Republic in Santa Barbara, California. The fund was created to promote civil liberties 
and study the balance between individual freedoms and the protection of national 
security. Towards the mission of “Strengthening of Democracy” as outlined in 
Gaither’s report, the fund supported projects that might be too provocative for the 
Ford Foundation: 
In that report, the Foundation recognized the following facts: First, that one of 
the major problems of any democratic society is how to secure greater 
allegiance to the basic principles of freedom and democracy in an ever-
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changing world. There is real danger that the gap between profession [sic] and 
pursuit of the ideals of American freedom may widen under the tensions and 
pressure of the international crisis. Second, that the spread of Communism 
represents one of the most critical threats to the American public welfare. And 
third, that some of the measures taken to deal with the threat of Communism 
in themselves pose grave problems concerning traditional freedoms.135 
 
The fund’s charter acknowledged both that communism represented a serious 
threat to Americans, but also that the perception of a threat invited a disproportionate 
response from the U.S. government and the public. In the context of Senator Joseph 
McCarthy’s efforts to root out accused communists, as well as the permanent status 
afforded the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1945, the fund’s first 
large grant was to the American Bar Foundation to study congressional 
investigations. In addition, the fund supported studies on religion in schools, 
communism, blacklisting, and housing discrimination, with a focus on de-segregation 
in the South.136 
Despite its ostensible independence, public disapproval for the activities of the 
Fund for the Republic were often directed at the Ford Foundation. Already branded as 
an organization with a “leftist slant,” the activities of the Fund for the Republic 
crystalized the suspicions of the Ford Foundation within the minds of many 
Americans.137 And, as criticism for the Fund for the Republic spilled over to the Ford 
Foundation, disapproval for the Ford Foundation bourgeoned into denunciations of 
                                               
135 See "Supplement B to Statement of H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., to the Special Committee to Investigate 
Tax Exempt Foundations, House of Representatives, 83rd Congress: History of the Establishment of 
the Fund for the Republic," September 29th, 1955, box 222, report 005019, Ford Foundation records, 
Catalogued Reports, Reports, RAC. 
136 Rosenfield and Wimpee, "The Ford Foundation: Themes, 1936-2001," 7. 
137 William Fulton, “Leftist Slant Begins to Show in Ford Trust,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 19, 
1951. 
  
72  
 
the Ford Motor Company. Various letter writing campaigns encouraged Ford owners 
to personally write Henry Ford II—then CEO of the Ford Motor Company and 
Chairman of the Ford Foundation—to announce a boycott of Ford cars. One of 
hundreds of variations on a theme, a Dallas housewife wrote in 1965: “None of our 
family buys Fords, Mercury’s [sic], or Lincolns because the Ford Foundation tends to 
favor left wing projects. Oh that the real Henry Ford were with us! He’d trust LBJ as 
far as he could throw him.”138 
Letter-writers accused the Fund for the Republic, the Ford Foundation, or the 
Ford Motor Company of being “infiltrated by Jews,” smelling “to high heaven of 
Communism and internationalism,” and “backing pagan immorality.”139 Programs 
that supported de-segregation efforts received particularly caustic responses. A 
member of the Mississippi State Legislature wrote: “I think God made the white 
person white for a purpose and made the Negro black for a purpose, and didn’t intend 
for the Ford Foundation or any other organization to change it to a mongrel race.”140 
The Ford Foundation’s National Achievement Scholars Program drew the ire from a 
Tampa, Florida parent who wrote: 
I was greatly angered when my teen-aged daughter brought home her Student 
Information Bulletin regarding the National Merit Test and I read of the 
National Achievement Scholarship Program for Negro students. Isn’t this 
discrimination against the white student? I was amazed that your company 
would sponsor such a program thru [sic] the Ford Foundation. I own two late 
model Falcons and a ’52 Ford but I’ll not buy any more Ford products. Let’s 
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give the white kids a break for a change.141 
 
In the context of reactionary anti-communist panic, the foundation’s mandate 
to “strengthen democracy” was interpreted by many in the United States as socialist 
and by extension unpatriotic. Henry Ford II, chairman of the foundation in the early 
1950s, and president of the Ford Motor Company from 1945 to 1960, was the 
recipient of most of the public criticism of the foundation’s activities, despite his lax 
involvement with the foundation’s day-to-day activities. On claims that the 
foundation harbored communist intentions, Ford II remarked in 1955: “The American 
Legion used to claim we were full of Communists…. Once I was called a Communist 
myself, at a social gathering, by a very influential woman…. You call someone a 
Communist when you don’t agree with him. I don’t agree with [Senator Joseph] 
McCarthy, so I suppose that makes me a Communist.”142 
By contrast, the foundation’s international efforts were interpreted abroad in 
the exact opposite way. The conclusion was not altogether unreasonable; the 1948 
Gaither Report includes the statement “as the tide of communism mounts in Asia and 
Europe, the position of the United States is crucial.…The United States appears to be 
the only country able to provide even a part of the urgently needed assistance.”143 
While it was interested in probing the anti-communist mania in the United States, the 
Ford Foundation was simultaneously focused on promoting democracy and free 
                                               
141 Letter from M.S. Heffner to Henry Ford II Concerning the National Merit Test, February 28, 1965, 
box 4, Ford Foundation records, Office of the President, Office Files of Henry T. Heald, RAC. 
142 Dwight MacDonald, "Profiles: Foundation," The New Yorker, December 10, 1955, 78. 
143 The Ford Foundation, Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program, 1949, 
27. 
  
74  
 
markets abroad. Historian Hugh Wilford describes the American mentality after the 
Second World War:  
The United States had the upper hand in many dimensions of the rapidly 
developing Cold War. Economically, it was clearly the strongest power on 
earth…and it still enjoyed sole possession of the atom bomb. However, in an 
equally important theater of this new kind of international conflict—the 
ideological struggle between capitalism and communism for the “hearts and 
minds” of nonaligned peoples around the world—its advantages were far less 
obvious.144 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, governments play a larger role in direct support for 
the arts and the humanities in Europe than they do in the United States. Whereas 
private philanthropy fills this void in the United States, in Europe large-scale 
charitable giving is relatively uncommon, and in some cases viewed with suspicion. 
The late French-born economist and art historian John Michael Montias noted in 1986 
that in France “the patronage of private individuals and firms is regarded with 
suspicion, for fear of money-minded interference. The tendency is to ‘demand more 
state intervention because it offers better guarantees of liberty and equality.’”145 
Emblematic of a bureaucratic, institutional form of philanthropy, the Ford 
Foundation was viewed with heightened curiosity in the 1950s as it expanded its 
operation abroad. In his four-part series on the Ford Foundation for the New Yorker in 
1955, Dwight MacDonald cited a letter from an American sociologist working in 
Paris on a Ford Foundation grant: “Some [French intellectuals] suspect that these 
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foundations are some sort of quasi-official intelligence agencies working for the State 
Department under cover of scientific respectability. Giving one’s private goods for 
public welfare on such a scale just doesn’t fit with French experience. Of course, the 
motivation is complex, and Americans don’t wholly understand it, either. But they 
believe it. The French just don’t believe it.”146 
Darren Walker, President of the Ford Foundation since 2013, recognizes that 
throughout much of its history the Ford Foundation was ideologically aligned with 
the U.S. government in its promotion of a liberal international order based on 
promoting democratic values, open markets, and durable civil institutions. In a 2018 
essay in Foreign Affairs, Walker writes: “During much of the last century, 
philanthropic foundations based in the United States exported American ideals about 
democracy, market economies, and civil society. That mission was made possible by 
ideological support from and alignment with the U.S. government, which, in turn, 
imbued foundations with prestige and influence as they operated around the 
world.”147 
 In fact, many high-ranking Ford Foundation officials were directly involved 
in anti-communist efforts with the U.S. Government or influential non-governmental 
organizations in the post-World War II period. H. Rowan Gaither, who chaired the 
foundation’s Study Committee in the late 1940s and served as president of the 
foundation from 1953 to 1956, was a founder of the Rand Corporation, a think tank 
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entangled in the Cold War arms race. Paul G. Hoffman, president of the Ford 
Foundation from 1950 to 1953, headed the Economic Cooperation Administration, 
the U.S. Government agency created to administer the Marshall Plan from 1948 until 
1950.  
McGeorge Bundy, Ford Foundation president from 1966 to 1979, was also 
intimately involved with the Marshall Plan as a member of the Council on Foreign 
Relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Before joining the Ford Foundation, he 
served as National Security Adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, where he 
played crucial advisory roles in the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
and the Vietnam War. In addition, Bundy was responsible for supervising the Central 
Intelligence Agency, which allegedly maintained a close relationship with the Ford 
Foundation.148 
As argued in several books, principally Frances Stoner Saunders’ The 
Cultural Cold War and Hugh Wilford’s The Mighty Wurlitzer, the CIA and the Ford 
Foundation maintained some deal of coordination in the 1950s and 1960s, as the CIA 
operated various front groups in the United States and abroad. Stonor explains how 
by the mid 1950s the foundation was so close to the CIA that the foundation was 
regularly coordinating with the agency, and the foundation was responsible for 
funding a variety of CIA front organizations, including the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom, which received millions from the Ford Foundation and was exposed as a 
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CIA front organization by the New York Times in 1967.149 
The connections between the Ford Foundation and the U.S. foreign policy 
apparatus were not lost on citizens of countries in which the foundation operated 
during the Cold War period. Although some Americans perceived the foundation as a 
leftist organization, many outside the United States suspected it not only of being 
anti-socialist, but also of being an agent of the U.S. government.  
For example, the foundation’s activities in Greece in the early 1970s were 
viewed with great local suspicion. Governed by a military dictatorship from 1968 to 
1974, Greece maintained a tenuous relationship with the United States. Concerned 
with the preservation of ancient Greek artifacts during this period of political 
instability, the foundation responded to the military junta in Greece with the 1968 
Emergency Program of the Arts in Greece.150 Supporting preservation-minded 
performing arts groups, writers, and researchers, the efforts in Greece constituted an 
ostensibly apolitical reaction to political unrest.  
But several Greek grantees were imprisoned after receiving foundation grants 
related to projects that were perceived as being critical of the military government.151 
Dr. Dionysios Karagiorgas, an economics professor and leader of an opposition 
network called the Democratic Defense, was imprisoned after a bomb exploded in his 
hand at his home. In possession of a dozen small explosives smuggled from Sweden, 
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Karagiorgas admitted that he intended to explode the bombs publicly in protest of the 
military dictatorship. Although the bombs were largely innocuous—evidenced by the 
fact that Karagiorgas survived an explosion of one in his hand—two Greeks had been 
accidentally killed by similar devices in the late 1960s, and the government reacted 
by sentencing Karagiorgas to life in prison. Working with only his left hand—his 
right one was wounded in the bomb incident—Karagiorgas completed, under a Ford 
Foundation grant, a critical book entitled The Distribution of Fiscal Burden in Greece 
in 1972.152 
Tensions over the situation in Greece prompted the foundation to send Vice 
President W. McNeil Lowry to Athens in early 1973 to answer questions about the 
foundation’s intentions. During a four and a half hour press conference on January 
12, 1973, Lowry noted the foundation’s reliance on a local consultant in its decision 
making processes, a Mrs. Kety Myrivili, and vehemently stated that the foundation 
made its grants without political interference: “No government, either the American 
government or, in this case, the Greek government is involved at any stage of the 
procedure [of grantmaking]…. Very often…I am asked by the person concerned what 
his obligations toward the Ford Foundation will be if he gets a grant. My answer is 
invariably: none.”153 
Although the Ford Foundation’s international projects were generally not 
focused on the arts, we will see that the international political activities of the 
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foundation figured into the rationale for the creation of the domestic Program for the 
Humanities and the Arts and the subsequent Program for Symphony Orchestras. 
 
Program Area 3: The Strengthening of the Economy 
 
“The Ford Foundation will support activities designed to advance the 
economic well-being of people everywhere and to improve economic 
institutions for the better realization of democratic goals.”154 
 
 The Ford Foundation’s early activities in support of its mission to strengthen 
the economy were small in comparison to its other program areas. Although in 1950 
and 1951 many projects under the auspices of the “establishment of peace” umbrella 
had economic components, no domestic economic projects were supported financially 
by the foundation until 1952. In 1952 Ford grants supporting the mission of 
strengthening the economy comprised a total of only $627,463, compared to 
$11,537,361 for the establishment of peace, $1,289,000 for strengthening free 
institutions, $22,065,232 for education in a democratic society, and $2,094,800 for 
human behavior.155 
 To administer its economic programs, the Ford Foundation created an 
independent organization called Resources for the Future in the mold of the East 
European Fund and the Fund for the Republic; from the mid 1950s through the 1970s 
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Resources for the Future received more than $50 million in operating funds from the 
Ford Foundation. Created nearly two decades before the establishment of the Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency, Resources for the Future was concerned primarily 
with the increasingly symbiotic relationship between the growth of the world 
economy and the preservation of natural resources. Benefitting from the leadership of 
Chairman Horace Albright, who by 1952 had served as director of the National Park 
Service as well as president of the U.S. Potash Corporation, Resources for the Future 
was a research institution dedicated to pragmatic approaches to conservation.156 
In 1953, Resources for the Future organized the Mid-Century Conference on 
Resources for the Future in Washington, D.C. with a grant of $175,000 from the Ford 
Foundation. More than 1,500 attendees participated in the conference, with working 
groups organized around land use, domestic and international natural resources 
issues, mining, and other topics.157 President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote to Horace 
Albright with interest about the Mid-Century Conference: “I believe the full and 
economic development of natural resources is essential to economic growth and 
national security. I hope the conservation movement, begun under President Theodore 
Roosevelt, will continue to prosper and grow in influence.”158 In addition, 
Eisenhower expressed support for the input of Resources for the Future in policy 
discussions: “I believe that private organizations, such as Resources for the Future, 
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Inc., should be encouraged to undertake studies and promote discussion of national 
issues on a competent and nonpartisan basis, and I am sure that both the Executive 
Branch and the Congress will review with interest the conclusions reached.”159 
In the spirit of opening new channels of dialogue, the Mid-Century 
Conference provided preservation-minded policy-makers with a forum to develop 
potential legislation. One such piece of legislation is the Wilderness Act of 1964, 
which protects nearly ten million acres of federal land under the National Wilderness 
Preservation System. The Act elegantly describes a wilderness as: “An area where the 
earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a 
visitor who does not remain.”160 Although the passage of the Wilderness Act was the 
result of hard work from several organization, Horace Albright’s declaration at the 
Mid-Century Conference is an important predecessor of the Act’s formal protection 
of wilderness areas:  
The wilderness areas in the national forests have never had a basis in law. 
They have been set aside by the Secretary of Agriculture for a good many 
years, and I am not sure that even now he can go to Congress and get such a 
law. Right away it would be asked: Would that mean the stopping of grazing, 
or of mining, or of cutting? But, just the same, law is the only means by which 
the areas can eventually be protected. The wilderness areas, or some of them 
and some of their characteristics, ought to be embodied in the law.161 
  
In addition to ongoing support for the Resources for the Future fund 
throughout the 1950s, a great deal of the Ford Foundation’s economic program 
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support funded Ph.D and faculty research on topics ranging from public housing to 
public utility rate-making. Similar to the foundation’s programs to study the 
government’s role concerning civil liberties, the economic programs often focused on 
the government’s growing role in economic matters. In this vein, a $750,000 grant to 
the Brookings Institution in 1960 intended to 
explore urgent policy questions raised by government’s expanding economic 
role, which is evidenced by the fact that in the past decade government 
expenditures have increased more than twice as much as the gross national 
product. Such matters will be studied as revision of tax legislation, financing 
of state and local expenditures, and evaluation of government services 
competing for shares of the public treasury.162  
 
 An organization founded in 1916 as an instrument of public policy and 
economic research, the Brookings Institution has regularly received Ford Foundation 
grants since 1954, and has served, alongside other institutions such as the RAND 
Corporation, Harvard, Yale, and Stanford Universities, and others, as a research arm 
of the foundation. Although the foundation created organizations like the Fund for the 
Republic and Resources for the Future when needed, it has also outsourced research 
to established organizations when appropriate. 
 Concerned with the economic issues related to population growth, the Ford 
Foundation granted more than $40 million from 1954 to 2001 to the Population 
Council, a nonprofit founded in 1952 by John D. Rockefeller III.163 The council 
conducted research projects domestically and internationally on the relationship 
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between population growth, economies, and natural resources. The Ford Foundation 
grants to the Population Council and to individual scientists contributed to the 
development and distribution of contraceptives internationally, particularly 
intrauterine devices (IUDs), as well as research into the effectiveness of various 
contraceptives for women and drugs for men that suppress sperm formation.164 
   
Program Area 4: Education in a Democratic Society 
 
“The Ford Foundation will support activities to strengthen, expand and 
improve education facilities and methods to enable individuals more fully to 
realize their intellectual, civic, and spiritual potentialities; to promote greater 
equality of education opportunity; and to conserve and increase knowledge 
and enrich our culture.”165 
  
Central to the foundation’s early activities in education were the Fund for the 
Advancement of Education and the Fund for Adult Education, both established in 
1951. Created with grants of $7 million and $4.8 million, respectively, the funds 
reflected the foundation’s interest “in exploring the kinds of ventures in the 
organization and content of education that would help the American people meet their 
new responsibilities in the world.”166 
Early programs of the Fund for the Advancement of Education were directed 
towards teacher training; fellowships for younger college instructors allowed for a 
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paid year of advanced training, and state teachers’ colleges were given grants to 
improve liberal arts education for prospective secondary teachers. Concerned with 
educational setbacks associated with universal military service, the fund established 
scholarships for outstanding sixteen-year-old students to take college classes before 
beginning military service.167   
In 1951 the fund began its “Test Cities Project,” an experiment designed to 
emphasize continuing education for adults. The Test Cities Project involved eleven 
cities: Akron, Ohio; Bridgeport, Connecticut; Chattanooga, Tennessee; Kansas City, 
Missouri; Little Rock, Arkansas; Lubbock, Texas; Memphis, Tennessee; Niagara 
Falls, New York; Racine, Wisconsin; Sioux City, Iowa; and York, Pennsylvania. Also 
included were two regional programs focused on West Texas and the San Bernardino 
Valley region of Southern California. It is unclear how or why these cities and 
regions were chosen, but starting in 1951, each city or region received $24,000 from 
the Fund for Adult Education to design and administer its own adult education 
program focused on the liberal arts and/or the humanities. The programs ranged from 
informal debates on foreign affairs, discussions on local issues, and book clubs. 
Unlike traditional vocational programs, the programs were not career oriented, but 
rather were intended to develop citizenship and civil debate over issues of local and 
national importance.168 
Although the Test Cities Project was not focused on the performing arts, it 
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exemplifies several salient concepts that would inspire other programs, like the 
Program for Symphony Orchestras. First, it was intent on spreading the wealth to 
cities and regions large and small, beyond simply pouring more resources into 
established cultural centers. Second, it embodied a largely hand-off approach to the 
activities of its grantees. Instead of partnering with each individual city/region to help 
design programs that would be most relevant or beneficial to each region, the 
foundation simply provided the capital and let local leaders design and execute 
programs relevant to their interests and priorities.    
The Fund for Adult Education also focused on educational television and 
radio programs, spending more than $11 million between 1951 and 1957 to set up 
twenty-eight educational television stations around the country.169 This nascent 
educational television network was supported by the Educational Television and 
Radio Center in Ann Arbor, Michigan, which helped provide program material to the 
local educational stations around the country, and served as a clearinghouse for 
content sharing.170  
Although the Fund for Adult Education was phased out by 1960, the Ford 
Foundation’s support for educational television spread to dozens of local channels in 
the 1960s. After granting more than $200 million in the 1950s and 1960s, the Ford 
Foundation’s efforts were superseded by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting 
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(CPB) in 1967.171 Nonetheless, the foundation emerged as a key funder of the CPB 
and its national networking organization—not unlike the earlier Education Television 
and Radio Center—the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), and served as a backer of 
projects like the Children’s Television Workshop, the producer of Sesame Street.172 
 
Program Area 5: Individual Behavior and Human Relations 
 
“The Ford Foundation will support scientific activities designed to increase 
knowledge of factors which influence or determine human conduct, and to 
extend such knowledge for the maximum benefit of individuals and 
society.”173 
  
The Ford Foundation’s early programs in Individual Behavior and Human 
Relations were focused on improving techniques for the scientific study of human 
behavior, training behavioral scientists, and applying research in the areas of the 
behavioral sciences in the processes of social change.174 
Principal among these contributions in the area of behavioral sciences was the 
creation of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Palo Alto, 
California in 1954 with an initial contribution of $3.5 million. Since its inception, the 
Center has offered behavioral scientists residencies and research support. Work 
conceived at the Center has led to more than 1,900 publications on topics ranging 
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from Navajo use of Peyote—The Peyote Religion Among the Navaho by David 
Friend Aberle, 1957—to approaches to gender and identity in the millennial 
generation—Where the Millennials Will Take Us: A New Generation Wrestles with 
the Gender Structure by Barbara J. Risman, 2018. Major funding for the Center from 
the Ford Foundation continued through the late 1970s, and the Center now continues 
its mission with support from nearby Stanford University.175  
Earlier work in the area of human behavior also included grants to individual 
researchers, universities, and the Institute for Social Research in Oslo, Norway. An 
additional $875,000 was granted to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with 
the vague mandate to study “what information and ideas reach various kinds of 
people in foreign countries; the channels by which the information and ideas are 
conveyed; and the effect of psychological, institutional, political, economic, and 
philosophical factors on the ways in which people interpret, and react to, the 
information and ideas.”176 
 The foundation took specific interest in mental illness and mental health, 
noting in its 1955 annual report a dearth of knowledge in the field: “Professionals in 
the field, government, and the general public have been concerned with the incidence 
of mental illness, the expense of hospitalization for mentally ill patients, the 
inadequacy of basic knowledge and of available therapies, and the general cost in 
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human terms.”177 
 Noting an uptick in psychiatric hospital admissions beginning in 1946 and 
continuing exponentially into the 1950s, the foundation appropriated $15 million—or 
nearly three times all federal and state expenditures for mental health research in 
1951—in 1955 for a program tasked with determining the causes of mental illness, 
developing and testing methods of treatment and prevention, and increasing positive 
mental health in the general public.178 
  Beginning in the early 1950s, $600,000 in grants to the law schools of the 
University of Chicago and Harvard University focused on juries and juvenile 
delinquency. This funding supported Harvard researchers Drs. Sheldon and Eleanor 
Glueck and their Social Factor Scale, used to predict the future behavior of a child. 
The Gluecks’ studies of juvenile delinquency began in the 1920s, and by the mid-
1950s the Gluecks were considered experts in the field of criminology. Describing 
this research, the 1956 Ford Foundation Annual Report shows a photograph of an 
elementary school boy entering the front door of his home alone; the caption notes: 
“No one greets this boy on his return. Warmth or indifference of home atmosphere 
and consistency of discipline and supervision are weighed in Glueck scale predicting 
future behavior of child.”179 
The issue of juvenile delinquency continued to interest the Ford Foundation 
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through the 1950s and 1960s. In addition to the Gluecks’ studies, the foundation 
supported institutional research studies at the University of Southern California 
($700,000) and Syracuse University ($740,000). The Syracuse study involved the 
impact of young people moving into a new low-income housing project in a middle-
class residential area. USC’s study concerned teenage boys who had dropped out of 
high school or who were considering dropping out of high school, particularly the 
connections between centers of authority: the home, the school, and the correctional 
center.180 
 By the mid 1950s, the distinctions among the five main action areas outlined 
in the Gaither report began to fade, and the Ford Foundation relocated from Pasadena, 
California to Lower Manhattan in New York City, where it remains today. In 1953, 
Wilson McNeil Lowry (1913–93) joined the foundation to head its education 
program. Born in 1913 in Columbus, Kansas, Lowry earned a Ph.D from the 
University of Illinois in 1941, where he taught English and edited Ascent, a quarterly 
literary journal, from 1940 to 1942. Lowry joined the war effort in 1942, first as a 
writer with the Office of War Information, and then as an active duty lieutenant in the 
U.S. Navy until 1946. After the war, he worked as a newspaper editor in Ohio, chief 
of the Washington bureau of the James M. Cox Newspapers, and associate director of 
the International Press Institute in Zurich.181 
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2018. 
  
90  
 
 Lowry served in many different official capacities with the Ford Foundation 
from 1953 to his retirement in 1975, beginning as assistant to foundation vice 
president William McPeak. McPeak served as staff secretary for the original Ford 
Foundation Study Committee in 1948 that produced the Gaither Report, and 
consulted with Lowry about the possibility of explicitly including the arts and 
humanities in the Ford Foundation’s expanded program. But even by this point, early 
on in the Study Committee’s work, it was clear that the foundation’s efforts would be, 
as Lowry described retrospectively in 1972 “completely post-war oriented and what 
later became called ‘problem solving oriented’…. Already it was clear that the drift 
and bias of the Study Committee was international and national affairs.”182 
 Although funding for the arts was not emphasized in the post-Gaither Report 
Ford Foundation of the early 1950s, Lowry’s ascension to Program Director of 
Education in 1955 came on the eve of a financial windfall that necessitated expanding 
the foundation’s purview.   
 
The Initial Public Offering of Ford Stock 
 
 On January 18, 1956 the Ford Foundation made its first public offering of 
Ford Motor Company shares, marking the first time since 1919 that a significant 
number of shares were held outside of the Ford family and the Ford Foundation. 
                                               
182 "Interview with W. McNeil Lowry for the Ford Foundation Oral History Project," January 14, 1972, 
box 3, Ford Foundation Records, Oral History Project, RAC, 2. 
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Between Henry Ford’s death in 1947 and the initial public offering in early 1956, the 
Ford Foundation held 88 percent of the company’s shares, while the Ford Family—
and a small group of key Ford employees—held the remainder. This arrangement was 
designed to protect the family’s controlling stake in the company. Thus, the 
foundation’s shares were strictly non-voting, and the family’s shares retained voting 
power, meaning that only the family members had the ability to elect company board 
members and steer the overarching direction of the corporation.183 Table 2.3 
summarizes the Ford Motor Company’s capitalization before and after the 1956 
initial public offering. 
     
                                               
183 The Ford Foundation Annual Report: October 1, 1954 to September 30, 1955 (New York, NY: The 
Ford Foundation, 1955), 168. 
  
 
 
 
Table 2.3: Ownership of Ford Motor Company Shares Before and After 1956 Initial Public Offering184 
 
                                               
184 The Ford Foundation Annual Report: October 1, 1955 to September 30, 1956 (New York, NY: The Ford Foundation, 1956). 
# of Shares % # of Shares % # of Shares % # of Shares %
Pre–1955 3,089,908   88.4% 42,140        1.2% 190,347      5.4% 172,645      4.9%
New Class B - Voting
# of Shares % # of Shares % # of Shares % # of Shares %
46,348,620  86.7% 632,100      1.2% 2,855,205   5.3% 3,625,545   6.8%
# of Shares % # of Shares % # of Shares % # of Shares % # of Shares %
After IPO 36,148,620  67.6% 632,100      1.2% 10,200,000  19.1% 2,855,205   5.3% 3,625,545   6.8%
Ford Foundation Ford Employees Ford Family
"Class B" - Voting
At 
Recapitalization
Ford Foundation Ford Employees Ford Family
Ford Foundation Ford Employees Ford Family
21-1 Split of Original 
Class B Shares
New Class A - Voting New Class B - Voting
Public
"Class A" - Nonvoting
15-1 Split of Original Class A Shares
New Class A - Voting 92
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 The first sale of company stock in early 1956 earned the Ford Foundation 
nearly $650 million dollars in proceeds, amounting to a gain of more than $500 
million over the value of the shares on the books at the end of 1955.185 This first sale 
accounted for about 22 percent of the foundation’s holdings in Ford Motor Company 
stock, and periodic sales continued until the foundation was completely divested from 
the company in 1974. In 1955, before the first sale, the foundation’s total assets were 
$580 million. In 1956, after the sale, total assets stood at $999 million, and by 1965 
the foundation crossed the $3 billion threshold for the first time. As of December 31, 
2017, the foundation’s assets totaled nearly $14 billion.186 
 Commenting on the transformative nature of this sale, foundation president H. 
Rowan Gaither, Jr. noted in the 1956 Annual Report: “In sum, the Foundation’s 
programs during this year took on new dimensions, moved into new areas, reflected 
anew the cast range of possibilities and choices which confront the entire institution 
of American philanthropy—and, we hope, reaffirmed basic principles that link the 
past and its performance to the future and its promise.”187 
 Empowered by the windfall of the initial public offering, Lowry, as the 
foundation’s Education Program Director, developed a $500 million program to help 
                                               
185 See the Ford Foundation Annual Report: October 1, 1955 to September 30, 1956 (New York, NY: 
The Ford Foundation, 1956). 
186 It is important to note that as a private foundation the Foundation does not accept donations; the 
growth in its assets over time is a result of the careful stewardship and appreciation of its investments. 
See the Ford Foundation: Financial Statement as of December 31, 2017 and 2016, 
https://www.fordfoundation.org/media/3845/the-ford-foundation-2017-financials-final.pdf, accessed 
October 16, 2018. 
187 The Ford Foundation Annual Report: October 1, 1955 to September 30, 1956 (New York, NY: The 
Ford Foundation, 1956), 12. 
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raise faculty salaries at hundreds of private liberal arts colleges, endow medical 
schools at private universities, and expand the services of privately supported 
hospitals.188 
 The faculty salary grants—totaling $260 million split between all 630 private, 
accredited, four-year colleges in the United States—combined endowment grants and 
“accomplishment” (expendable) grants. The endowment grants were allocated based 
on the undergraduate instructional costs for the 1954–55 academic year, and were 
mandated to be invested as endowment funds for a period of ten years, with all 
income applied to increasing faculty salaries. After the ten-year period, the colleges 
were free to use the endowment funds as they pleased. The outlay for expendable, 
“accomplishment grants”—totaling $50 million to 126 colleges—was devised to 
reward “colleges selected from among the institutions emphasizing liberal arts and 
sciences which have, since World War II, shown special leadership within their own 
regions in improving the status and compensation of their teachers.”189 This basic 
dual model of endowment and expendable funds would inspire the design of the 
foundation’s symphony orchestra program in the 1960s and 70s. 
 Although the 1956 teacher salary efforts did not have a mandatory matching 
component, Lowry recalled in his 1972 oral history how the foundation’s intervention 
attracted donors to education: “College after college reported that a potential donor 
sitting over here, who had never given to the college or if he had he usually gave to it 
                                               
188 The Ford Foundation Annual Report: October 1, 1955 to September 30, 1956 (New York, NY: The 
Ford Foundation, 1956), 12. 
189 Ibid., 30. 
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for a building or a plaque or something, was now giving to it for faculty salaries.”190 
 Reflecting his background from rural Kansas and the University of Illinois, 
Lowry notably bucked the foundation’s focus on east-coast, blue blood academic 
institutions, principally Harvard. Instead, beginning with the $500 million faculty and 
medical school grants, Lowry insisted on spreading the wealth throughout the entire 
United States; a 1973 Washington Post article about Lowry noted: “He still recalls his 
boyhood days in Kansas; points out that he was born near the then geographical 
center of the United States…, remembers hearing about how his grandfather cried 
when McKinley defeated William Jennings Bryan. He roots his populism in the arts 
in the political populism of his Kansas family.”191 
 
The Program in the Humanities and the Arts 
 
 In November 1955, Lowry prepared a memo proposing “a program of 
philanthropic support of cultural affairs through institutions in the humanities and 
creative arts.” The spirit of the Rockefeller Foundation’s justification for renewing its 
Louisville project in 1955—that the project “was intended to be a demonstration that 
the United States, contrary to a widely prevalent opinion, maintains an interest in and 
provides a healthy environment for the arts” was smartly repurposed by Lowry: 
“Earlier studies of European and Asiatic attitude towards the United States since 
                                               
190 Charles T. Morrissey, "Interview with W. McNeil Lowry for the Ford Foundation Oral History 
Project," January 14, 1972, box 3, Ford Foundation Records, Oral History Project, RAC, 35. 
191 Jean M. White, "The Ford Foundation's Lowry," The Washington Post, March 4, 1973. 
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World War II had shown full awareness of our military, industrial and commercial 
resources but a very distorted picture of American culture, and even in some quarters 
a disbelief that an American culture in fact existed.”192 Lowry quickly transitioned, 
though, and argued for the significance of cultural and artistic programs beyond their 
geopolitical benefits: 
In any nation where the importance of the individual is paramount, increased 
support of cultural affairs for themselves will probably have more lasting 
effects on intercultural movements among nations than a program which 
begins with one national political objective, however idealized.193 
 
And unlike his predecessors at the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations, 
Lowry departed widely from the prevailing gestalt of the arts as an adjunct to 
education; he wrote in 1984:  
[Fred] Keppel of Carnegie and [Raymond] Fosdick and his associate, David 
Stevens of Rockefeller worked professionally toward identified objectives in 
the humanities, but in programs of modest scale and viewing art largely as the 
handmaiden of education.194 
 
Instead, Lowry elegantly argued that the arts were an intrinsically 
indispensable part of civilized society: 
The sciences, even those we call social, essentially must move in a rigorous 
climate that is ethically neutral. Art and culture do not. The “best that has been 
thought and said in the world” is at least as important to a society that is 
approaching a material and technological peak as to any other. In few 
generations could the cultivation of activities in which the individual reigns 
supreme have been more urgent than in ours.195 
 
                                               
192 “A Program of Philanthropic Support of Cultural Affairs Through Institutions in the Humanities 
and Creative Arts,” box 5, WML. 
193 Ibid. 
194 McNeil Lowry, ed., The Arts and Public Policy in the United States (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 10-11. 
195 "A Program of Philanthropic Support of Cultural Affairs Through Institutions in the Humanities and 
Creative Arts," W. McNeil Lowry, November 11, 1955, box 5, WML. 
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Consistent in his staunch defense of the arts, Lowry maintained this position 
in his 1972 oral history, conducted as part of the Ford Foundation Oral History 
Project, and described his approach to funding the arts “in the artist’s own terms just 
as you would do a program in science, hopefully, in the scientist’s own terms. In 
other words, I was declaring war on the whole treatment of the arts by foundations to 
this date [1972] which had been an adjunct to education.” Lowry continued: “We’re 
going to get in bed, figuratively, with the artist and the artistic director and in those 
terms…we’re going to try to develop a philanthropic program in the arts.”196  
In 1955, Lowry noted several opportunities for foundation investment in the 
arts, including opera, symphonic music, ballet, composition, book publishing, and 
others, with estimated total grants of $82 million.197 In 1957, a Program in 
Humanities and the Arts was approved on an exploratory basis, with an annual budget 
of $2 million and a focus on the 
creative development of individual talents; stimulation of experiments, 
demonstrations, and studies helping to clarify objectives, set standards, or 
open new avenues in the arts and humanities; preparation of a comprehensive 
study of the economic and social positions of the arts and of the artist in 
America today; and encouragement of scholarship and scholarly projects basic 
to the humanities generally rather than to specialized fields.198  
Inspired by the earlier cultural programs of the Carnegie and Rockefeller 
Foundations, Lowry consistently focused his efforts not only on the blue-blooded 
                                               
196 Charles T. Morrissey, "Interview with W. McNeil Lowry for the Ford Foundation Oral History 
Project," January 14, 1972, box 3, Ford Foundation Records, Oral History Project, RAC, 364. 
197 "A Program of Philanthropic Support of Cultural Affairs Through Institutions in the Humanities and 
Creative Arts," W. McNeil Lowry, November 11, 1955, box 5, WML. 
198 The Ford Foundation Annual Report: October 1, 1956 to September 30, 1957 (New York, NY: The 
Ford Foundation, 1957), 19. 
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cultural capitals of the United States—at that time Boston, New York, Chicago, and 
Philadelphia—but also on many smaller communities. In addition, Lowry encouraged 
the use of matching grants, which essentially forced his grantees to learn how to raise 
money on their own, a philanthropic method that would later be adopted by the 
National Endowment for the Arts.199 
Ford Foundation officials visited communities across the country and spoke 
with local experts to identify needs in artistic fields. The foundation followed up on 
these investigations by appropriating $1.5 million for grants in opera, $775,000 in 
other forms of music, $1.5 million to theater, $750,000 to visual arts, $300,000 to 
creative writing, and $175,000 to ballet. In addition, approximately $775,000 was 
granted for various humanities-related projects.200 These grants involved developing a 
curriculum for the Minneapolis School of Art ($150,000), implementing a program to 
develop actors and produce theater in the Midwest by the Cleveland Play House 
($130,000), and funding contemporary music at the Experimental Opera Theatre of 
America in New Orleans ($165,000), at the New York City Opera ($105,000), and at 
                                               
199 Lowry’s personal influence on the foundation of the NEA cannot be understated; Representative 
Frank Thompson of New Jersey described Lowry’s influence in a speech on the floor of the House of 
Representative on March 8, 1973: “I was…working on the legislation which eventually passed creating 
the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities…. Mac Lowry persuaded me that there should be 
a delicate and continuing balance between Federal support of the arts and private support…. It would 
not have been possible, I believe, without Mac Lowry’s support and advice.” "Congressional Record - 
House," March 8, 1973, box 2, Ford Foundation Records, Office of the President, Office Files of 
McGeorge Bundy, RAC. See Also: “By 1968 NEA’s leverage ratio had reached 1 to 3. For every 
dollar the endowment granted three came in from other sources. Leverage became a persuasive selling 
point for arts lobbyists and foundation program directors alike.” Mark Dowie, American Foundations: 
An Investigative History (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001), 175. 
200 "An Enlarged Program in the Arts: Humanities and the Arts Program Policy Discussion Paper," 
March 17th, 1960, box 122, report 002782, Ford Foundation records, Catalogued Reports, RAC. 
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six regional symphony orchestras ($210,000).201 
The $150,000 grant to the Minneapolis School of Art funded five-years of 
experimental course design in visual education. In his grant application, W.B. Bryan, 
the director of the Minneapolis school, noted that during his fifteen years as a 
counselor at Princeton he observed that many of the students who struggled 
academically were visual learners, rather than verbal ones: “The vision of the artist, 
Mr. Bryan believes, is not conventional and is not considered academically and 
philosophically respectable. If the visual artist’s own approach were experimentally 
to be accepted as a positive base for general education even in the liberal arts and 
sciences, it might have imaginative and liberating results.”202 
Although Lowry’s staff noted that Bryan’s application was vague; (“The 
outlines of curricular development foreseen by the Minneapolis School necessarily 
remain very general at this date,” they wrote) the proposal was nonetheless approved 
under the assumption that “the Foundation’s grant, coming at this time, would not 
only permit the Minneapolis School of Art the widest latitude in studying and making 
plans but would be taken as at least a token of concern for the future of the 
independent arts school as an institution.”203 
The grant to the Cleveland Playhouse had a dual mission to support emerging 
actors and extend professional theater to small towns in the Midwest. To develop 
                                               
201 The Ford Foundation Annual Report: October 1, 1956 to September 30, 1957 (New York, NY: The 
Ford Foundation, 1957), 19. 
202 Ford Foundation records, Office of the President, Office Files of Henry T. Heald, RAC; 
"Humanities and the Arts: The Minneapolis School of Art," 1958, box 5,  
Ford Foundation records, Office of the President, Office Files of Henry T. Heald, RAC. 
203 Ibid. 
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talent, a portion of the grant was devoted to three-year paid fellowships for fifteen 
actors. During the third year of the fellowship, the fifteen actors would tour the region 
for a thirty-six-week season.204 After two years in Cleveland, the actors began their 
tour in late 1960, covering twenty-five states, with productions of Christopher 
Marlowe’s “Doctor Faustus,” Ben Jonson’s “Volpone,” and George Bernard Shaw’s 
“Candida.” New York Times music and drama critic Howard Taubman joined the 
company for several performances and remarked on the flexibility of the troupe in 
accommodating unusual conditions: 
In an Alabama town the “theatre” was a long, narrow room without a raised 
stage or raked seats. “Candida” was enacted with actors and audience at the 
same eye level. When the actors played a scene sitting down, the audience 
stood up. To save the audience that trouble of jumping up and down, and to 
spare themselves the intrusive noise of scraping chairs, the performers went 
through the later stages of the play standing up.205 
 
Taubman concluded his review by noting the great expense of touring 
productions, and he readily conceded that it was unlikely that small towns would be 
able to support one-night tour stops, let alone their own resident theater companies. 
But he made a plea for the continuation of such performances through government or 
philanthropic intervention: “Is there any hope of breaking through this vicious circle? 
Only if a powerful foundation or the Federal Government underwrote a long-range 
program…. Have we the daring as a nation to engage in such an enterprise? Can we 
afford to? Or, to be more pertinent, can we afford not to?”206 
                                               
204 See "Humanities and the Arts: Cleveland Play House Foundation," 1958, box 5,  
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Starting in 1957, the Ford Foundation made many grants to the New York 
City Opera Company to support performances of contemporary operas. The 
foundation’s first grant to City Opera of $105,000 partially underwrote the 
performances of a series of operas written by Americans—including naturalized 
European-born composers—during the five-week spring 1958 season: 
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Table 2.4: Operas Performed by the New York City Opera during Spring 1958 with 
Support from the Ford Foundation207 
 
 
 City Opera’s successful spring season in 1958 led to several subsequent grants 
to for the same purpose, and an expansion of the program to the Metropolitan Opera 
Company, the Lyric Opera of Chicago, and the San Francisco Opera in 1959.208 
In 1959 the Foundation partnered with the Music Educators National 
Conference on a program that placed seventy-three talented young composers in 
secondary school music programs and communities around the country. With a $3 
million grant in 1963, the program expanded and continued under the auspices of 
MENC until 1973, training dozens of young composers, commissioning hundreds of 
new works, and hosting workshops and residencies in communities around the 
country. The first cohort included well-known wind band composer John Barnes 
Chance, composer and comedian Peter J. Schickele (a.k.a. PDQ Bach), and twenty-
                                               
207 "Humanities and the Arts: New York City Opera Company," 1958, box 5,  
Ford Foundation records, Office of the President, Office Files of Henry T. Heald, RAC.; See also 
Tedrin Blair Lindsay, “The Coming of Age of American Opera: New York City Opera and the Ford 
Foundation, 1958-1960” (PhD diss., University of Kentucky, 2009). 
208 The Ford Foundation Annual Report: October 1, 1958 to September 30, 1959 (New York, NY: The 
Ford Foundation, 1959). 
Composer Title Date Composed
Gian Carlo Menotti "The Old Maid and the Thief" 1939
Gian Carlo Menotti "The Medium" 1947
Gian Carlo Menotti "The Consul" 1950
Carlisle Floyd "Susannah" 1956
Douglas Moore "The Ballad of the Baby Doe" 1955
Douglas Moore "Devil and Daniel Webster" 1939
Kurt Weill "Lost in the Stars" 1950
Marc Blitzstein "Regina" 1949
Vittorio Giannini "Taming of the Shrew" 1954
Leonard Bernstein "Trouble in Tahiti" 1953
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three-year-old Philip Glass.209 
Assigned to Pittsburgh, PA schools in 1962 and 1963, Glass wrote ten choral 
works, one band work, four orchestral works, and five chamber works, all for high 
school students. The only work from this period acknowledged by Glass in his online 
catalog is the Brass Sextet, which was published in 1964 and is accompanied by this 
note:  
Brass Sextet, composed in 1962/64 for two trumpets, two horns, trombone and 
tuba, is something of a curiosity. It was written when Philip Glass, after 
graduating from the Juilliard School of Music, was composer-in-residence 
with the Pittsburgh Public Schools on a Ford Foundation project. This was 
several years before he began to become known for the repetitive minimalist 
techniques which launched him to fame and have enabled him to enter some 
of the world's leading opera houses.210 
 
An early signature program of the Ford Foundation’s Arts and Humanities 
Program, the Young Composer’s Project served not only to fund young composers 
and encourage their careers, but also to expose young music students to contemporary 
music. Consistent with McNeil Lowry’s interest in American communities large and 
small, composers were placed in tiny towns like Hastings-on-Hudson, New York, and 
Winfield, Kansas, as well as big cities such as Philadelphia and Los Angeles. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter shows how the Ford Foundation grew from its $25,000 origins in 
                                               
209 See Paul Covey, “The Ford Foundation–MENC Contemporary Music Project (1959- 1973): A 
View of Contemporary Music in America” (PhD diss., University of Maryland, 2013).  
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1936 to its multi-billion-dollar scope in the late 1950s. Beginning with roots in 
Detroit, and a local focus on projects close to the Ford family’s interests, in the early 
1950s the foundation moved its headquarters to New York City and developed a five-
point program of international scope. With input from leaders in business, politics, 
and academia from throughout the United States, and eventually the world, the 
foundation transcended its roots as a family effort as it achieved independence from 
its founding family. Although the bonds between the Ford family and the Ford 
Foundation began to fray in the early 1950s, in the late 1950s the foundation began 
formally dissolving its relationship with the Ford Motor Company and the Ford 
family through its divestment of Ford Motor Company stock. By 1974 the foundation 
owned no shares of Ford Motor Company Stock, and by 1977 there were no Ford 
family members on the Foundation’s board.211 
Beyond the severing of these financial and administrative ties, though, the 
Ford Foundation’s salient leftist political philosophy starting in the early 1950s, 
draws a direct contrast to Henry’s Ford famously right-wing politics. Beyond the 
libertarian ethic embodied by the Edison Institute, Ford expressed stridently 
reactionary and anti-Semitic views through his hometown newspaper, The Dearborn 
Independent, which he purchased in 1918. He published a lengthy series of articles 
that claimed a vast Jewish conspiracy was attempting to re-shape America. These 
articles were eventually bound and collected into four volumes titled “The 
                                               
211 See the Ford Foundation Annual Report: October 1, 1973 to September 30, 1974 (New York, NY: 
The Ford Foundation, 1974); and The Ford Foundation Annual Report: October 1, 1975 to September 
30, 1976 (New York, NY: The Ford Foundation, 1976). 
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International Jew,” and distributed widely to Ford dealers around the country. Ford 
also republished in English The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a notorious forgery 
originating in Russia that describes a sinister cabal of Jewish puppet-masters. 
Furthermore, Ford was greatly admired by Adolph Hitler, who awarded him an award 
from the Nazi regime called the “Grand Cross of the German Eagle” in 1938.212  
 Although Ford died in 1947, and thus had nothing to do with the Ford 
Foundation’s activities in the 1950s and beyond, it is nonetheless interesting to 
consider how the foundation quickly developed priorities that might not have aligned 
with those of its founder. The Ford Motor Company received more than 1,000 letters 
in the 1950s complaining about the Ford Foundation, the Fund for the Republic, or 
both. And as we have seen, many of these letters contrasted the activities of the Ford 
Foundation with the ideology of Henry Ford. A summary of these letters prepared by 
a Ford Foundation staffer recognized a 
deep admiration for Henry Ford, Sr., and a phrase that recurs constantly is that 
he “must be turning over in his grave” at the antics of his grandson [Henry 
Ford II, chairman of both the Ford Foundation and the Ford Motor Company]. 
There are definite indications that many of these writers share Henry Ford, 
Sr.’s attitude on United States involvement in foreign affairs, on labor unions, 
and other matters.213 
 
 As I discuss in depth in the Conclusion, the Ford Foundation’s current focus, 
as of 2018, is on reducing income inequality; whereas Henry Ford may have been 
interested in alleviating poverty, the foundation’s current president Darren Walker 
                                               
212American Experience, “Ford’s Anti-Semitism,” accessed January 28, 2019, 
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sees poverty as a symptom of an increasingly unequal financial system in which too 
much capital is held by too few: “We understand…that social, cultural, political, and 
economic inequalities set in place reinforcing conditions from the very start of life—
in homes, in neighborhoods, and in schools—that create cycles of poverty, illiteracy, 
and lack of opportunity.”214 If Ford was “turning over in his grave” in the 1950s, as 
many letter writers guessed, he would certainly be confounded by the state of the 
Ford Foundation today. 
Furthermore, Ford might have been surprised also by breadth of the Ford 
Foundation’s activities undertaken in the years after his death. During his life the 
foundation had made grants almost exclusively in Detroit and Michigan. But by the 
early 1950s, the Ford Foundation was making grants throughout the United States and 
around the globe. Despite being one of the richest, most influential men in history, 
Henry Ford was still intrigued by tawdry anti-globalist conspiracy literature like the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion; ironically, starting in the 1950s the Ford Foundation 
became the object of the same kind of reactionary anti-elitism that its founder 
espoused.  
Thus, although the postwar Ford Foundation was preoccupied primarily with 
the requisite hard sciences needed to reimagine and redesign the world after the 
war—as exemplified by the five-point program of the Gaither Report—it also became 
interested in envisioning an America that transcended military domination. It is 
important to remember that a key rationale for the creation of the Program in the 
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Humanities and the Arts was that it would help the United States project the influence 
afforded by cultural proficiency.  
In a similar vein, the U.S. State Department sponsored hundreds of trips of 
U.S. musicians and ensembles abroad beginning in the early 1950s. These trips were, 
according to musicologist Danielle Fosler-Lussier, a form of “development aid,” in 
concert with agricultural, scientific, and technical projects. In addition to symphony 
orchestras and chamber groups, the State Department also organized trips of African 
American jazz musicians. The Soviet Union alone received one hundred of these 
visits between 1950 and 1980, but other less obvious countries received State 
Department attention as well, including Iceland (forty-six performances), Uruguay 
(fifty-three), and Indonesia (ninety-one). According to Fosler-Lussier, this musical 
diplomacy served several purposes:  
The musicians toured in order to make music, as themselves—but they also 
appeared as an expensive gift from one county to another, as spokespersons 
for America’s goodwill, and as examples of particular ideas (musical freedom, 
racial equality).215    
 
This idea, that a cultural reputation would temper the image of the United 
States and persuade other countries to emulate the United States resonates with the 
concept of “soft power,” coined by Harvard political scientist and former U.S. deputy 
Undersecretary of State Joseph S. Nye, Jr., in his 1990 book Bound to Lead: The 
Changing Nature of American Power. According to Nye, “hard power” results from 
coercion or payment. By contrast, “soft power,” is earned by getting people to want 
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the same things that you want. Whereas hard power is achieved through military and 
economic success, the tools of soft power are things like democracy, human rights, 
and cultural diversity.216 Although the Ford Foundation’s Program for the Humanities 
and the Arts—as well as the State Department’s musical diplomacy efforts—was 
founded many years before the ideation of “soft power,” it is evident that Lowry’s pet 
program was created in this vein; with U.S. military and economic might solidified by 
the end of the second world war, as McNeil Lowry argued, it was time for the U.S. to 
flex its cultural muscles. 
Starting in the late 1950s McNeil Lowry and his staff began diverting Ford 
Foundation funds to deserving artists and organizations around the country through 
the Young Composer’s Project, as well as through smaller grants to various opera and 
theater companies. But the ballooning Ford Foundation budget and the ongoing 
public offering of Ford stock necessitated larger, more ambitious outlays. In the next 
chapter I discuss McNeil Lowry’s answer to the foundation’s call for a program in the 
$50 to $100 million range: the Program for Symphony Orchestras. 
 
 
 
  
                                               
216 See Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic 
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CHAPTER 3. 
The Symphony Orchestra Program 
 
Introduction 
 
From 1957 to 1972 the Ford Foundation’s Program in the Humanities and the 
Arts granted approximately $250 million to music, theater, dance, visual arts, and 
film. Of this total, $37.7 million went to various music programs, like the 
Contemporary Music Project, and a wide swath of individual organizations and 
institutions, like the New York City Opera and the Berkshire Music Center. But in 
addition to the regular activities of the Humanities and Arts Program, several projects 
with special significance occupied the department’s time and/or resources. 
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Table 3.1: Ford Foundation Program in the Humanities and the Arts Grants 1957–72. 
Source: the Washington Post217 
 
Approximately $8 million was granted with funds outside the Humanities and 
Arts Program’s budget for projects related to the Ford Motor Company and the Ford 
Family, principally grants to the Dearborn (MI) Library for the commemoration of 
Henry Ford’s hundredth birthday and a gift in honor of Edsel Ford to the Museum of 
Modern Art in New York. Although these funds came from outside Lowry’s budget, 
they utilized Lowry’s staff resources for research and administration.218 
Support for the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts began in 1957 in an 
effort led by John D. Rockefeller III to bring together physically the Metropolitan 
Opera, the New York Philharmonic, and the Julliard School. Begun before the formal 
creation of the Program in the Humanities and the Arts, the Foundation’s trustees 
                                               
217 Jean M. White, "The Ford Foundation's Lowry," The Washington Post, March 4, 1973. 
218 Charles T. Morrissey, "Interview with W. McNeil Lowry for the Ford Foundation Oral History 
Project," January 14, 1972, box 3, Ford Foundation Records, Oral History Project, RAC, 519. 
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$22.5 
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$32.1 
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believed that the “national and international significance” of the project was 
“sufficient to merit its encouragement,” and approved close to $30 million in 
grants.219  
Unlike most projects, where the staffs of various divisions—like Humanities 
and the Arts—research and submit projects up the chain to the foundation’s president, 
who then submits the proposals for board approval, special projects like Lincoln 
Center were often driven by foundation executives or by board members themselves. 
In the case of Lincoln Center, McNeil Lowry recalls that the impetus came directly 
from foundation president Henry Heald, whose close acquaintance George Stoddard 
was one of Lincoln Center’s original board members and planners.220 
Similarly, in April, 1963, the Ford Foundation’s trustees approved a $5 
million grant for the construction of what would become the Kennedy Center in 
Washington, D.C. Joining a protracted fundraising effort that begun during the 
Eisenhower presidency and continued during the Kennedy years, the Ford Foundation 
was among a large group of funders, including the Kennedy family and several 
foreign governments.221 Despite Eisenhower’s initiation of the project in the late 
1950s, Kennedy’s personal leadership in the early 1960s brought the project into 
greater focus, and Kennedy proved especially adept at wrangling support from 
disparate sources. McNeil Lowry recalls it as “one of the worst cases of arm twisting 
                                               
219 The Ford Foundation Annual Report: October 1, 1956 to September 30, 1957 (New York, NY: The 
Ford Foundation, 1957), 20. 
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that any President of the United States ever put on a Foundation.”222  
This arm twisting came primarily via Ford Foundation chairman and Kennedy 
adviser John J. McCloy. Kennedy wrote to McCloy in February, 1963 with great 
interest in the project: “I understand the Ford Foundation will be considering the 
Cultural Center this week. Their assistance is vital and I would appreciate very much 
anything you can do to encourage their interest.”223 McCloy responded that although 
he could not make any commitments prior to the board’s discussion, he did agree to 
privately discuss the matter with trustee Eugene Black—another Kennedy 
acquaintance—and Ford Foundation President Henry Heald.224 During the board’s 
discussion of the cultural center, Lowry remembers: 
There was open discussion in the Board about the kind of arm twisting that 
had been applied to the Chairman…. After the vote was taken and one 
member of the Board voted ‘No’ and said he was going to go outside and 
throw up…word leaked out…and President Kennedy attempted to find 
out…who said that, so that he could wreak havoc on him. I don’t think he ever 
did find out; but that was his attitude.225 
 
The Special Programs in the Humanities and the Arts undertaken under Lowry 
were encouraged by powerful interests like the Ford Family, Nelson Rockefeller III, 
and John F. Kennedy himself. But none of these programs were as large as the Ford 
                                               
222 Charles T. Morrissey, "Interview with W. McNeil Lowry for the Ford Foundation Oral History 
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Foundation’s $80.2 million Program for Symphony Orchestras. This chapter explores 
the reasons why symphony orchestras were chosen for such a large Ford Foundation 
outlay, the process undertaken by Lowry and his staff in earning board approval, and 
the terms and dimensions of the program itself. 
  
U.S. Orchestras in the 1950s and Early 1960s 
 
Lowry’s Program in the Humanities and the Arts was approved in 1957 with a 
small annual budget of $2 million, and research on symphony orchestras began 
immediately, involving meetings in New York, extensive correspondence, and visits 
to orchestras and communities throughout the country. Lowry and his staff consulted 
managers, musicians, conductors, union leaders, and others concerning the needs of 
orchestral musicians and the problems facing American orchestras. 
George Kuyper, manager of the Chicago Symphony from 1944 to 1959, was 
engaged as a lead consultant.226 In 1957 Kuyper described to Lowry several problems 
facing symphonic orchestras; beyond the difficulties of building audiences, managing 
budgets, and cultivating donors, Kuyper articulated a struggle in finding musicians:  
One of the great problems for the future is the shortage of players able to carry 
their weight. The Chicago Symphony added five new players this year and 
had to raid smaller orchestras like New Orleans, Kansas City and so on to do 
so. If the smaller orchestra dries up, the big ones will, therefore dry up too, 
                                               
226 "Request for Extension of Formal Appointment of George Kuyper as Consultant to the Humanities 
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because the conservatories are not training replacements.227 
 
In the 1950s, most orchestras struggled to find quality musicians, particularly 
string players. For top orchestras, like the Chicago Symphony, most vacancies were 
filled by players from lower-tier orchestras. Ramsi P. Tick, the manager of the 
Buffalo Philharmonic, noted in an interview with Edward F. D’Arms in 1957 the 
particular difficulty of retaining players as a middle-tier orchestra: “It is difficult to 
hold good musicians in the orchestra because of the shortness of the season and the 
low minimum wages. The result is that Buffalo has a large proportion of young 
players who are on their way up; this provides good musicianship but prevents the 
development of a distinctive style in ensemble playing.”228 Tick’s appraisal of the 
orchestra business is representative of the general malaise among managers 
interviewed by the foundation: “He was clearly very gloomy over his own situation 
and very much harassed by his numerous duties…. He felt that the basic problem was 
not to aid the composer, but to enable orchestras such as the Buffalo orchestra to stay 
alive.”229 
In contrast to Kuyper, Alice Taylor, the manager of the Southern California 
Symphony Association (the Los Angeles Philharmonic) said in 1957 that she was 
                                               
227 Edward F. D’Arms, "Humanities and the Arts Staff Work--Interview with George Kuyper, 
Manager, The Chicago Symphony, Chicago," November 4, 1957, box 29, W. McNeil Lowry Papers, 
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, WML. 
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“quite optimistic about the future of her orchestra.”230 But she also shared the 
concerns of Kuyper and Tick over the lack of quality string players: “Like so many 
others, Miss Taylor is worried by the shortage of strings,” she told D’Arms.231 
Furthermore, Taylor’s main concern was the dearth of good concert halls in Los 
Angeles; until Dorothy Chandler Pavilion was completed downtown in 1964, the Los 
Angeles Philharmonic performed in an auditorium owned by the local Baptist 
Church. Although Taylor acknowledged the hall’s adequate size and good acoustics, 
she wanted the orchestra to have a permanent home and thought that the Ford 
Foundation could help by studying the condition of auditoria throughout the 
country.232 
Many managers were troubled by the fact that capable musicians often 
graduated from conservatories and music schools and then decided to become public 
school teachers, because they could make more as teachers than they could as 
orchestral musicians. The Minneapolis Symphony’s manager Boris Sokoloff noted in 
1957 that “at some schools [conservatories and schools of music] they try to tell the 
students what it is to work in an orchestra, but if they are honest and explain the low 
financial return, it is not very stimulating to the student’s choice.”233 In a similar vein, 
the Rockefeller Foundation’s 1965 Panel Report on the Future of Theatre, Dance, 
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and Music in America, recommended “that the artistic goal of the nation be the day 
when the performing arts are considered a permanent year-round contribution to 
communities throughout the country, and our artists are considered as necessary as 
our educators.”234 A press release from the Ford Foundation announcing its 
symphony orchestra program in 1966 noted that “any player in a major symphony has 
had to spend at least as much time, money, and effort on his education as a teacher. 
Furthermore, the conditions of employment are more favorable to schoolteachers than 
to orchestra musicians.”235  
In a 1965 meeting with Ford Foundation consultant George Kuyper, Los 
Angeles Philharmonic manager W.O. Severns, who succeeded Alice Taylor as LA 
Phil manager, cited public-school teacher wages as a target for orchestral musicians’ 
salaries: “He believes they should take teachers’ salaries as a yardstick with $10,000 
as the minimum salary…. At the present this minimum is about $7,500 or $8,000.”236 
In the early 1960s, only in the “Big Five” orchestras were median musician salaries 
higher than those of public-school teachers, and raising orchestra salaries above those 
of public school teachers became a particular priority for any prospective action in the 
orchestra field.237  
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By contrast, in terms of artistic reputation, the Ford Foundation learned that 
top U.S. orchestras were highly regarded at home and abroad. Although the bulk of 
music played by orchestras around the world was (and continues to be) predominantly 
of European origin, the foundation noted that the New York Philharmonic was 
formed in 1842, the same year as the Vienna Philharmonic; the Boston Symphony 
was founded in 1882, a year before the Berlin Philharmonic; the St. Louis Symphony 
came into existence in 1885, before the Amsterdam Concertgebouw; and the Chicago 
and Cincinnati orchestras both performed before the London Symphony.238 In 
addition, Ford Foundation research suggested that top U.S. orchestras were already 
performing more concerts than their European peers; during the 1963–64 season the 
Vienna Philharmonic gave twenty-three concerts and the London Symphony 
performed sixty-six. By contrast, during the same season, the Boston Symphony gave 
121 concerts, the Philadelphia Orchestra gave 159, and the New York Philharmonic 
gave 183.239 The United States also benefitted from a diffusion of symphonic talent 
across the country, second only to Germany. In France in the early 1960s there were 
only two orchestras outside Paris, and in England there were only five outside 
London; aside from several orchestras maintained by the Italian state radio, there was 
only one professional symphony orchestra in Italy.240 
Ford Foundation staff interviewed conductor, impresario, and Metropolitan 
Opera broadcast commentator Boris Goldovsky no fewer than nine times between 
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1957 and 1964, and consulted with renowned conductors such as Leopold Stokowski 
and Fritz Reiner.241 In 1958, while Musical Director of the Houston Symphony, 
Stokowski thought that efforts to compare the United States and Europe in terms of 
cultural sophistication were misguided: “There are, he says, thirty centuries of culture 
in Italy versus three in the United States…. In Italy people must have opera just as 
they must have spaghetti…. With the Americans music is more of an intellectual 
thing but with the Italians it is a thing of the heart.”242 Stokowski also believed that 
orchestras could not support themselves without either government or foundation 
support: “Eventually we have to find a way to overcome these difficulties through 
foundations, government support or some other way. Government support, however, 
would require more taxation and people don’t want to stand for it.”243 
Fritz Reiner, conductor of the Chicago Symphony, echoed Kuyper’s belief 
that one of the Chicago’s Symphony’s biggest problems was the lack of string 
players, and that the reason was partially that “the conservatory trained people for 
virtuoso performances” rather than “orchestral participation.”244 One positive 
development noted by Reiner was the increased number of musicians trained in the 
United States: “He contrasted the situation of large symphony orchestras when he 
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came to America in 1922 with the situation today. He said that the Chicago 
Symphony now had about 95 percent Americans in the orchestra, whereas in 1922 it 
would have been about 50–50.”245 Furthermore, whereas during the first half of the 
twentieth century it was almost mandatory for aspiring American musicians to 
acquire training in Europe, by the 1950s the top American conservatories, principally 
the Curtis Institute of Music in Philadelphia (founded 1924) and the Juilliard School 
in New York City (founded 1905), among others, were considered as good if not 
better than the premier European schools. 
Although foundation leaders talked extensively to conductors about the 
situation of orchestras, they were also careful to forge relationships with the 
American Federation of Musicians (AFM) and the American Symphony Orchestra 
League (ASOL, known today as the League of American Orchestras). Helen 
Thompson of the American Symphony Orchestra League appears to have first 
suggested the idea of a large-scale program for symphony orchestras sometime in 
1959, and the ASOL provided the foundation with information on orchestra budget 
sizes as early as 1957.246 Thompson also hoped that the creation of the International 
Conference of Symphony and Opera Musicians (ICSOM)—an organization founded 
in 1962 and incorporated within the AFM to specifically represent major symphony 
musicians—would improve labor relations and help raise wages. Furthermore, she 
believed that orchestras would need endowment funds to sustain and improve their 
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operations long-term.247 
One of the ASOL’s key contributions to the foundation’s research was the 
sharing of its financial data on hundreds of orchestras throughout North America. 
Under Thompson, the ASOL grouped orchestras into several categories based on 
annual budget size. Orchestras were classified as “major,” “metropolitan,” or 
“community,” based on guidelines established by the managers of the largest major 
orchestras. Although this classification was somewhat trivial in the 1950s, it became a 
symbol of legitimacy in the 1960s and 1970s, and was a key metric used by the Ford 
Foundation in choosing participants for its nascent Symphony Orchestra Program.248 
In 1958, twenty-six orchestras with annual budgets exceeding $175,000 were 
classified as major, while seventeen with annual budgets between $100,000 and 
$175,000 were considered metropolitan. By the early 1960s, major orchestras had 
budgets above $250,000, and in 1966 the threshold was again moved, this time to 
$500,000. In 1966, the ASOL classified twenty-five orchestras as major and thirty-six 
as metropolitan; by 1971, thirty orchestras were in the major category, and seventy-
six were in the metropolitan category.249 The semi-professional community 
orchestras, with annual budgets below $100,000, were not offered grants as part of 
the Program for Symphony Orchestras. 
Meetings with union leadership (the AFM), indicated not only the difficulties 
of a career in the orchestra (low pay, irregular employment schedules, etc.) but also 
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trepidation regarding a large-scale infusion of foundation funding. In a 1961 meeting 
with AFM president Herman Kenin and officials from the New Orleans, Atlanta, 
Seattle, Newark, Pittsburgh, and Detroit locals, many issues facing orchestral 
musicians were discussed. If the foundation were to give large amounts of money to 
the orchestras, some worried that local donors might curtail their contributions under 
the assumption that costs were now covered by an enormously wealthy third-party (a 
fear articulated in the literature as “crowding out”).250 Edward F. D’Arms 
summarized the opinions of various AFM officials thus: “If the FF were to aid in the 
expanded program, care must be taken to make clear to the local citizenry that their 
help is still needed, perhaps more than ever.” 251 Because the foundation money 
wouldn’t exist in perpetuity, the orchestras would need to maintain ties to local 
donors while simultaneously receiving the foundation’s support.  
Considering the input of these various stakeholders, several priorities became 
evident to Lowry and his staff. First, although it was necessary to guarantee longer 
employment, approaching fifty-two weeks, and higher wages for the players, it would 
only be possible if salaries increased enough for musicians to drop other non-musical, 
part-time jobs.252 Second, if there were to be a large infusion of Ford Foundation 
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money, local fundraising mechanisms would need to be maintained and new ones 
developed. Finally, it would be essential not only to provide short-term operational 
support, but also to encourage the creation and augmentation of orchestral 
endowment funds. As these needs became clear, Lowry and his staff began work on a 
formal program for symphony orchestras. 
 
Internal Competition for a Large Arts Project 
  
In the wake of the Ford Motor Company IPO in 1956, the Ford Foundation 
searched for large spending programs in the $75 million to $100 million range. 
McNeil Lowry recalls that Henry Heald, the foundation’s president from 1956 to 
1965, was under pressure to find suitable ways to distribute the foundation’s money: 
Heald “asked each division to bring up big spending programs…. Every program—
because that’s what they were in those days; there were thirteen of them; put forward 
ideas for how to spend somewhere between seventy-five and one-hundred million.”253 
Lowry’s humanities and arts program submitted two proposals: one for art museums, 
and one for symphony orchestras.254 
Humanities and arts staff members fixated on museums and orchestras in their 
research and travel in the late 1950s; a departmental budget proposal for the 1960 
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fiscal year notes visits to museums and symphony orchestras as the top two travel 
destinations for H&A staffers.255 Although it seems like museums share a similar 
niche, Lowry recalls that “both Mr. Heald and the Board showed a disposition about 
the orchestra as the oldest center of cultural activity spread geographically in the 
United States and in its cultural history.”256 Furthermore, Lowry believed that 
symphony orchestras were chosen partly because the estimated cost of a program for 
orchestras was between seventy-five and eighty-five million, whereas a similar 
program for the sixty leading art museums would have cost more than one-hundred 
million.257  
A Rockefeller Foundation Report on the performing arts published in 1965 
resonates with this notion of the orchestra as the oldest and most geographically 
diffuse of cultural activities, noting that “of all existing professional organized 
activity in the performing arts, the longest established, most widely dispersed, and 
most stable is the symphony orchestra.”258 In addition, the Rockefeller Report argues 
that orchestras formed the backbone of broader cultural activities in a city: 
Because of the superior organization and stability of symphony orchestras, 
they might well become the keystone in a developing arch of cooperative 
performing arts endeavors. Neither opera nor ballet can properly exist without 
an orchestra…. Using the orchestra as the basic component, these other forms 
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might be created around it.259 
 
Paul Ylvisaker, the director of the Ford Foundation’s Public Affairs Program 
during the early phases of the symphony program, recalled an almost religious 
reverence for symphony orchestras among board members: “Since symphonies are 
like motherhood, nobody was going to stand in the way of this thing, and it sailed all 
the way on up…to the trustees’ level. And here are the trustees whose wives were on 
the [symphony] boards and, you know, it meant something in the social pages, and 
how could you say anything against symphonies.”260 According to Ylvisaker, only 
trustee Henry Ford II—Henry Ford’s grandson—questioned the program’s necessity, 
asking why classical music organizations should take preference over music in 
popular culture: 
Henry Ford [II] looked round the room and he was embarrassed ‘cause he 
knew he was a philistine and he knew how he was regarded…. He was kind of 
a skunk at the tea party. He looked round the table and finally he blurted out. 
He said, “You know, I know what you’re going to think, but look, I’m going 
to ask a question: Given American tastes, why should we decide that we 
should give eighty-million to the symphony and not the same amount to the 
Beatles?”261 
 
 Ylvisaker continued: “I had the feeling that was a good fair democratic 
question, you know…. Well, of course, he was quickly encased in motherhood words 
and so forth and the vote went through.”262 
Looming large over any discussion of a large symphony program was the 
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Rockefeller Foundation’s Louisville Orchestra project in the 1950s. Boris Sokoloff, 
manager of the Minneapolis Symphony, said to McNeil Lowry in a 1957 interview 
that the Rockefeller Foundation was misguided in granting to only one orchestra and 
noted “a tendency on the part of many foundations to rush into things without 
adequate grass roots investigation.”263 
A strong link between the Rockefeller Louisville Program and the Ford 
Foundation’s Symphony Orchestra Program existed partly because Lowry’s assistant, 
Edward F. D’Arms, served in a similar role with the Rockefeller Foundation from 
1947 to 1957, during the early years of the Louisville grants.264 As discussed in 
Chapter 1, when D’Arms interviewed Louisville’s Mayor Charles Farnsley in 1952, 
Farnsley said that support for the Louisville Orchestra “helped Louisville to obtain 
new business firms.”265 A similar argument was made in 1964 when the Humanities 
and the Arts Program presented a discussion paper on the Program for Symphony 
Orchestras to the Ford Foundation board: “Many communities are aware of the 
importance of cultural activities as a means of attracting and holding industries and 
commercial enterprises which employ many workers.”266 
 More broadly, the assertation that grants to artists, and the arts in general, 
improved communities was essential in the Ford Foundation’s messaging. Lowry’s 
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1960 plea for increased funding for his arts and humanities program noted that “this is 
a time when the arts are important to national interest…. There are increasing and 
spontaneous utterances, public and private, of the belief that art and the artist cannot 
be left as mere ornaments to American life.”267 
 
The Program for Symphony Orchestras 
 
McNeil Lowry and his staff submitted a discussion paper concerning a 
“program for symphony orchestras” to the Ford Foundation’s Executive Committee 
in September 1964. Lowry’s paper included a request for up to $110 million to 
“consolidate, through one historic action, the position of the symphony orchestra in 
the United States.”268 Of this $110 million, $25 million would be granted as 
expendable funds, and $77–85 million, in the form of Ford Motor Company stock, 
would be held in trust, and distributed to the orchestras after a period of ten years. 
Lowry explicitly outlined the mission of the proposed program:  
The purposes of such a program would be 1) to maintain and improve the 
quality of performance of fine music by the leading orchestras in the country; 
2) to increase the amount of quality music played by these orchestras; 3) to 
improve the financial situation of orchestral musicians and so to ensure an 
adequate supply of fine players both now and in the future; and 4) to stabilize 
the financial position of the leading American orchestras.269 
 
                                               
267 "An Enlarged Program in the Arts: Humanities and the Arts Program Policy Discussion Paper," 
March 17th, 1960, box 122, report 002782, Ford Foundation records, Catalogued Reports, RAC. 
268 "Humanities and the Arts Program Discussion Paper: Program for Symphony Orchestras," 
September 24–25, 1964, box 63, Ford Foundation records, Education and Public Policy Program 
(EPP), Office of the Arts, Program Files, RAC. 
269 Ibid. 
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More specifically, the program would work toward season expansion and 
higher wages for musicians, while also developing fundraising mechanisms and 
building administrative competence among participating orchestras. After approval 
by the board, the foundation notified the public of the Symphony Orchestra Program 
via press release on October 22, 1965.270 Negotiations with individual orchestras 
during the subsequent months determined appropriate allocations of expendable and 
endowment funds, and by June 1966, the sixty-one participating orchestras were 
privy to the grant terms and their individual allocations.271 
                                               
270 Sigmund Koch to Harold L. Gregory, October 22, 1965, box 31, WML. 
271 "Telephone Calls from Orchestras After Receipt of Letters of Grant," June 29, 1966, box 30, WML. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Participants in the Symphony Orchestra Program272 
                                               
272 See the Ford Foundation: Millions for Music – Music for Millions,” Music Educators Journal, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Sep., 1966), pp. 83–86; 
"Orchestras by Group and 65–66 Budget," 1966, box 63, Ford Foundation records, Education and Public Policy Program (EPP), Office of the Arts, 
Program Files, RAC. 
Group 1
Boston S.O. 1881 12,606$     101,024$       2:1 $2,000,000 $500,000 $4,000,000 $4,133,721
Los Angeles P.O. 1919 9,303$       74,554$         2:1 $2,000,000 $500,000 $4,000,000 $4,000,000
Chicago S.O. 1891 11,121$     89,123$         2:1 $2,000,000 $500,000 $4,000,000 $4,025,429
Philadelphia O 1900 12,700$     101,777$       2:1 $2,000,000 $500,000 $4,000,000 $4,132,421
Cleveland O 1918 Unavailable Unavailable 2:1 $2,000,000 $500,000 $4,000,000 $6,540,427
Minneapolis S.O. 1903 7,250$       58,101$         2:1 $2,000,000 $500,000 $4,000,000 $7,924,814
Group 2
National (D.C) S.O. 1931 6,456$       51,738$         3:2 $2,000,000 $500,000 $3,000,000 $3,114,054
Pittsburgh S.O. 1926 5,373$       43,059$         3:2 $2,000,000 $500,000 $3,000,000 $3,000,000
San Francisco S.O. 1910 5,992$       48,020$         3:2 $2,000,000 $500,000 $3,000,000 $4,124,855
Cincinnati S.O. 1895 5,290$       42,394$         3:2 $2,000,000 $500,000 $3,000,000 $3,000,000
Group 3
Houston S.O. 1913 4,463$       35,766$         1:1 $2,000,000 $500,000 $2,000,000 $2,022,582
St. Louis S.O. 1880 5,146$       41,240$         1:1 $2,000,000 $500,000 $2,000,000 $2,000,475
Dallas S.O. 1899 4,168$       33,402$         1:1 $2,000,000 $500,000 $2,000,000 $2,036,808
Indianapolis S.O. 1929 3,778$       30,277$         1:1 $2,000,000 $500,000 $2,000,000 $2,247,885
Group 4
New York P.O. 1842 12,400$     99,373$         2:1 $1,000,000 $500,000 $2,000,000 $2,001,252
Detroit S.O. 1914 8,600$       68,920$         2:1 $1,000,000 $500,000 $2,000,000 $1,960,916
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Group 5
Baltimore S.O. 1914 4,590$       36,784$         1:1 $1,000,000 $250,000 $500,000 $1,000,000 $1,008,489
Buffalo P.O. 1936 4,720$       37,826$         1:1 $1,000,000 $250,000 $500,000 $1,000,000 $1,009,373
Seattle S.O. 1903 2,901$       23,249$         1:1 $1,000,000 $250,000 $500,000 $1,000,000 $1,109,354
New Orleans S.O. 1935 3,930$       31,495$         1:1 $1,000,000 $250,000 $500,000 $1,000,000 $1,073,667
Rochester P.O. 1923 5,600$       44,878$         1:1 $1,000,000 $250,000 $500,000 $1,000,000 $1,009,641
San Antonio S.O. 1939 2,929$       23,473$         1:1 $1,000,000 $250,000 $500,000 $1,000,000 $1,109,354
Kansa City S.O. 1933 3,360$       26,927$         1:1 $1,000,000 $250,000 $500,000 $1,000,000 $132,092
Denver S.O. 1934 3,216$       25,773$         1:1 $1,000,000 $250,000 $500,000 $1,000,000 $1,002,657
Atlanta S.O. 1945 2,070$       16,589$         1:1 $1,000,000 $250,000 $500,000 $1,000,000 $1,017,763
Group 6
Milwaukee S.O. 1959 4,257$       34,115$         1:1 $1,000,000 $250,000 $1,000,000 $1,239,232
Utah (Salt Lake City) S.O. 1940 2,278$       18,256$         1:1 $1,000,000 $250,000 $250,000 $1,000,000 $1,053,832
Hartford S.O. 1947 2,398$       19,217$         1:1 $1,000,000 $250,000 $100,000 $1,000,000 $1,003,664
Oakland S.O. 1933 1,242$       9,953$            1:1 $1,000,000 $250,000 $100,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,808
American S.O. 1962 1,600$       12,822$         1:1 $1,000,000 $250,000 $250,000 $1,000,000 $0
Portland (Oregon) S.O. 1911 1,700$       13,624$         1:1 $1,000,000 $250,000 $1,000,000 $1,074,655
Group 7
Honolulu S.O. 1901 2,885$       23,120$         1:1 $750,000 $100,000 $250,000 $750,000 $781,741
Syracuse S.O. 1961 1,740$       13,944$         1:1 $750,000 $250,000 $750,000 $776,075
North Carolina S.O. 1932 1,260$       10,098$         1:1 $750,000 $250,000 $750,000 $843,171
Group 8
Phoenix S.O. 1947 1,846$       14,794$         1:1 $600,000 $50,000 $150,000 $600,000 $666,656
Oklahoma City S.O. 1937 2,545$       20,396$         1:1 $600,000 $150,000 $600,000 $599,982
Birmingham S.O. 1933 1,490$       11,941$         1:1 $600,000 $50,000 $150,000 $600,000 $682,858
Average 
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Group 9
San Diego S.O. 1927 1,250$       10,017$         1:1 $500,000 $100,000 $500,000 $531,816
Louisville O 1937 1,850$       14,826$         1:1 $500,000 $100,000 $100,000 $500,000 $556,898
Florida (Orlando) S.O. 1951 1,802$       14,441$         1:1 $500,000 $100,000 $500,000 $523,832
Tulsa P.O. 1948 1,300$       10,418$         1:1 $500,000 $100,000 $500,000 $561,037
Nashville S.O. 1946 1,400$       11,220$         1:1 $500,000 $100,000 $100,000 $500,000 $506,658
New Haven S.O. 1894 1,000$       8,014$            1:1 $500,000 $100,000 $500,000 $606,728
New Jersey S.O. 1924 1,100$       8,815$            1:1 $500,000 $50,000 $150,000 $500,000 $517,370
Columbus (Ohio) S.O. 1951 905$           7,253$            1:1 $500,000 $100,000 $500,000 $597,804
Toledo O 1943 850$           6,812$            1:1 $500,000 $50,000 $100,000 $500,000 $510,091
Sacramento S.O. 1948 720$           5,770$            1:1 $500,000 $100,000 $100,000 $500,000 $538,039
Richmond S.O. 1957 655$           5,249$            1:1 $500,000 $50,000 $100,000 $500,000 $500,508
Kalamazoo S.O. 1921 420$           3,366$            1:1 $500,000 $100,000 $500,000 $758,850
Wichita S.O. 1944 500$           4,007$            1:1 $500,000 $50,000 $100,000 $500,000 $608,620
Group 10
Memphis S.O. 1951 930$           7,453$            1:1 $400,000 $100,000 $400,000 $404,822
Omaha S.O. 1924 800$           6,411$            1:1 $400,000 $100,000 $400,000 $486,012
Group 11
Little (New York City) O 1947 2,500$       20,035$         1:1 $350,000 $75,000 $350,000 $81,309
Rhode Island (Providence) P.O. 1945 1,360$       10,899$         1:1 $350,000 $75,000 $75,000 $350,000 $354,708
Festival (New York City) O 1964 900$           7,213$            1:1 $350,000 $75,000 $350,000 $0
Hudson Valley (Poughkeepsie) P.O. 1960 856$           6,860$            1:1 $250,000 $75,000 $250,000 $250,778
Brooklyn P.O. 1954 787$           6,307$            1:1 $250,000 $75,000 $250,000 $77,866
Shreveport S.O. 1948 953$           7,637$            1:1 $350,000 $75,000 $250,000 $250,778
Fort Wayne P.O. 1944 490$           3,927$            1:1 $250,000 $75,000 $250,000 $250,000
Jacksonville S.O. 1949 884$           7,084$            1:1 $250,000 $75,000 $250,000 $264,343
Group 12
S.O. of Puerto Rico 1957 1,016$       8,142$            N/A $0 $375,000 $0 $0 $0
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Although Lowry initially asked for a total of $110 million, including $25 
million for expendable funds and $85 million for the endowment trust, discussions 
with the Ford Foundation’s trustees brought the total amount of the program down to 
$80.2 million. In addition to $25 million in expendable funds, as originally planned, 
the endowment trust received $58.75 million, with $58 million making up the 
endowment fund contributions of the foundation and the remaining $750,000 
allocated to the two program beneficiaries for which no endowment funds were 
distributed: The Symphony Orchestra of Puerto Rico, which was given $375,000 to 
promote annual tours in the Caribbean, and the American Symphony Orchestra 
League, which received $360,000 for operating costs.273 
Twenty-five of the participating orchestras also received what were 
designated as “developmental funds,” which were additional expendable funds paid 
yearly. These funds were given to the smaller major orchestras (that is, those shown 
in Table 3.2 that received only $1 million in endowment funds), and to the so-called 
metropolitan orchestras. Whereas the regular expendable funds were intended to help 
the orchestras maintain and grow their regular operations, the development funds 
were intended to help orchestras with special projects. In addition, unlike the 
expendable funds, the orchestras themselves were required to apply for their allocated 
development funds annually and specify exactly how they would be utilized.  
For example, the Baltimore Symphony received $50,000 in development 
funds annually for five years, for a total of $250,000 (in addition to the orchestra’s 
                                               
273 "Puerto Rico Symphony Developmental Funds," 1971, box 30, WML. 
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endowment and expendable funds). This sum was devoted primarily to paying 
salaries for new weeks added to the season, but also to establishing twelve regional 
symphony societies.274 Table 3.3 shows the uses of the total developmental funds by 
the twenty-five orchestras as described in the Foundation’s 1972 developmental fund 
assessment. 
 
Table 3.3: Development Funds Usage as a Percentage of $4.1 Million Total275 
 
Direct Salary Support  61% 
Extending Performance Opportunities 19% 
Miscellaneous Items  9% 
"Assistance with Total Operation" 6% 
Pension Funds  3% 
Extra Musicians  1% 
 
 
The announcement of the Symphony Orchestra Program and the allocations to 
its participants led to great disappointment among the many small orchestras around 
the country that were not included. Although the foundation only accepted major and 
metropolitan orchestras, according to the ASOL’s budgetary standards, it still 
received a great deal of correspondence from smaller orchestras. As late as February 
                                               
274 It is unclear what exactly the ‘12 regional societies’ did, where they were located or if any still 
exist. The Mid-Shore Symphony Society of Centreville, Maryland, which is currently active as of 
2018, may have been one of these societies created by the Ford Foundation’s developmental grant; it 
was created in 1970. See "Review and Evaluation of Symphony Developmental Funds Granted Under 
the 1966 Symphony Orchestra Program," October 20, 1972, box 62, Ford Foundation records, 
Education and Public Policy Program (EPP), Office of the Arts, Program Files, RAC; and 
http://www.baltimoresymphonyontheshore.com/. 
275 "Review and Evaluation of Symphony Developmental Funds Granted Under the 1966 Symphony 
Orchestra Program," October 20, 1972, box 62, Ford Foundation records, Education and Public Policy 
Program (EPP), Office of the Arts, Program Files, RAC. 
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1966, the foundation still considered including community orchestras below the 
$100,000 threshold, and requested information from the ASOL about these smaller 
orchestras.276 In addition, many smaller orchestras, including some with expenses of 
more than $100,000 annually, expressed frustration for not being included in the 
program. 
One such orchestra was the Dayton Philharmonic, which maintained 
membership with the ASOL and paid its annual membership dues, but failed to 
provide its annual financial information to the league. This financial information was 
collected by the ASOL every year from member orchestras and used to update its 
listings of major and metropolitan orchestras. But because this classification held 
little important in the 1950s and early 1960s, some smaller orchestras failed to send in 
their financial information, were not included in the ASOL’s listings, and thus not 
referred to the Ford Foundation in preparation for the Symphony Orchestra Program. 
A letter from Helen Thompson to Edward F. D’Arms in October 1965 notes 
the newfangled importance of the ASOL’s classifications. “Had it been possible for 
us to have known how vital this listing would be in conjunction with the endowment 
program, I would have discussed it more fully with you…. We do not include any 
orchestra on these listings unless and until the orchestra has documented its financial 
operations with the League office.”277 Because the Dayton Philharmonic failed to 
                                               
276 Letter from Helen M. Thompson to Edward F. D’Arms, February 17, 1966, box 62, Ford 
Foundation records, Education and Public Policy Program (EPP), Office of the Arts, Program Files, 
RAC. 
277 Letter from Helen M. Thompson to Edward F. D’Arms, October 26, 1965, A Guide to the Ford 
Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC. 
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send in any financial reports, it was not included on ASOL lists, and was not included 
in the Symphony Orchestra Program, even though its budget qualified it for 
“metropolitan” status.278 
The Dayton Philharmonic was a close case, but many smaller, more obscure 
orchestras wrote to the Ford Foundation and/or the ASOL hoping for last-minute 
inclusion. Boston Symphony Orchestra violinist Victor Manusevitch was particularly 
persistent with his pet project, the semi-professional Cambridge Civic Orchestra, and 
he corresponded intermittently with Ford Foundation staff from 1964 to 1970 in an 
attempt to wrangle financial support for his orchestra. Although the Cambridge Civic 
Orchestra was too small and too amateurish for consideration in the Symphony 
Orchestra Program, Manusevitch persisted until a meeting in 1970 with foundation 
staffer Richard P. Kapp, in which Kapp noted: “I outlined to him all of the reasons 
that I could not encourage him to look to the FF for assistance and I think he finally 
realized that no help could be expected.” Frustrated, Manusevitch responded: “If I 
don’t believe that there is an ultimate chance of FF help I have nothing to look 
forward to and will probably disband the whole orchestra.”279 
Some smaller orchestras worried that they would be crowded out by nearby 
orchestras receiving Ford funds. The Philharmonic Society of Northern New Jersey—
a small community orchestra in Paterson, NJ not included in the Ford trust—wrote to 
foundation president Henry Heald expressing worry that the grantee New Jersey 
                                               
278 Ibid. 
279 "Interview with Victor Manusevitch, Music Director, Cambridge Civic Symphony Orchestra, Inc.," 
June 29, 1970, box 28, WML. 
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Symphony would overwhelm the Newark metro area with free and discounted 
concerts and render the Philharmonic Society of Northern New Jersey irrelevant. Ford 
staff member Sigmund Koch wrote back and argued that this was not the case: “I can 
assure you that even if the New Jersey Symphony were to be one of the grantees in 
this program, its expanded activities would not reach the proportions of flooding the 
Paterson area with concerts, free or otherwise, in a manner to endanger the future 
activities of the Philharmonic Society of Northern New Jersey.”280 
Helen Thompson and the ASOL received a bevy of similarly distressed letters 
from small-budget orchestra. Thompson noted in late 1965 that 
the announcement of the program seems to be casting a cloud of doom over a 
good many of the more enterprising and rapidly expanding community 
orchestras…. Some of these orchestras…seem to feel that the endowment 
program is going to give such a push forward to the majors and metropolitans 
in their geographical regions…that they—the community orchestras—will 
find they are no longer needed in the musical world. I do not share this 
apprehension.281 
 
Small community orchestras, ranging from unpaid volunteer orchestras, to 
semi-professional union orchestras, are the most prevalent class of orchestras in the 
United States, with a great deal of organizational and operational diversity. Thus, it is 
difficult to assess the impact of the Program for Symphony Orchestras on the 
community orchestras, because unlike the major and metropolitan orchestras, 
community orchestras as a group do not share as many salient characteristics. Most of 
                                               
280 Letter from Sigmund Koch to Carl E. Schmid, President, the Philharmonic Society of Northern 
New Jersey, December 28, 1965, box 62, Ford Foundation records, Education and Public Policy 
Program (EPP), Office of the Arts, Program Files, RAC. 
281 Letter from Helen M. Thompson to Edward F. D’Arms, October 26, 1965, A Guide to the Ford 
Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC. 
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the larger budget community orchestras in the 1960s, like the Amarillo, Harrisburg, 
and Springfield (IL) Symphonies still exist. Others, such as the Scranton 
Philharmonic, merged with other local orchestras, and some, like the Albuquerque 
Civic Symphony and the Philharmonic Society of Northern New Jersey, are now 
defunct. 
The lucky participating organizations received a combination of expendable 
and developmental funds paid quarterly during the first five years of the program as 
well as endowment funds payable at the termination of the grant period on June 30, 
1976.282 To prioritize fundraising, the endowment funds would only be released to 
orchestras that succeeded in raising matching funds to the foundation’s contributions. 
Although the orchestras received notice of the grant program in 1966 and could count 
on a certain level of expendable funds over the next five years, they were not entitled 
to any of the endowment money until 1976, and only then if they independently 
raised a specified amount of matching funds by June 30, 1971. As shown in Table 3.2 
above, except for the Detroit Symphony, the Kansas City Symphony, the American 
Symphony, the Oklahoma City Symphony, the Festival Orchestra of New York, the 
Little Orchestra (N.Y.), and the Brooklyn Philharmonic, all of the participating 
orchestras were successful in raising matching funds. At the conclusion of the 
matching period a total of more than $84 million—more than half a billion dollars of 
purchasing power in 2018—had been independently raised by all of the orchestras.283  
                                               
282 “Ford Foundation: Grants, April 11, 1963–December 5, 1968,” The New York Philharmonic Digital 
Archives, accessed November 2015, http://archives.nyphil.org/. 
283 "Special Report: Symphonic Strains (Financial)," February 1, 1973, box 29, WML. 
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 For example, as shown in Table 3.2, the New York Philharmonic was notified 
of a total grant of $1.5 million on June 24, 1966.284 As the foundation’s letter to the 
orchestra explains, $1 million would be devoted to endowment funds (payable at the 
end of the ten-year period) and $.5 million would be designated as expendable funds 
and paid quarterly from 1967 to 1971. Like the other premier orchestras, the New 
York Philharmonic was obligated to match each Ford Foundation endowment dollar 
at a 2:1 ratio. Thus, the total impact of the program would be the $1.5 million from 
the Foundation, plus the $2 million raised by the orchestra itself, for a total of $3.5 
million.  
As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, the Minnesota Orchestra raised more 
money than other participating orchestra. Required to raise $4 million to claim a final 
endowment grant of $2 million from the foundation, the orchestra instead raised 
nearly $8 million in matching funds by 1971, resulting in a total endowment fund of 
more than $10 million.285  
Of the sixty orchestras awarded a beneficial interest in the trust, by 1971, 
five—the American Symphony Orchestra, the Brooklyn Philharmonic, the Festival 
Orchestra Society, the Kansas City Symphony, and the Little Orchestra Society—
failed to reach their matching requirements and were cut off. This reduction in 
beneficiaries resulted in a rebalancing of the trust in 1971, with the terminated 
orchestras’ interests—a total of $2.995 million—split among the fifty-five remaining 
                                               
284 “Ford Foundation: Grants, April 11, 1963–December 5, 1968,” The New York Philharmonic Digital 
Archives, accessed November 2015, http://archives.nyphil.org/. 
285 See "Financial Position of the Minnesota Orchestral Association," 1971, box 30, WML; and 
Minnesota Orchestra Reconciliation, 1971, box 30, WML. 
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orchestras.286 Two orchestras—the Detroit Symphony and the Oklahoma City 
Symphony—were slightly below their required matching amounts but were allowed 
to maintain their interests in the Trust. 
Notably, among the five New York City orchestras included in the 
endowment trust, only the New York Philharmonic succeeded in its matching 
program. The Festival Orchestra Society went out of business in 1968, and the 
Brooklyn Philharmonic, Little Orchestra Society, and American Symphony ended 
well below their matching goals. In the case of the Little Orchestra Society, a New 
York City orchestra that is still active today, the foundation demanded at the start of 
the program in 1966 “that the Orchestra take effective steps to diversify its base of 
philanthropic support.”287 The Little Orchestra’s did manage to raise $81,309 towards 
its goal of $350,000. But in addition to falling short in its fundraising, the Little 
Orchestra received 99 percent of its annual maintenance funds—its regular 
fundraising operations—from the music director, Thomas K. Scherman, and the 
Scherman Foundation, a family foundation for which the conductor was a 
benefactor.288 
The American Symphony Orchestra, founded by Leopold Stokowski in 1962, 
was a particularly difficult case. It appears that the orchestra’s administrators were 
woefully unprepared to participate in the Symphony Orchestra Program. Although it 
was required to raise $1 million, the ASO reported exactly $0 in its endowment 
                                               
286 "Termination of Five Grants Awarded Under the Symphony Orchestra Program," September 1, 
1972, box 29, WML. 
287 Notes on the Little Orchestra Society, 1972, box 30, WML. 
288 Ibid. 
  
139  
 
matching account on June 30, 1971. Curiously, the orchestra did note $5,262 of 
royalties raised toward the matching challenge in its June 30, 1967 report to the 
Foundation. But by the following year’s report, this small sum had been transferred to 
a separate fund, the “Leopold Stokowski Fund.”289 The orchestra was terminated 
from the trust in 1971, but has maintained operations, under longtime conductor Leon 
Botstein, to the present day. 
In July 1972—the first year without the discontinued orchestras—the trustee 
of the Ford trust, the Bank of New York, made erroneous distributions of income to 
four of the discontinued orchestras, including the American Symphony. The other 
three orchestras returned the erroneous distributions to the bank, but the American 
Symphony Orchestra refused to return the mistaken $12,941, instead asking that the 
bank consider the distribution as a charitable contribution. This request was of course 
not acceptable, and a lawsuit was filed demanding the return of the full amount.290 
Because the orchestra nearly declared bankruptcy in the early 1970s when Leopold 
Stokowski resigned as conductor and returned to London, it is unlikely that the 
$12,941 was ever returned to the Bank of New York. 
Even some orchestras that achieved their matching requirements by June 30, 
1971 were not entirely out of the woods and in the foundation’s good graces. One of 
the terms outlined in the June 24, 1966 letter to the participating orchestras stated:  
Funds raised by the Orchestra for the purpose of Foundation matching are to 
be retained by the Orchestra in an isolated endowment account, established for 
                                               
289 American Symphony Orchestra Notes, December 21, 1971, box 29, WML. 
290 Letter from Marcia Thompson to Symphony Orchestra Program Trust, April 30, 1973, box 29, 
WML. 
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the purpose of this program, the principal of which is to be retained by the 
Orchestra until the termination of the program on June 30, 1976.291 
 
Thus, the matching funds raised toward the endowment challenge could not be 
withdrawn until June 30, 1976. The New Jersey Symphony appears to have 
overlooked this provision; according to annual financial reports submitted by the 
orchestra to the Ford Foundation, $250,000—half the total $500,000 raised—was 
withdrawn between November 4, 1971 and February 18, 1972. $50,000 was restored 
in May, 1972, leaving the New Jersey Symphony “owing” $200,000 to its isolated 
Ford endowment account.292 As a result of this mistake, on June 29, 1972, the 
foundation issued a stern warning: 
If the Symphony prior to September 1, 1972 has not restored to its Ford 
isolated endowment account all principal withdrawn from the account, the 
Symphony authorizes the Trustee to pay all income accruing on or after 
September 1, 1972, and upon the termination of the Trust the Symphony’s 
share of principal, to all other qualifying orchestras according to their pro rata 
share of income and principal.293 
 
The New Jersey Symphony provided fiscal year 1972 audited financial 
statements to the foundation in December, 1972, but they were apparently so 
incomplete and confusing that the foundation decided to withhold final judgment 
until fiscal year 1973 statements were released. The 1973 audit was released late, in 
May, 1974, and revealed that not only had the orchestra failed to reimburse its 
isolated Ford account, but that it had further withdrawn the principal, leaving only 
                                               
291 “Ford Foundation: Grants, April 11, 1963–December 5, 1968,” The New York Philharmonic Digital 
Archives, accessed November 2015, http://archives.nyphil.org/. 
292 Letter from Symphony Orchestra Trust Committee to Alan V. Lowenstein, June 29, 1972, box 29, 
WML. 
293 Ibid. 
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$25,000 left in the account. Of this unfortunate failure, Program Officer Marcia 
Thompson noted “there seems little alternative, unhappily, but to advise the 
Symphony that its beneficial interest in the Trust has been terminated.”294  
The Orchestra of Puerto Rico was a special case, in that it was the only 
grantee orchestra incorporated outside of a U.S. state. In addition, the Orchestra of 
Puerto Rico was the only orchestra included to receive most (95 percent) of its 
funding from direct government subsidy, via the government of Puerto Rico and the 
government’s Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company.295 The orchestra 
performed a short season of eight weeks, with some musicians imported from the 
mainland, and the remainder mostly associated with the Conservatory of Puerto Rico. 
In early 1966 two representatives of the orchestra visited with the foundation in New 
York seeking participation in the Symphony Orchestra Program. But when it became 
clear that there would be a matching component, the orchestra’s leaders balked at the 
impracticability of raising matching funds under a regime of direct government 
subsidy.296 
In lieu of a stake in the endowment trust, the Ford Foundation granted the 
Orchestra of Puerto Rico developmental (expendable) grants of $75,000 per year for 
five years ($375,000 total) for annual two-week, off-island tours. Although this 
appropriation differed from the others, both because it had no matching component 
and also because of its rigid specificity of purpose, Lowry’s staff related its objectives 
                                               
294 "Symphony Orchestra Program: New Jersey Symphony Orchestra," July 31, 1974, box 29, WML. 
295 "Proposed Expendable Grant to the Orchestra of Puerto Rico," April 8, 1966, Box 30, WML. 
296 Ibid. 
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to the greater objective of the Symphony Orchestra Program in that they would serve 
to extend the season, increase the income for players, expose an underserved region 
(the Caribbean) to orchestral music, and “enhance the prestige of Puerto Rico and its 
orchestra in Latin American circles.”297 When reviewing the grant to the Orchestra of 
Puerto in 1972, after the five years of expendable funds were distributed, Program 
Officer Oleg Lobanov noted: “This is a laudable program although there seems little 
lasting benefit. All in all, a good utilization of funds.”298 
 
Conclusion  
 
Before and during the Symphony Orchestra Program, officials from the Ford 
Foundation and the ASOL tried to convey to all involved that the $80.2 million 
investment was not a panacea for all of the troubles faced by orchestras. Helen 
Thompson noted that  
This program—exciting, challenging and generous as it is—will not even 
yield sufficient endowment income to meet the present operating deficits of 
the major orchestras—to say nothing of the combined operating deficits of the 
major and  metropolitan orchestras or the inevitable increase in the operating 
deficits over the next several years.299 
 
The Ford Foundation echoed this point in its 1966 press release announcing 
                                               
297 "Proposed Expendable Grant to the Orchestra of Puerto Rico," April 8, 1966, Box 30, WML. 
298 "Puerto Rico Symphony: Evaluation o Developmental Grant of $375,000," August 8, 1972, Box 30, 
WML. 
299 "Comments on the Ford Foundation Orchestra Endowment Program from Helen M. Thompson to 
Large Budget Community Orchestras Affiliated with the League," October 28, 1965, box 62, Ford 
Foundation records, Education and Public Policy Program (EPP), Office of the Arts, Program Files, 
RAC. 
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the allocations to the orchestras: “The Foundation’s program, despite its size, will 
hardly solve all the problems of the orchestras. Nor does it mean anything like 
affluence to the orchestra musician.”300 For every major and metropolitan orchestra 
musician to earn annual salaries of $15,000 and $5,000 respectively ($116,000 and 
$39,000 in 2018 dollars), a program in the range of $463 million was required, nearly 
six times the Ford Foundation’s $80.2 million effort.301 
The Ford Foundation expected that the results of the program would vary 
depending on the situations of each individual orchestra and the people involved in 
the day-to-day operations, echoing the Rockefeller Foundation’s 1965 Panel Report:  
Too many people believe that a simple infusion of more money will solve all 
the problems of the performing arts in this country. But money is, in the last 
analysis, a neutral object, a tool. It has no capacity for vision; this must be 
supplied by men. Money can be poured into any project, but if it is not used 
wisely and imaginatively, it is money wasted.302 
 
And as early as 1973, some Ford Foundation officials characterized the 
symphony orchestra program as misguided. Ford Foundation staff member Paul 
Ylvisaker predicted that “all it would do is raise the union wages and would put the 
orchestras right back where they had been.” Describing the program overall as “a 
disaster from start to finish,” Ylvisaker based his claims on the idea that without 
drastic changes such as raising revenues, lowering expenses, and building audiences, 
                                               
300 "News from the Ford Foundation: Ford Foundation Program for Symphony Orchestras," July 6, 
1966, Box 3, Series 1.3, MOAA. 
301 "News from the Ford Foundation: Ford Foundation Program for Symphony Orchestras," July 6, 
1966, Box 3, Series 1.3, MOAA. 
302 The Performing Arts: Rockefeller Panel Report of the Future of Theatre, Dance, Music in America 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 149. 
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the foundation’s contributions wouldn’t engender any sustainable change.303 In her 
1973 oral history, Marcia Thompson (not to be confused with Helen Thompson, the 
ASOL director), the Ford Foundation Program Officer presiding over the Symphony 
Orchestra Program, distrusted the abilities of the individual orchestras to manage their 
own large endowments: “If we had to do it over, if we had that $80 million…I 
wouldn’t start out with endowment because I think endowment is only as good as the 
management of the endowment or the management of the institution, and I just don’t 
think most symphony orchestras have disciplined themselves sufficiently.”304  
It is tempting to judge orchestras based on their success in raising matching 
funds relative to their endowment goals. But a successful matching campaign did not 
necessarily ensure long-term success, and the efficacy of the Ford Foundation’s 
Program for Symphony Orchestras should be rated in terms of the long-term success 
of orchestras who met their matching requirements. In the case of the Oakland 
Symphony, for example, successful matching efforts appear to have had the opposite 
of the intended effect, with the orchestra eventually filing for bankruptcy in 1986. As 
we shall see in Chapter 4, the Oakland Symphony fell into the pattern of 
mismanagement to which Thompson and Ylvisaker alluded, despite receiving more 
than $1 million as part of the Symphony Orchestra Program.  
                                               
303 Charles T. Morrissey, "Interview with Paul Ylvisaker for the Ford Foundation Oral History 
Project," September 27, 1973, and October 27, 1973, box 3, Ford Foundation Records, Oral History 
Project, RAC, 47. 
304 Charles T. Morrissey and Ronald J. Grele, "Interview with Marcia T. Thompson for the Ford 
Foundation Oral History Project," August 28, 1973, box 3, Ford Foundation Records, Oral History 
Project, RAC, 25–26. 
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 By contrast, the Minnesota Orchestra thrived under the Symphony Orchestra 
Program. It raised more endowment matching funds than any other participating 
orchestra, expanded its reach through extended touring, augmented its administrative 
staff, and built a new hall in downtown Minneapolis. The orchestra leveraged robust 
local support and efficient management to wring maximum benefit from the Ford 
Foundation’s contributions.  
In the following chapters I discuss the long-term implications of the 
symphony orchestra on two particularly divergent orchestras: the Oakland Symphony 
and the Minnesota Orchestra. The results of these case studies suggest that ultimately 
the results of the Ford Foundation’s Program for Symphony Orchestras depended not 
so much on the design or implementation of the program, but rather on the orchestras’ 
complex local situations. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
The Symphony Orchestra Program in Context 1: The Oakland Symphony 
 
Introduction 
 
On September 13, 1986, the front page of the San Francisco Chronicle 
reported the collapse of the fifty-three-year-old Oakland Symphony Orchestra.305 
After losing nearly $1 million in its final season, amassing unsustainable debts, and 
exhausting the interest of donors, the financial outlook of the Oakland Symphony was 
grim. But alongside the financial struggles encountered by many U.S. orchestras, the 
Oakland Symphony’s demise also represented a dearth of purpose; one of the most 
dynamic orchestras in the United States in the 1960s had simply become a lesser 
iteration of the nearby San Francisco Symphony. 
The Oakland Symphony’s downfall typifies many of the difficulties 
experienced by performing arts non-profits, and the myriad pitfalls available to 
executives, board members, and musicians. But the orchestra’s final decline into 
bankruptcy also exemplifies the optimism of orchestras in the period following the 
Ford Foundation’s Symphony Orchestra Program. Having successfully participated in 
the Ford Program by raising matching funds and expanding programming with 
expendable funds, the fall of the Oakland Symphony suggests that the Symphony 
Orchestra Program was not a panacea for every orchestra. 
                                               
305 Michael Harris, "Oakland Symphony Cancels Season," San Francisco Chronicle, September 13, 
1986. 
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 Although no single person or organization was ultimately responsible for the 
Oakland Symphony’s decline, the Ford Foundation’s intervention in the 1960s and 
1970s led to unrealistic ambitions by board members, managers, and musicians in the 
subsequent decades. This chapter discusses how the Ford Foundation’s money 
ironically contributed to the orchestra’s decline and eroded the orchestra’s identity in 
the Bay Area and the United States.  
  
The Ford Grant and Musician Compensation 
   
 The total stated grant to the Oakland Symphony from the Ford Foundation 
equaled $1.35 million, including $1 million in matched endowment funds, $250,000 
in expendable funds distributed annually from 1967 through 1971, and $100,000 in 
“developmental” funds, distributed annually for special projects proposed by the 
orchestra.306 The orchestra was also entitled to the dividends earned by the Ford stock 
placed in trust, as well as to the long-term capital gains accrued by the trust fund over 
the ten year grant period. In addition, in 1971, a reallocation of shares of the several 
orchestras that had failed to match the Ford Foundation’s endowment contributions 
increased the Oakland symphony’s share of the total Ford trust.307 Thus, the Ford 
Foundation’s total contribution to the Oakland Symphony—not including the 
$1,000,808 raised by the orchestra itself—amounted to $2,130,343: $1 million in trust 
                                               
306 Letter from Joseph M. McDaniel to Edgar Kaiser, 1966, A Guide to the Ford Foundation Records, 
Grants O–R, RAC. 
307 Letter from William H. Nims to Harry R. Lange, 1972, A Guide to the Ford Foundation Records, 
Grants O–R, RAC. 
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principal, $230,930 in long-term capital gains (a result of the increase in stock price 
from $50.50 per share in 1966 to $58.50 per share in 1976), $350,000 in expendable 
funds, and $549,413 in dividends.308 
As with many other participating orchestras, the distribution structure of the 
Ford program proved problematic for several reasons. By delivering expendable 
funds for only five years, the orchestras’ budgets were dramatically increased with 
the expectation that they would be able to raise funding from other sources when the 
Ford Foundation distributions ceased. In addition, the expendable funds, which were 
intended for new endeavors and salary development, created unsustainable 
expectations among audiences and musicians. When the Ford Foundation wrote its 
last expendable fund checks in 1971, the orchestras that failed to successfully 
capitalize—by creating sustainable programs and developing new audiences—were 
left to make difficult cuts. 
The New Jersey Symphony, based in Newark, is somewhat similar to the 
Oakland Symphony in that both orchestras were located in the immediate vicinity of 
world-class orchestras. The distance between Newark and Manhattan, home of the 
New York Philharmonic, is about the same distance between Oakland and San 
Francisco, and the New Jersey Symphony’s premature invasion of its endowment 
funds in 1971—as discussed in Chapter 3—exemplifies the pressure orchestras were 
under when the expendable funds ceased.309 
                                               
308 "Symphony Orchestra Program: Summary of Transactions," 1976, A Guide to the Ford Foundation 
Records, Grants O–R, RAC. 
309 Letter from Symphony Orchestra Trust Committee to Alan V. Lowenstein, June 29, 1972, box 29, 
WML. 
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 Although the Oakland Symphony did not invade its endowment funds as early 
as the New Jersey Symphony did, the the expendable contribution of the Ford 
Foundation to the Oakland Symphony—$350,000 spread over five seasons—
amounted to an annual distribution of $70,000, a large part of the orchestra’s total 
annual budget of $320,000 during the 1965–66 season.310 Melanie Beene, in her 
exhaustive 1988 study of the orchestra’s decline, Autopsy of an Orchestra, describes 
the impact of the Ford Foundation’s expendable funds:  
Calculating from the ten-year long-range plan submitted with the Ford 
proposal, during the first year under the grant program Ford funds supported 
26% of the Association’s annual budget. This declined to 15% after five years 
and to 5% of the budget after ten years. The Ford Foundation funds effectively 
inflated the organization’s budget only then to be withdrawn. The Association 
was not able to replace the missing Ford income.311  
  
The foundation’s intention was that the expendable funds would help the 
orchestras tap new audiences and donors, and raise the salaries of orchestral 
musicians. Symphony musicians in many of the recipient orchestras, chronically 
underemployed and underpaid, seized on the Ford program as an opportunity to raise 
their compensation. Indeed, one of the Ford Foundation’s goals in establishing the 
program in the first place was to provide enhanced compensation for the musicians, 
as we saw in Chapter 3. The Oakland musicians were no exception, working under a 
                                               
310 "Orchestras by Group and 65–66 Budget," 1966, box 63, Ford Foundation records, Education and 
Public Policy Program (EPP), Office of the Arts, Program Files, RAC. 
311 See Melanie Beene, Patricia A. Mitchell, And Fenton Johnson, “Autopsy of an Orchestra: An 
Analysis of Factors Contributing to The Bankruptcy of The Oakland Symphony Orchestra 
Association” (San Francisco: Melanie Beene, 2012), 48. 
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contract that guaranteed them less than $800 for the entire 1965–66 season.312 As a 
result, the majority of Oakland musicians worked other jobs, many of them 
nonmusical, and the orchestra’s official 1966 application to the Ford Foundation 
includes a diverse list of these occupations. Although many players maintained 
musical jobs typical of orchestral musicians around the country, such as college 
teaching and freelancing, many also taught in public and private schools, and 
managed their own private studios. In addition, many maintained non-musical careers 
as engineers, small business owners, and craftspeople: 
                                               
312 Adjusted for inflation this would account for about $6000 in 2016 purchasing power. Oakland 
Symphony Wage Scale, 1970, box 27, Ford Foundation records, Education and Public Policy Program 
(EPP), Office of the Arts, Program Files, RAC. 
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Table 4.1: Oakland Symphony Musicians’ Outside Employment in 1966313 
 
During the 1966–67 season, the orchestra began to implement a dramatic rise 
in salaries that brought the musicians from a minimum salary of $784 in 1965–66 to 
$2,025 in 1969–70:  
                                               
313 "Oakland Symphony Orchestra Association: Ford Foundation Application," January 14, 1966, A 
Guide to the Ford Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC. 
Institutional Teaching:
College (9)
Public School (17)
Private School (2)
Private Studio Teaching (28)
Free Lance/Casual Musical Jobs (54)
Miscellaneous, Comprising the Following Occupations (41)
Student
Structural Engineer
Housewife
Office Worker
Restauranteur
TV-Stereo Salesman
Clerk
Jewelry Maker
Stage Manager (Oakland Symphony)
Card Writer
Sales Clerk
Clerk-Typist
Office Clerk
Multilith Operator
Carpenter/Cabinet Maker
Personnel Manager and Librarian  (Oakland Symphony)
Computer Programmer
Systems Co-ordinator, Auto Club
Electronic Technician
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Table 4.2: Salary Growth of Oakland Symphony Musicians from 1965 to 1970314 
 
 
 
Although these increases most likely did not allow orchestra members to drop 
other jobs completely, they certainly helped, and were indicative of the promising 
early returns of the Symphony Orchestra Program. In 1970, at the conclusion of the 
orchestra’s two-year master agreement starting in the 1967–68 season, the vice 
president of Local 6, the Bay Area’s American Federation of Musicians chapter, 
wrote directly to the Ford Foundation as thanks for a musician-friendly agreement: 
We recently concluded a new two-year master agreement with the Oakland 
Symphony Association. It provides the foundation for a bright future for a 
great young orchestra, and, at the same time, includes substantial pay 
increases and sorely needed additional benefits. Please accept our thanks and 
the grateful thanks of our musicians for the grants which have enabled a wise 
and progressive management to provide this new agreement.315 
 
The 1967 agreement included a tenure provision to fortify job security, and 
the 1974 contract increased the size of the orchestra to eighty-six players, which 
                                               
314 Oakland Symphony Wage Scale, 1970, box 27, Ford Foundation records, Education and Public 
Policy Program (EPP), Office of the Arts, Program Files, RAC. 
315 Letter from J.J. Spain to the Ford Foundation, October 2, 1967, Ford Foundation Records, Grants 
O–R, RAC; and Oakland Symphony Wage Scale, 1970, box 27, Ford Foundation records, Education 
and Public Policy Program (EPP), Office of the Arts, Program Files, RAC. 
Season Min Scale 
Per Set
Sets Per 
Season
Min Scale 
Per Season
Inflation 
Adjusted 
(2018 Dollars)
Year Over 
Year Increase
1965–1966 98$          8 784$         6,294$          -               
1966–1967 130$         8 1,040$      8,117$          33%
1967–1968 165$         8 1,320$      9,994$          27%
1968–1969 180$         8 1,440$      10,464$        9%
1969–1970 225$         9 2,025$      13,953$        41%
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remained the standard until 1986.316  The Oakland musicians were never paid as well 
as the musicians of the so-called “major” orchestras—like the cross-bay San 
Francisco Symphony—but they continually outpaced musicians in comparable 
orchestras. As Melanie Beene notes, from 1976 to 1986, the Oakland musicians’ 
wages increased 340 percent; during this period a musician in the Oakland Symphony 
could expect to earn from 52 to 160 percent more per season than the national 
average for comparable “regional” orchestras. And although the relatively high cost 
of living in the Bay Area may have accounted for part of the reason why Oakland 
musicians were better paid then their peers, the 340 percent increase in wages 
outpaced changes in the Bay Area’s consumer price index, which increased only 
103.317 
The Ford Program was directly responsible for these increases, not only 
because it provided the orchestras with the financial means to support their musicians 
and lengthen their seasons, but also because it created new expectations among the 
players. In fact, in Oakland, the 1967 agreement was precipitated by a brief strike 
because the musicians were aware of the approaching Ford windfall.318 
A letter from Helen Thompson of the American Symphony Orchestra League 
to Ford Foundation Program Officer Edward F. D’Arms from April 1966 suggests 
that Ford Foundation officials were aware of the pressure the grant funds placed on 
orchestras in the process of personnel negotiations: 
                                               
316 Beene, Mitchell, and Johnson, “Autopsy of an Orchestra,” 53. 
317 See Beene, Mitchell, and Johnson, “Autopsy of an Orchestra,” 55. 
318 Beene, Mitchell, and Johnson, “Autopsy of an Orchestra,” 53. 
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I am writing to you on behalf of a number of the major orchestras (as well as a 
few of the metropolitans) to ask if it would be possible for the Foundation to 
help the orchestras resolve, in some manner, a situation in reference to the 
endowment Program that is becoming more crucial day by day. 
 
….The funds that may be available to the orchestras through the Endowment 
Program are being made the focal point of contract discussion by 
representatives of the musicians in the negotiations of a number of the 
orchestras. 
  
The representatives of the musicians are reluctant (and, in some cases are 
actually refusing) even to continue negotiation discussions until the 
orchestras’ association representatives can tell them the exact provision (to the 
dollar) of a given orchestra’s arrangement with the Foundation relative to the 
Endowment Program. 
 
….As a result of this complex situation, the negotiation committees for both 
the musicians and the orchestras are becoming worn out, weary, frustrated and 
quarrelsome with resulting loss of good will, faith and constructive 
approaches to the many other facets of the working agreements that are 
covered in the contracts.  
  
….Well do we understand that the Foundation’s main concern is to assist the 
orchestras in the overall strengthening of their operations and future 
development, and no one wishes to have the present exigencies overshadow 
the long term goals and benefits of the Endowment Program.319 
 
D’Arms had already discussed the details of the Symphony Orchestra 
Program with Herman Kenin, President of the American Federation of Musicians, 
several months earlier, in February 1966. Kenin quickly recognized the program’s 
implications on collective bargaining, and employed a “pot of gold” metaphor when 
the describing the effect the Ford contributions would have on negotiations: 
Mr. Kenin seemed to grasp the essential points quickly and understandingly, 
including the fact that negotiations between players and management were 
                                               
319 Letter from Helen M. Thompson to Edward F. D’Arms, April 15, 1966, A Guide to the Ford 
Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC. 
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currently delayed because of players’ natural desire to share in the “pot of 
gold” they seemed to think was to be received by the orchestras.320 
 
Jack Bethards, who managed the Oakland Symphony in the early 1970s, 
characterized the effect of the Ford Program in similar terms:  
One of the big problems is the orchestra knew that we had this huge 
endowment, and that killed negotiations completely…. They were making far 
more than any orchestra of the same status, and then want even more, more 
and more control, more and more regulations, work rules and so on.321 
 
 Michael Morgan, who has, since 1990, conducted the Oakland-East Bay 
Symphony Orchestra—the orchestra created to fill the space left by the bankruptcy of 
the Oakland Symphony, echoes the remarks of Kenin and Bethards:   
It’s like anything, in that once somebody gets something, they think they’re 
going to have it all the time, and now everyone has really contentious 
negotiations…because everyone thinks there’s more money around than there 
is. And all of that started back then, people and the players thinking there’s a 
whole big pile of money being hidden from them somewhere; it makes the 
relations more adversarial when people think there’s something being kept 
away from them.322 
 
Bethards contends that the large salary gains won by the musicians were the 
result of the combination of an easily coerced and overly social board and a frustrated 
group of musicians who formed the orchestra’s bargaining committee. 
I can remember one of the big negotiations; we were just near opening night 
for a season, and I said [to the board], “Let’s take the strike….” And they 
would not do it because all of their opening night parties were all arranged and 
that’s the true reason, they said so…. The board would never take the hard 
way and face a strike. 
 
The problem with negotiations with symphony orchestras is not the union; the 
union is generally very practically minded. It’s the players’ committee…. 
                                               
320 Interview with Herman D. Kenin, 1966, box 30, WML. 
321 Author’s interview with Jack Bethards, October 15, 2016. 
322 Author’s interview with Michael Morgan, June 17, 2016. 
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They are far more adamant about every detail of the contract than the union. If 
you were dealing directly with the union, it would be a relatively reasonable 
contract. But the players’ committees are made up of lower section players, 
and symphony players in general are a very depressed bunch…. So the 
players’ committee was very tough and hard to reason with, and most of it 
was the Ford Foundation’s fault.323 
 
Melanie Beene articulated a similar opinion about negotiations with orchestral 
musicians in general: 
The San Francisco Symphony employs about 100 wonderful musicians, but 
there’s another 100 just as qualified who could fill every seat in that orchestra. 
So all the freeway philharmonic people that occupy all of these other 
orchestras are frustrated because their classmates are sitting pretty making 
$100,000 a year and they’re barely making it driving all over. 
 
I remember at the time of the study [Autopsy of an Orchestra] there was some 
survey in the Times about job satisfaction, and symphony musicians were the 
lowest, below cab drivers. And I remember somebody I interviewed on the 
board said “I don’t know why they expect to get paid…. Don’t they enjoy 
what they’re doing?”…. So there was this tension around “should we pay for 
this?” that’s complicated.324 
 
 The Ford Foundation’s goal to raise salaries in orchestras was a laudable one, 
and the bargaining struggles early on during the program were necessary growing 
pains towards bringing orchestral salaries to levels comparable to other professionals. 
But coupled with other ultimately untenable projects, like the purchase of the 
Paramount Theater in Oakland, the Ford money was simply not enough to engender 
the kind of advancement that the Oakland Symphony envisioned.  
 
The Paramount Theater 
                                               
323 Author’s interview with Jack Bethards, October 15, 2016. 
324 Author’s interview with Melanie Beene, November 6, 2016. 
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Although the increase in musician compensation eventually contributed to the 
shaky pecuniary situation of the orchestra, the purchase and subsequent renovation of 
the Paramount Theater in downtown Oakland also led to financial difficulty. Built in 
1931 and acquired by the Oakland Symphony in October 1972, the Paramount 
Theater began its life as an art deco movie house. Compared to the orchestra’s former 
home, the drab 2,000-seat Auditorium Theater, the Paramount was larger, at 3,000 
seats, and more attractive, with a classic interior and a striking hundred-foot mosaic 
façade. Depicting male and female puppeteers, the colorful Paramount mosaic is one 
of downtown Oakland’s most striking constructions, and part of the renewed interest 
that accompanied the orchestra during the early and mid 1970s. 
 According to Melanie Beene, the orchestra’s board planned to raise $4 million 
to purchase, refurbish, and endow the Paramount. Prominent board members Edgar 
Kaiser and Stephen Bechtel each contributed $250,000, and the previous owner of the 
theater contributed $500,000 so that the $1 million purchase price was covered. But 
only $705,000 was pledged to complete the renovation, and no monies were raised 
for endowment funds.325 
Furthermore, the pledges were not all received before the renovations were 
scheduled to begin, and the orchestra needed a $1 million loan to complete the project 
on time. The loan—and its accompanying interest—put great pressure on the 
                                               
325 See Beene, Mitchell, and Johnson, “Autopsy of an Orchestra,” 14. 
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orchestra to succeed in the new hall.326 As Bethards suggests, the orchestra did enjoy 
early success at the Paramount; subscription sales increased 161 percent in the first 
season in the hall, from 4,381 in 1972–73 to 11,434 in 1973–74.327 Sales remained 
strong the next year; in both of the first two seasons in the Paramount subscription 
sales accounted for more than 80 percent of capacity, and including single ticket 
sales, the hall was nearly sold out both years.328 By comparison, the San Francisco 
Symphony sold an average of 69.4 percent of capacity on subscription from 1973 to 
1988.329  
But by the end of the second season at the Paramount, Bethards was gone 
after serious disagreements with the board of directors (discussed below). His 
departure lead to a slow subscription campaign for the following season; during the 
1975–76 season, the orchestra’s third at the Paramount, only 70 percent of capacity 
was sold on subscription, and the hall was only at 78 percent of total capacity, 
including single ticket sales.330 This downward trend continued until the orchestra’s 
last years; on average, the orchestra only sold 66 percent capacity at the 
Paramount.331   
                                               
326 Beene, Mitchell, and Johnson, “Autopsy of an Orchestra,” 14. 
327 Memorandum: Danny Newman to Marcia Thompson, May 8, 1974, A Guide to the Ford 
Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC. 
328 Including single ticket sales, the Paramount was sold at 95 percent capacity in 1973–74, and 89 
percent in 1974–1975. See Beene, Mitchell, and Johnson, “Autopsy of an Orchestra,” 27. 
329 The San Francisco Symphony performed in the 3100-seat War Memorial Opera House until 1980, 
when the 2700-seat Davies Symphony Hall was completed. See Beene, Mitchell, and Johnson, 
“Autopsy of an Orchestra,” 26. 
330 Beene, Mitchell, and Johnson, “Autopsy of an Orchestra,” 27. 
331 Ibid., 27. 
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The Paramount project soon proved to be deeply problematic. The hall was 
too large for the orchestra to fill once the initial excitement had faded, and in addition 
to the usual expenses associated with operating a large hall, the Paramount accrued a 
sizeable annual property tax bill of $50,000. In May 1975, the orchestra negotiated 
the sale of the hall to the city of Oakland, in exchange for $1.00 and forty years of 
free rent.332 But the $1 million loan taken out to renovate the hall—and the 
accompanying interest—still required servicing by the orchestra. 
At the conclusion of the Ford Foundation Program in 1976, the orchestra was 
awarded custody of the Foundation’s endowment contribution, a total of $1.23 
million, including capital gains. Instead of placing this money in a permanent 
endowment, the orchestra used the money to service debt associated with the 
Paramount’s renovation loan.333 The combination of the Ford Foundation’s 
$1,230,000 and the $1,000,808 raised locally to match the Ford dollars should have 
left for a total endowment in 1976 of at least $2,230,808. Instead, as a result of the 
many factors outlined above, from 1976 to 1983 the endowment hovered between $1 
million and $1.4 million. By 1985—when the orchestra was in its last season—the 
endowment was worth less than $300,000.334 
Melanie Beene summarized the Paramount boondoggle thus: 
The Oakland Symphony’s restoration of the Paramount Theatre is an example 
of how an institution put its central mission – maintaining a viable symphony 
orchestra – at risk…. The result was financial crisis. From running a 
symphony orchestra, the organization suddenly took on the tasks of 
                                               
332 Ibid., 27. 
333 See Beene, Mitchell, and Johnson, “Autopsy of an Orchestra,” 15. 
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landowner, historical restorer, and facility renter…. The perils of the so-called 
“edifice complex” are not uncommon in the performing arts, and the Oakland 
Symphony is not the first organization to allow a building acquisition to derail 
it from its central purpose.335 
 
 Thus, the costly restoration of the Paramount Theater contributed to the 
orchestra’s troubles in the 1970s and 1980s, as part of a broader transformation of the 
orchestra during and after the Symphony Orchestra Program. Encouraged by the 
successful results of the Ford matching challenge, the Oakland Symphony board tried 
and failed to capitalize on its fundraising momentum to raise enough money for the 
hall’s renovation. Nonetheless, in a sustained bid to become a major orchestra, and in 
fact achieve major budgetary status, the board took on major debt to finance the 
Paramount’s renovation.  
It was not uncommon for orchestras to upgrade their performing spaces in the 
1970s; as we will see in Chapter 5, the Minnesota Orchestra built a new hall around 
the same time the Paramount was renovated. But the pressures of owning, renovating, 
and maintaining an auditorium are manifold, and the Oakland Symphony’s leaders 
simply were not prepared to capitalize on it. 
 
Crises of Leadership 
 
In addition to the myriad difficulties associated with the Paramount, 
leadership problems plagued the Oakland Symphony beginning in 1971 at the 
                                               
335 Ibid., 75. 
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conclusion of the Ford match. The success of the orchestra in the matching challenge 
empowered the board to reimagine the Oakland Symphony as more than just a 
regional orchestra, which led to disagreements about the organization’s purpose. At 
the end of the successful second season at the Paramount, Jack Bethards left 
following an acrimonious falling out with the board. Bethards describes his departure 
thus: 
I just had a total split with the board. I didn’t like the way things were going; I 
particularly didn’t like how they were trying to handle the theater part of it.… 
That was one big controversy, and just general personality clashes. I’d had 
enough.336 
 
Bethards’s departure created great strife within the organization, and left the 
orchestra without decisive management. The aforementioned dip in subscription sales 
during the orchestra’s third season (1975–76) at the Paramount was in large part the 
result of Bethards’ departure. Danny Newman, the Ford Foundation consultant who 
worked with the Oakland orchestra in the 1970s, noted in his June 1975 report to 
Marcia Thompson the implications of Bethards’ departure on ticket sales: 
Although the Oakland Symphony had a good subscription year [the 1974–75 
season], even higher than the year before when we had made that enormous 
gain, there was a considerable internal dissatisfaction due to the departure of 
the general manager, Jack Bethards, who had dominated the workings of this 
organization for the past few years. Because of his falling out with the Board, 
nothing much had been done the entire winter and spring concerning the 
subscription effort for the 1975-76 season. Now that he is gone and a much-
belated campaign is underway, the renewal [of concert subscriptions] appears 
to be poor.337 
 
                                               
336 Author’s interview with Jack Bethards, October 15, 2016. 
337 Memorandum: Danny Newman to Marcia Thompson, June 14, 1975, A Guide to the Ford 
Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC. 
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After Bethards’ departure, nine out of eleven administrative staffers were 
dismissed or fired between June 1975 and October 1976.338 Newman believed that 
Musical Director Harold Farberman also represented an obstinate barrier to smooth 
workings at the orchestra: 
The musical director has always been very sensitive about renewal, somehow 
taking any person’s refusal to renew as a rebuke to his artistic direction…. 
Last year, too, he pressed very hard for comparative figures on this subject—
that is compared with other Orchestras. After he left the meeting to catch his 
plane for the American Symphony League’s conference in San Diego, I was 
able to concentrate more on the practical plans for the next several months339 
 
Hired in 1971 to replace the renowned and adventurous Gerhard Samuel, 
Farberman incited great resistance during his tenure, which lasted until 1979. 
Whereas German-born Samuel deftly combined Germanic sensibility with 
emblematically west-coast musical progressivism, Farberman came from New York 
City with a swagger that charmed the board and annoyed the musicians. Although the 
board saw Farberman as a means to ground the orchestra in the classics and expand 
the organization’s social reputation, he was deeply unpopular with the musicians and 
administrative staff. Jack Bethards recalls him as an able musician but an injudicious 
leader: 
Really solid professional musician, from a commercial musical family in New 
York. He was a typical powerhouse working musician, very skilled guy, but a 
terribly difficult person to get along with, in many ways…. He had a lot of 
skill and thorough training and background and so on, but he just rubbed 
people the wrong way, and he rubbed me the wrong way.340 
 
                                               
338 Robert Commanday, “Upheavals Within the Oakland Symphony Structure,” The San Francisco 
Chronicle, October 24, 1976. 
339 Memorandum: Danny Newman to Marcia Thompson, June 14, 1975, A Guide to the Ford 
Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC. 
340 Author’s interview with Jack Bethards, October 15, 2016. 
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Farberman’s difficulties in the early 1970s with the musicians were 
exacerbated by a constant flow of negative press. In the pages of the Oakland Tribune 
and the San Francisco Chronicle, local critics Robert Commanday, Paul Hertelendy, 
and Heuwell Tircuit consistently panned Farberman, mostly for non-musical 
transgressions. Danny Newman’s May 1974 report to Marcia Thompson noted 
Farberman’s difficulties with the press and his impact on subscriptions sales: 
The big problem seems to be that their musical director, Maestro Farberman, 
has been under an unremitting attack from the critical press. When I read 
some of these reviews a few months ago I told the Oakland Symphony 
management to expect a negative reaction from the subscribers; they felt that I 
was unnecessarily pessimistic.341 
 
Heuwell Tircuit’s Nov, 1973 review “Oakland Symphony’s Decline” in the 
San Francisco Chronicle typifies the negative response to Farberman in the press: 
The radical decline in performance standards by the Oakland Symphony was 
shocking. What had been the Bay Area’s second orchestra—and at one time, 
many of us felt it was number one—has now sunk to fourth, at best.  
 
Harold Farberman, excuse me, it is now officially “Maestro Farberman”— 
churned out a pedestrian, humorless performance.  
 
A week ago, without mentioning Watergate, I wrote a calm, rather friendly 
letter to President Nixon trying offer logical reasons as to why he should 
resign. Clearly, it is time to begin composition of such a letter to Maestro 
Farberman. Farberman has managed, if only passively, to destroy the Oakland 
Symphony, its personnel, repertory, performance standards and reputation.342 
 
Tircuit also responded negatively to the Paramount—“How can anyone be 
expected to stay awake amid that morass of bad sight lines and yucky colors”—but 
                                               
341 Memorandum: Danny Newman to Marcia Thompson, May 8, 1974, A Guide to the Ford 
Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC. 
342 Heuwell Tircuit, "Oakland Symphony's Decline," The San Francisco Chronicle, November 1, 1973. 
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his distaste with the hall resonates more as condescension from a San Francisco critic 
accustomed to the San Francisco Symphony’s august War Memorial Opera House, 
than as objective critique.343 He was not alone—and perhaps not unjustified—in his 
reproach of the haughty Farberman. 
Los Angeles Times critic Martin Bernheimer visited with Farberman before a 
concert in 1974 at the newly-renovated Paramount Theater and noted the sparkle of 
the updated hall: “the Paramount conveys a warmth and a charm that seem to elude 
our stark and sterile new houses.” Echoing the Bay Area critics, Bernheimer was 
critical of Farberman’s conducting: “The strings sounded muffled, the brass 
disembodied, the winds out of kilter. To complicate matters, the orchestra responded 
sluggishly to Farberman’s brisk, efficient, ultimately impersonal urges…. From 
where I sat, things definitely looked better than they sounded.”344 
A critical assessment of Farberman penned in 1973 by Chronicle critic Robert 
Commanday earned the writer a “thank you” card signed by thirty-seven members of 
the orchestra. When Commanday mentioned the card to Farberman and Bethards—as 
an example of the orchestra’s discontent—the conductor responded by telling the 
orchestra that he had “seen” the card, insinuating that he knew which orchestra 
members had signed it. A musician told Commanday about Farberman’s boast, and 
finally Bethards intervened in support of Commanday.345 
                                               
343 Tircuit, "Oakland Symphony's Decline."  
344 Martin Bernheimer, “Concerts Amid Art Deco Glitter,” Los Angeles Times, May 19, 1974. 
345 Letter from Robert Commanday to Michael Sleeter, 1973, Oakland Symphony Orchestra Archive, 
Museum of Performance and Design, San Francisco, California (Hereafter cited as OAK). 
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Although Hertelendy, Commanday, and Tircuit grated against Farberman’s 
personality, their reviews of Farberman’s musical abilities were somewhat mixed. 
Responding to Tircuit’s claim that the Oakland Symphony had “sunk to fourth” best 
in the Bay Area, Hertelendy gave high marks to Farberman for a 1973 performance of 
Felix Mendelssohn’s Fourth Symphony: “The orchestra appeared stung by a lone 
trans-bay critic’s contention that it had slipped to No. 4 among Bay Area orchestras, 
because the way that it played Mendelssohn’s Fourth Symphony, it was second to 
nobody in Northern California…. Farberman’s interpretation of the symphony was a 
gem, and the musicians played like masters all the way.”346 In 1977 Commanday 
offered praise in the Chronicle: “High praise goes to Farberman for his attentiveness 
to [piano soloist Lazar] Berman’s constant give-and-take rubato, shaping a 
performance in which the orchestra was one with Berman in feeling and romantic 
style…. The Farberman-Oakland Symphony performance was energetic and 
dynamic.”347 
But the musicians’ dislike of Farberman continued through the mid 1970s. In 
1976 the orchestra produced a series of concerts conducted by Antonia Brico, the first 
woman to conduct the Berlin Philharmonic, and a graduate of the University of 
California, Berkeley and Mills College.348 Brico conducted Brahms, Mozart, and 
                                               
346 Paul Hertelendy, “Symphony Scores Success,” The Oakland Tribune, November 11, 1973. 
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Sibelius with the Oakland players in April 1976, and a press release by the players 
suggested that her concerts symbolized the orchestra’s frustrations with Farberman: 
The reasons for the players’ sponsoring their own concerts were several. One 
important reason was the seeking of artistic rewards. The Orchestra had 
played five years under the leadership of Harold Farberman with no guest 
conductor until this year. The musicians were looking for new inspiration, for 
more variety in programming, and the orchestra was unhappy with the musical 
leadership of Mr. Farberman…. The enthusiastic response of the audiences to 
the concerts was rewarding to the musicians. The standing ovation for Brico, 
the soloists and orchestra was tremendous. Now the players must decide if 
they will produce further concerts.349 
 
 In 1977, when Farberman’s contract was up for renewal the second time, the 
majority of orchestra members again voiced their opposition to him; a letter from the 
Players’ Committee to the board’s president indicated that 66 percent of musicians 
did not want his contract renewed. The board renewed it nonetheless.350 
In 2016 Farberman recalled the distaste of the musicians as growing pains: 
“The orchestra support was spotty, especially at the beginning of my tenure when I 
had to replace several musicians who were not professional quality but were long 
time members of the initially amateur orchestra.”351 But he recalls a strong working 
relationship with the board: “The Board renewed my contract three times. We worked 
well together…. The Board insisted I transform the quality of the orchestra and 
supported me fully as I did change the performing level of the orchestra.”352  
                                               
349 Oakland Symphony Players' Committee Press Release, April 5, 1976, OAK. 
350 Beene, Mitchell, and Johnson, “Autopsy of an Orchestra, 5. 
351 Harold Farberman, e-mail message to author, November 22, 2016. 
352 Ibid. 
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Erstwile Oakland Symphony bassoonist Robert Hughes recalls that 
Farberman’s personality and ability to hobnob with the board as the reason for his 
continued employment by the orchestra, despite the protests of the musicians: 
He was popular with the board, and he had the ability to socialize and flatter 
and invite to dinner members of the board. He could cultivate the board. I 
would have expected them to see through the flattery, but apparently they 
didn’t, and they granted him what he wanted until ultimately it didn’t work 
out.353 
  
As a result of the heightened importance placed on American Symphony 
Orchestra budgetary categories by the Ford program, Farberman and the board 
believed that the orchestra should strive quickly to attain “major” status—as defined 
by the American Symphony Orchestra League—under the impression that the 
orchestra would be eligible for larger NEA grants, and it is clear that a sense of 
factionalism emerged within the organization.354 Jack Bethards and the musicians 
appear to have opposed the rapid transformation of the organization. In contrast, 
Farberman and the board bullishly pushed for growth in all aspects. New concert 
series, for example, created confusion for audiences; by 1986 the orchestra was 
selling tickets for seven different series.355  
From 1970 to 1986 the orchestra went through seven different managers, 
including Jack Bethards. A report prepared by a consultant in 1977 noted: “The 
Oakland Symphony Orchestra has not been distinguished in its history of general 
                                               
353 Author’s interview with Robert Hughes, December 9, 2017. 
354 See Beene, Mitchell, and Johnson, “Autopsy of an Orchestra.” 
355 These were the Grand Series, Features, Pops, Favorite Classics, and Musical Galaxy Series in 
Oakland, the Zellerbach Series in Berkeley, and the Rheem Series in Moraga. See Oakland Symphony 
1986–1987 Season Brochure, OAK. 
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managers, the position having been something of a revolving door.”356 In addition, 
the board consistently failed to adequately staff the marketing department. Melanie 
Beene notes that for most of 1976 to 1982 the orchestra did not employ a marketing 
director or manager, or consider the position critical to fill.357 
The notoriously difficult Farberman also exacerbated staffing problems. 
Danny Newman, the Ford Foundation consultant, wrote in 1975: 
The current promotion person is evidently not a favorite of the music 
director’s, yet we cannot afford to rock the boat with the coming season so 
close now. I have urged him [Farberman] when I later saw him in San Diego, 
to step aside and let her work without fear of being fired.358  
 
 Bethards describes some of the particular difficulties in working with 
Farberman: 
 
He could be sloppy, he would program something and then leave things up in 
the air for me to pick up the pieces. He would treat the orchestra members in 
the little ways that a conductor can needle people. He was a needler, and also 
sometimes would come a little bit unprepared, not for lack of talent, but 
sometimes just a little laziness. He very much wanted to put himself at the 
forefront of everything. It was just a lot of little things that added up to an 
unpleasant situation.359 
 
Although Bethards characterized his split with the orchestra in terms of 
personality clashes, Farberman recalls Bethards’ departure in different terms: “Finally 
Edgar Kaiser’s Vice President, Phil Bush, examined the Paramount financials and 
discovered Mr. Bethards was charging the Symphony expenses that actually belonged 
                                               
356 George Alan Smith, "A Report of the Place and Use of the Oakland Symphony Orchestra," 1977, 
OAK. 
357 See Beene, Mitchell, and Johnson, “Autopsy of an Orchestra.” 
358 Memorandum: Danny Newman to Marcia Thompson, June 14, 1975, A Guide to the Ford 
Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC. 
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to the Paramount. He was fired on the spot.”360 It is unclear exactly how Bethards’ 
short tenure with the Oakland Symphony came to an end and whether he resigned or 
was fired, but his unceremonious departure is indicative of the disagreements that 
clouded the top levels of the orchestra’s leadership. Bethards’ vision of careful 
growth clashed with Farberman and the board’s Ford-financed visions of grandeur. 
 
The Board 
 
Because of staff discontinuities, Farberman and the board enjoyed a unique 
degree of autonomy and continuity. The board revolved around Edgar Kaiser and his 
various lieutenants, as well as representatives from several other large Oakland 
companies, including Bechtel Engineering and Mervyn’s department stores. Stephen 
D. Bechtel and Edgar Kaiser were each responsible for the $250,000 gifts that 
enabled the Paramount purchase; in addition to serving as a board member of the 
Oakland Symphony, Bechtel was a trustee of the Ford Foundation from 1961 to 
1970.361 
Industrialist Edgar Kaiser Sr. served as chairman of the Oakland Symphony 
board for seventeen years starting in 1962 and was vital in wrangling support from his 
eponymous corporate and nonprofit enterprises.362 Head of the Kaiser companies, 
                                               
360 Harold Farberman, e-mail message to author, November 22, 2016. 
361 Although Bechtel was a trusted of the Ford Foundation, it is unlikely that his service had an impact 
on the Oakland Symphony’s inclusion in the Program for Symphony Orchestras. The orchestra was 
automatically included because it was classified as a metropolitan orchestra by the American 
Symphony Orchestra League. 
362 See Beene, Mitchell, and Johnson, “Autopsy of an Orchestra.” 
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including the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, the Kaiser Cement 
Corporation, and the Kaiser Steel Corporation, Kaiser’s influence was essential in 
raising matching funds during the Ford Program. In addition to cash gifts totaling at 
least $139,350, Kaiser directed donations of $100,000 each from the Kaiser 
Foundation and Kaiser Industries; Kaiser executives and family members also 
chipped in with gifts of Kaiser stock totaling $216,750. 
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Table 4.3: Gifts Related to Edgar Kaiser and Kaiser Companies During the Matching 
Phase of the Symphony Orchestra Program363 
 
 
 
                                               
363 See "Oakland Symphony Orchestra Association: Securities Received as Ford Gifts From July 1, 
1970 — June 30, 1971," 1971, A Guide to the Ford Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC; "Oakland 
Symphony Orchestra Association: Ford Endowment Gifts Received 1968/1969," 1969, A Guide to the 
Ford Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC; "Oakland Symphony Orchestra Association: 1969/1970 
Payments on Endowment Pledges," 1970, A Guide to the Ford Foundation Records, Grants O–R, 
RAC; "Oakland Symphony Orchestra Association: Securities Received as Ford Gifts From July 1, 
1967 — June 30, 1968," 1978, A Guide to the Ford Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC; "Oakland 
Symphony Orchestra Association: Securities Received as Ford Gifts From July 1, 1966 — June 30, 
1967," 1967, A Guide to the Ford Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC. 
Season Company Donor Amount
1966–1967 Kaiser Industries Mrs. George Havas 25,000$           
Kaiser Industries Mrs. T.M. Price 1,250$             
1967–1968 Kaiser Industries Clay Bedford 1,900$             
Kaiser Industries Edgar Kaiser 22,000$           
Kaiser Industries Miller, M. 850$                
Kaiser Industries Mrs. T.M. Price 1,250$             
1968–1969 Kaiser Industries Mrs. T.M. Price 2,000$             
Kaiser Industries Mrs. T.M. Price 1,000$             
Kaiser Steel Heiner 1,500$             
Kaiser Industries Edgar Kaiser 17,500$           
1969–1970 Kaiser Steel Heiner 1,500$             
Kaiser Steel Myers 16,000$           
1970–1971 Kaiser Industries Edgar Kaiser 114,000$          
Kaiser Steel Myers 20,000$           
Total Kaiser Securities 225,750$          
Kaiser Himself 139,350$          
Kaiser Industries 100,000$          
Kaiser Foundation 100,000$          
Total Ford Match Gifts Explicitly Tied to Edgar Kaiser 565,100$          
Total Endowment Match Gifts From All Sources 835,908$          
Gifts of Kaiser Corporation Securities
Cash Gifts by Edgar Kaiser and Kaiser-Directed Philanthropies
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These donations—explicitly tied to Edgar Kaiser and/or Kaiser companies—
totaled more than $550,000. The total raised by the orchestra through June 30, 1971 
amounted to only $835,908—more than $150,000 short of the $1,000,000 needed to 
secure the Ford Foundation endowment grant—but an anonymous donor stepped in at 
the last minute to plug the gap. 364 
Although there is no way of confirming who anonymously saved the 
orchestra’s stake in the Ford Program, it is clear that the orchestra relied on Edgar 
Kaiser and his influence for more than 50 percent of the funds needed to accomplish 
the Ford match. A development department staffer during Kaiser’s chairmanship 
pithily summarized his influence: “Mr. Kaiser could materialize money.”365  
During and after the Kaiser Chairmanship, many involved with the Oakland 
Symphony believed that Kaiser was responsible for plugging the orchestra’s deficits. 
Mark Drury, a member of the bass section in the 1980s, and chairman of the 
orchestra’s final negotiating committee in 1986, recalls hearing from longtime 
members of the orchestra: “At the end of each fiscal year, management would go to 
Kaiser and say ‘we have a deficit of this much’ and he would just write a check. 
When he died in the early 1980s, there was no one to sign those checks.”366 
                                               
364 See "Oakland Symphony Orchestra Association: Securities Received as Ford Gifts From July 1, 
1970 — June 30, 1971," 1971, A Guide to the Ford Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC; "Oakland 
Symphony Orchestra Association: Ford Endowment Gifts Received 1968/1969," 1969, A Guide to the 
Ford Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC; "Oakland Symphony Orchestra Association: 1969/1970 
Payments on Endowment Pledges," 1970, A Guide to the Ford Foundation Records, Grants O–R, 
RAC; "Oakland Symphony Orchestra Association: Securities Received as Ford Gifts From July 1, 
1967 — June 30, 1968," 1978, A Guide to the Ford Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC; "Oakland 
Symphony Orchestra Association: Securities Received as Ford Gifts From July 1, 1966 — June 30, 
1967," 1967, A Guide to the Ford Foundation Records, Grants O–R, RAC. 
365 Beene, Mitchell, and Johnson, “Autopsy of an Orchestra,” 34. 
366 Author’s interview with Mark Drury, February 19, 2017. 
  
173  
 
Kaiser’s death in 1981 left the orchestra without its sustaining patron, and the 
overreliance on him throughout the 1960s and 1970s illustrates the board’s greatest 
failure to capitalize on the Ford Program by expanding the orchestra’s donor base. 
Because failing to achieve the Ford match would have been a tremendous 
embarrassment for the orchestra—and by extension Kaiser and his board—Edgar 
Kaiser took it upon himself to make the Ford match a success, even if by doing so he 
failed in the task of cultivating new donors. Thus, instead of fostering new sources of 
fundraising, the Ford match program had the opposite effect of reinforcing the 
perception that Kaiser could bankroll the entire Oakland Symphony operation. 
Melanie Beene writes: “Kaiser’s not inconsiderable clout and resources had, in the 
earlier years of the organization, contributed to the creation of an assumption on the 
part of the board that someone would always be there to help the Symphony out of 
the financial crisis of the moment.”367 Although the Oakland Symphony’s board 
never approached the wealth or prestige of the San Francisco Symphony’s, it would 
have been prudent to diversify its donor base beyond a single patron and his 
employees. 
During Farberman’s last season as music director (1978–79), six guest 
conductors were invited to audition for the post: Calvin Simmons, an assistant 
conductor under Zubin Mehta in Los Angeles; Christopher Keene, music director of 
the Syracuse Symphony; Michael Palmer, music director of the Wichita Symphony; 
David Gilbert, a winner of the Mitropoulos Conducting Competition; Lawrence 
                                               
367 Beene, Mitchell, and Johnson, “Autopsy of an Orchestra,” 34. 
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Smith of the Oregon Symphony; and Daniel Lewis, music director of the Pasadena 
Symphony and Professor at the University of Southern California.368  
Despite the many lows of the 1970s, the appointment of Calvin Simmons, a 
twenty-nine-year-old African-American San Francisco native as music director 
created new buzz about the orchestra in 1979. Simmons brought renewed interest in 
the orchestra, and drove increases in ticket sales and fundraising; his first season 
(1979–80) was the only one after 1976 in which the orchestra finished with a 
budgetary surplus.369 The orchestra also received exceptionally large public subsidies 
from the NEA and the California Arts Council during the Simmons years; the 
California Arts Council’s grant for the 1980–81 season (Simmons’ second) was the 
largest given to an organization with a budget comparable to Oakland’s.370 
Reviews of Simmons were positive. Heuwell Tircuit wrote in The Chronicle 
that Simmons was “a real gem,” and that his concerts were “a great improvement 
over recent seasons.”371 But in addition to his musical ability, Simmons’s ethnicity 
brought wider interest to the orchestra. The local African-American weeklies in the 
Bay Area—the San Francisco Sun Reporter and the Oakland Post—both reported on 
Simmons’ selection and homecoming.372 The Sun Reporter noted the historic nature 
of his appointment: 
A precocious Black youngster from San Francisco has become one of the 
leading young conductors of opera and symphony in this country. Before the 
                                               
368 Paul Hertelendy, “Symphony Slates Six Guest Conductors,” The Oakland Tribune, April 8, 1978. 
369 Ibid., 44. 
370 Ibid., 42. 
371 Heuwell Tircuit, “The Oakland Symphony Has Come Up with a Real Gem,” The San Francisco 
Chronicle, November 1, 1979. 
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age of 28, he established a reputation in Europe as well. His recent selection 
as music director of the Oakland Symphony makes him the first Black 
conductor of a major symphony orchestra in the United States. Calvin 
Simmons continues to excel in a field where few Blacks have gained 
prominence. 
 
Will Simmons, as a Black conductor, attract more minority members to the 
symphony? He says honestly, "I don't know," then laments, "Where are the 
Black musicians? Are they just staying away from auditions? It's open to 
everybody. Let's just see what happens now." Good musicians of any color-—
those who meet the standards or the orchestra--are hard to find, he 
emphasizes.Simmons doesn't want to "change" the present group of 
subscribers—only to "enlarge" them to include more Blacks and other 
minorities. "The Oakland Symphony is for everyone" has been a slogan of 
recent years. In the future, with Simmons leading the way, the symphony's 
goal could become a reality.373 
 
Simmons himself was keenly aware of what it meant for a young African-
American man to be at the helm of a symphony orchestra. Although Oakland is a city 
with a large African-American population, the Oakland Symphony was a majority 
white ensemble. When asked at the time of his hiring how many black musicians 
were in his new orchestra, Simmons replied simply, “I’m it.”374 In addition, Simmons 
recognized the intrinsic difficulties associated with building audiences for symphonic 
music in Oakland, and the elitism that often kept San Francisco audiences away from 
the East Bay: “Why shouldn’t people cross the bridge? It’s that damned Bay Area 
prejudice, and I find it a little provincial.”375 
The excitement regarding Simmons was ultimately short lived, though. His 
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tenure came to a tragic and abrupt end when he drowned while canoeing in upstate 
New York in August 1982. An unusual and ultimately unexplained incident, 
Simmons arrived early for a dinner party held at a home near Lake Pleasant and took 
a canoe out on nearby Connery Pond. Although there were campers nearby who saw 
him canoeing, none of them witnessed his fall into the water, and his body was never 
recovered. The entire incident is odd considering that Simmons was an experienced 
canoer: he spent three weeks on a canoe trip in Minnesota during the prior year.376 
If not for his untimely death, it is possible that the appointment of Simmons 
could have saved the Oakland Symphony. Although Simmons did not have enough 
time to define his programming style to the extent that Samuel and Farberman did, his 
presence—the African-American son of a local working-class family—distinguished 
the orchestra from the Edo de Waart-led San Francisco Symphony. And although the 
Oakland Symphony survived for several seasons after his death, his passing haunted 
the orchestra until the very end. Melanie Beene recalls a voice message left by a 
woman on the answering machine in the post-bankruptcy Oakland Symphony office: 
“The Symphony died because Calvin died.”377 
After a year-long search during the 1982–83 season, in which Leonard Slatkin 
served as artistic adviser, Richard Buckley assumed the role of Music Director. A 
young American who had been based in Seattle—and who was involved with the first 
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North American production of the Ring Cycle at the Seattle Opera—Buckley had 
dramatic plans to expand the offerings of the orchestra: 
I felt that we needed to find an identity, so I created with Arthur Jacobus, the 
orchestra’s manager, this idea of us becoming the regional orchestra that 
would be based at the Paramount Theater but also do outreach programs and 
do family concerts that would go to the different communities.378 
 
 Buckley and Jacobus outlined their plan for regionalization in the orchestra’s 
1985–89 Long-Range plan, entitled “A Plan of Artistic and Management Objectives 
for the Future.”379 In addition to performing runout concerts in the East Bay suburbs 
of Moraga, Concord, Martinez, Walnut Creek, Livermore, and Pleasanton, the 
objectives outlined in the 1985–89 plan included splitting the board of directors into 
smaller regional boards, a tour of the Western United States, a recording project, and 
an endowment drive to raise $5 million.380 Although the orchestra did perform 
runouts and split up the board, its other goals proved impractical. According to 
Melanie Beene, “The Oakland Symphony’s plans were often idealized visions rather 
than delineations of carefully constructed, achievable objectives.”381 
 Buckley maintains that the regionalization idea was a good one: “I still believe 
in it conceptually,” but that labor strife prevented the organization from reaching its 
potential, “We got great press, the orchestra was responding to me well, we were 
reviewed as the most improved orchestra, and we were flying high (ish). Then we go 
into the 1985–86 season, and it is negotiation time again.”382 Although Buckley ‘s 
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plans for the orchestra may have been overly ambitious, he aimed to remedy one of 
the orchestra’s central deficiencies: the lack of a clearly definable—and thus 
marketable—identity. 
 
Loss of Identity 
 
The Oakland Symphony first performed in 1933, but its modern history began 
in the late 1950s, when the musicians first began receiving paychecks, and when, in 
1959, Gerhard Samuel became the orchestra’s music director.383 Leading the 
orchestra in its first years as a professional ensemble, Samuel expanded the season 
from eight to twenty-four concerts, and helped Oakland and the Bay Area develop a 
national reputation as a locus of new music. Praised locally in the Oakland Tribune 
and the San Francisco Chronicle, as well as nationally in the Los Angeles Times and 
the Boston Globe, Samuel cultivated a unique reputation as a dual specialist of both 
Mozart and twentieth-century music, with a particular focus on West Coast 
composers. 
A list of Samuel’s performed works with the Oakland Symphony Orchestra 
illustrates his eclectic approach to programming with a striking preponderance of 
West Coast composers, some of whom had scant reputations outside of California.384 
Among those programmed by Samuel were Larry Austin, Charles Boone, Ingolf 
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Dahl, Richard Felciano, Lou Harrison, Andrew Imbrie, Wayne Peterson, and Morton 
Subotnick.385 By comparison, of the aforementioned composers, the San Francisco 
Symphony during the same span only performed the music of Charles Boone, 
Andrew Imbrie, and Wayne Peterson.386  
Samuel enjoyed a particularly strong relationship with Lou Harrison—whose 
music was performed at least ten times from 1959 to 1969.387 Although recognized in 
Oakland and by the Bay Area press, Harrison did not receive performances by the 
San Francisco Symphony in the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s.388  
In 1961, composer and conductor Robert Hughes began composition lessons 
in Aptos, California with Harrison and began to organize concerts at a coffeehouse 
called the Sticky Wicket. By 1963, the concerts at the Sticky Wicket evolved into the 
Cabrillo Festival of Contemporary Music at nearby Cabrillo College. In that same 
year Hughes joined the Oakland Symphony as a bassoonist and recruited Samuel to 
become the first music director of the Cabrillo Festival.389 During his tenure from 
1963 to 1968, Samuel guided the Cabrillo festival towards international renown as a 
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summer parallel to the Oakland Symphony. 390 Drawing mainly from the membership 
of the Oakland Symphony, the Cabrillo festival—like the Oakland Symphony—
consciously embraced Harrison and other composers working on the West Coast. 
In addition, during this period Samuel created the Oakland Symphony Chorus 
and the Oakland Youth Orchestra, which toured internationally, made commercial 
recordings, and was the first youth orchestra to win an ASCAP (American Society of 
Composers, Authors, and Publishers) Award for services to contemporary music.391 
Under the direction of Robert Hughes, the Youth Orchestra developed its own 
reputation as a home for new music; the orchestra even commissioned and premiered 
new works, including Lou Harrison’s second symphony: The Elegiac in 1975, and 
Ned Rorem’s Water Music in 1967.392 
In fact, Samuel’s Oakland Symphony provided a professional institutional 
home for many composers associated with the experimental Bay Area music scene 
centered around Mills College in Oakland. A tiny women’s liberal arts college, by the 
1930s Mills College had developed an extraordinary commitment to new music.393 
Assisted by several grants from the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1960s, Mills 
College absorbed the resources and the expertise of members of the San Francisco 
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Tape Music Center, which eventually became the Mills Center for Contemporary 
Music. Under the initial direction of Pauline Oliveros, Mills became a home for the 
burgeoning field of electronic music.394 Ford Foundation Program Officer Richard 
Kapp described a 1970 meeting with composer and co-director of the Mills’ Center 
for Contemporary Music Robert Ashley: 
The college has what appears to be a unique center…. What makes the Mills 
program unique is that all facilities are open not only to the college 
community but to the general public and most are in use at least 16 hours a 
day. The policy of the college has been to provide these facilities as what 
amounts to a national resource for serious and interested (but non-
commercial) users who pay a fee of about $2.50 per hour for the use of any 
studios, including a fully trained engineer-technician…. The Mills facility is 
the only one in the country that brings together all of the various approaches 
to electronic musical synthesis under one roof.395 
 
 Ashley and the music department at Mills ultimately received several Ford 
Foundation grants in the 1970s, to help composers visit and utilize Mills’ studios and 
create documentary films about American composers. In collaboration with the Ford 
and Rockefeller Foundations, Ashley’s fourteen-hour series Music with Roots in the 
Aether highlighted the work of composers David Behrman, Philip Glass, Gordon 
Mumma, Pauline Oliveros, and Terry Riley, as well as Ashley himself.396 
 Samuel was closely involved in the scene surrounding the San Francisco Tape 
Music Center and Mills College in the 1960s. David Bernstein writes in his history of 
the San Francisco Tape Music Center: “Gerhard Samuel was a friend of new music, 
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and his Oakland Symphony, then a sort of glorified community orchestra, was a 
source of lively concerts and chamber-music spin-offs, mostly at Mills College.”397 In 
1967 a McCall’s Magazine piece on the Tape Music Center reported on Oliveros’s 
approval of Samuel: “She says musicians today are the most conventional people she 
knows, with the possible exception of Mills’ great composer, Darius Milhaud, and 
Oakland Symphony conductor Gerhard Samuel.”398  
 Under Samuel, the Oakland Symphony earned a reputation for adventurous 
performances of new music, while during the same period the San Francisco 
Symphony lacked vitality under Josef Krips. In 1969, a Los Angeles Times feature by 
Martin Bernheimer described the rivalry between the two orchestras and the 
difficulties of the San Francisco Symphony: 
The San Francisco-Oakland rivalry was healthiest and most defensible in the 
days when Josef Krips used his orchestra primarily as a vehicle for the stodgy 
standards while, across the bay, Samuel made flamboyant but intelligent 
experimentation a way of musical life.399 
  
Harold Farberman also recalls the rivalry between the two orchestras at the 
start of his tenure in 1971: 
When I arrived in Oakland Josef Krips, an older German conductor, was the 
Music Director of San Francisco, which was great for me. His programs were 
considered boring and old fashioned, the orchestra good but not special…. 
The Oakland performance level slowly grew to that of San Francisco when 
Krips finally retired. When Ozawa succeeded Krips [in 1970] the San 
Francisco reviews for Oakland Symphony performances were equal to San 
Francisco's, and the two orchestras were actually considered rivals, although 
San Francisco had a Major Orchestra budget and reputation, and Oakland a 
Regional Orchestra budget and an "is there a there there" reputation.400 
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During a 1965 meeting with Ford Foundation consultant George Kuyper, 
Oakland Symphony senior staff and board members articulated the strong position of 
the orchestra relative to its rival across the Bay. Kuyper recalled: 
In reply to my query as to competition with the San Francisco Orchestra he 
[board member Stephen G. Herrick] replied that…more and more the Oakland 
Symphony is becoming the cultural image of the community; the concerts are 
the city’s leading social events. Oakland is growing rapidly—physically and 
economically—and the Symphony under Samuel “has captured the leadership 
position in the community’s cultural growth.” They feel that the competition 
(“Samuel has more stimulating programs”) is good for San Francisco.401 
 
From the perspective of the players, Robert Hughes recalls that playing under 
Samuel’s leadership was artistically stimulating, “It was a well-rounded and 
adventuresome time with him,” and that “critics agreed that the liveliest and most 
interesting orchestra in the Bay Area was the Oakland Symphony.”402 
Thus, the Oakland Symphony’s position in the Bay Area was strongest under 
Samuel, as it differentiated itself from the more conservative San Francisco 
Symphony. The orchestral voice of cutting-edge California composers, the Oakland 
Symphony occupied a unique musical space in Northern California and the Western 
United States. But conflicts between Samuel’s programming and the more 
conservative tastes of the orchestra’s Board led to his resignation in 1971.  
Although he offered his resignation to the board in July 1969, Samuel 
conducted through the 1969–70 season, as well as several concerts during the 1970–-
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71 season while a search was underway. He read a statement at the December 9, 1969 
board meeting: 
Many of you seem to be unaware of the fact that the Oakland Symphony 
exists at all and is miraculously known in wide international circles because it 
has, for eleven years, pursued a rather more relevant artistic policy than most 
other orchestras. 
 
…Mounting pressures by donors who feel that the orchestra should reflect 
their tastes and what generally amounts to a lack of vision as to where we 
should be heading to remain alive artistically, have made my work difficult 
and have frustrated any attempt to forge ahead spectacularly in directions 
which seem so clearly indicated by the changing times. 
 
…This Board must support the musical policy of its Musical Director, and not 
cater to the tastes of individual financial contributors whose sole aim should 
be the perpetuation of a first-class symphonic institution which will be able to 
accommodate the needs and tastes of audiences who are rapidly changing 
their listening habits and who will not remain satisfied with the status quo.403  
 
 George Kuyper recalled in his 1965 meeting report—at which Samuel was not 
present—a reluctance towards Samuel’s experimental programming: “Samuel has 
been commended for his stimulating programs. And yet at luncheon there was some 
grumbling about the inclusion of ‘avant garde’ music in the concerts.”404 Robert 
Hughes echoes Kuyper recollection, and notes that a faction of the board found 
Samuel too far out: “The orchestra would not have wanted him to leave. But the less-
cultured, moneyed members of the board did.”405 LA Times critic Martin Bernheimer 
said that Samuel “antagonized the sing-along contingent, both on his board and in his 
audience.”406 
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Samuel himself summed up the situation succinctly to the San Francisco 
Chronicle when news of his resignation was reported: “They would like me to 
become terribly establishment, with the ‘right’ artists and the ‘right’ programs…. 
What I’ve been doing is right for me. So they have to do their thing and I have to do 
mine.”407 
 Although the orchestra may have enjoyed a robust reputation in critical 
circles, contemporary music—as it does today—lacked the wider appeal of the 
canonic warhorses by Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, and Brahms. Jack Bethards recalls 
the contrast between popular and critical opinion during the Samuel years:  
Now, the reason it did well before Ford came in, Gerard Samuel, who was a 
really magnetic conductor, really brilliant guy, made Oakland the new music 
center of the United States. He premiered more new music and played more 
new music, than any other orchestra in the country, and you’d read about the 
Oakland symphony in the New Yorker, the New York Times, everywhere; they 
were the forerunner of modern music, and so they had a nationwide reputation 
in the 1960s but no audience, because the audience hated the music. But they 
had a great reputation in artistic circles.408 
 
 Farberman recalls a respect for—and maintenance of—Samuel’s patronage of 
contemporary music: “I was completely aware of Samuel's programming and admired 
him for it. I continued his new music programming, but with different repertoire…. 
New Music and commissions remained a feature of my Oakland programming.”409  
The Ford program should have capitalized on the Oakland Symphony’s 
identity as an originator of contemporary music. Instead, the program inspired the 
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board to reimagine the orchestra in more widely appealing terms. Farberman began 
his tenure by publicly repudiating Samuel’s programming choices in the press. John 
Rockwell announced Farberman’s appointment in Oakland in a 1970 Los Angeles 
Times article: 
A majority of the Oakland Symphony board in recent years had come to 
resent Samuel’s highly adventuresome programming, and his attention to 
avant-garde scores in particular. Farberman himself has something of a 
reputation as a conductor of modern, if not exactly radical music. But, he 
stated at a recent Bay Area press conference, that he was interested in “good 
music, not isms,” and that an orchestra “must not be a refuge for 
contemporary music, but play all kinds of music, and have a representative 
feeling for different aspects within the contemporary fold.”410 
 
The transition from Samuel to Farberman accompanied a shift of the opposite 
kind in San Francisco. Seiji Ozawa replaced Krips in San Francisco, and brought 
energy both as a conductor and as an innovative programmer. Ford Foundation 
Program Officer Oleg Lobanov recalled a 1972 trip to the Bay Area and a concert by 
the San Francisco Symphony: 
The real highlight of the trip, however, came two days later at the San 
Francisco Symphony concert. In my judgement Ozawa is molding a first-rate 
orchestra; he is an exceptional conductor. The concert included a stunning 
performance of the “Mozart Piano Concerto No. 21 in C Major K.467” with 
Christoph Eschenbach, and an excellent reading of the Scriabin “Poem of 
Ecstasy.” But the program also included the first West Coast performance of 
Roger Sessions “Symphony No. 8” and the first American symphony 
appearance of the Japanese Imperial Court Orchestra performing a fascinating 
piece for the Court Orchestra and a traditional symphony orchestra written by 
Maki Ishii. All in all, one of the finest concerts I’ve heard in years.411 
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The shifted focus of the Oakland Symphony—away from contemporary music 
and towards more traditional symphonic repertoire—and the simultaneous re-
emergence of the San Francisco Symphony as a vital institution dulled the luster of 
the Oakland orchestra. Melanie Beene notes that by offering a unique product, 
Samuel’s orchestra could attract audiences from San Francisco: “They [the Oakland 
Symphony] would never draw from here [San Francisco]. People from here were 
going there [Oakland] because the product was different.”412 But once Samuel was 
gone, the orchestra became more like a typical symphony orchestra, lost its niche in 
the Bay Area, and instead attempted to compete with the San Francisco Symphony. 
Inferior musically, and lacking the social cache of San Francisco, the Oakland 
orchestra’s decline ultimately was hastened in the 1970s by a crisis of mission. Jack 
Bethards summarized the orchestra’s predicament in the 1970s: 
There was no reason for the Oakland Symphony to exist. It did not need to be 
there, because you have one of the world’s top orchestras in the country right 
there in San Francisco twenty minutes away, and it had all the social prestige. 
But when it [the Oakland Symphony] started trying to become a miniature San 
Francisco Symphony, that’s when it got in trouble.  
 
The real socialites of the Oakland area really were San Francisco socialites. 
There was really no artistic, or no market reason for the orchestra to exist. 
Who needs a second orchestra that is not quite as good as San Francisco? And 
you can go to San Francisco for a full 26-week season, and 3 nights a week 
every week.  
 
I suggested to the board very early in my tenure, look we should become 
differentiated from San Francisco, and I made several suggestions. I said how 
about a pops orchestra? How about a chamber orchestra? And how about, you 
won’t believe this, how about a band, a concert band? Do something that was 
completely different from San Francisco, but they wouldn’t hear of it, because 
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they wanted the society glamour of a symphony orchestra and symphony 
artists.413 
 
Bethards was not alone in proposing an alternate vision for the Oakland 
Symphony. In 1986, Charles Shere, writing for The Oakland Tribune, made a list of 
ways the Oakland Symphony could transcend its position as “a second-string San 
Francisco Symphony.”414 Among other ideas, Shere suggested a staged production of 
Porgy and Bess, readings of the music of living California composers, chamber-
orchestra concerts of music by Asian, Latino, and African-American composers 
throughout the Bay Area, and lunchtime concerts in corporate cafeterias and roof 
gardens.415  
But in arguing for new approaches, Bethards and Shere were competing not 
only with the board and musicians of the Oakland Symphony, but also with the 
general perception of the Symphony Orchestra as an elite institution. Schere argued 
that this crisis was an existential one: “The conventional orchestra concert is often 
more entertainment than art. And nothing is more demeaning than being out of a job 
and on the dole—which may be the alternative to a number of local musicians if the 
Oakland Symphony doesn’t adapt to the changing musical needs of the community 
that supports it.”416  
Although the Ford Foundation was not responsible for the germination of the 
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idea that symphonic music was more sophisticated than wind band music, jazz, or 
popular music, the Symphony Orchestra program reinforced the dual notion that 
professional symphony orchestras were a mark of civic merit, and that even cities like 
Oakland could—and should—support a professional orchestra. Although Oakland 
would never enjoy the philanthropic resources of New York, Boston, or San 
Francisco, the Symphony Orchestra Program encouraged the Oakland Symphony 
Orchestra to strive to compete with orchestras in wealthier cities. Ironically, as 
evidenced in reviews and interviews, at the end of Samuel’s tenure, and before the 
distribution of the Ford Endowment funds and the purchase of the Paramount, many 
believed that the Oakland Symphony actually was better than the San Francisco 
Symphony. It never achieved that level acclaim again. 
The ultimate death knell for the orchestra came in September 1986, when, 
after guaranteeing the musicians a base annual salary of $12,000 ($27,688 in 2018 
dollars) for the 1986–87 season, the board—with a projected deficit of nearly $1 
million for the upcoming series—told the musicians that it could only afford to pay 
about half that amount: $5,872.417 The players—under contract for the agreed upon 
minimum of $12,000—offered to take a cut to $8,500, but were ultimately rebuffed, 
leading to a stalemate in negotiations, and the ultimate shuttering of the organization. 
 
Conclusion 
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The story of the Oakland Symphony—and its ultimate downfall—exemplifies 
the complicated nature of the Ford Foundation’s Program for Symphony Orchestras. 
Blame for the bankruptcy of the orchestra can be assigned to many causes. Unaware 
of the seriousness of the situation, the musicians failed to accept a working 
compromise in the final hours. But it was the board and the management that 
misrepresented the association’s finances until the very end and who unsustainably 
raised supply—and by extension expenses—without a demand-based mandate. For 
example, Harold Lawrence, manager of the orchestra from November 1977 to 
September 1981, increased the number of guaranteed services drastically from 72 to 
124 under the assumption that “supply creates demand.”418   
But the “supply creates demand” approach that ultimately sank the orchestra 
was made possible by the Ford Foundation’s grants under the Program for Symphony 
Orchestras. Although the foundation cannot be held accountable for the tragic and 
inexplicable death of Calvin Simmons, the mishandling of the foundation’s grant 
monies exacerbated the association’s worst impulses. 
The orchestra failed to capitalize on the matching mechanism and expand its 
fundraising base, ultimately relying on the same small moneyed group that had 
funded the orchestra all along. In addition, the orchestra misused the Ford funds, by 
financing the purchase and renovation of the Paramount Theater, which was simply 
too large and expensive to become profitable. Concurrently, though, in many ways 
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the orchestra did succeed in fulfilling the Ford Foundation’s general aims. By 
lengthening seasons, and improving pay, the Oakland Symphony improved the 
financial well-being of its musicians and provided the East Bay with an arguably finer 
orchestral instrument, if only until 1986. None of the positives helped the orchestra 
keep its doors open in the end, though, and the Oakland case—starting with the 
departure of Gerhard Samuel in 1971—can be directly tied to decisions made in 
response to the Ford Foundation program. 
The orchestra’s final negotiations in the fall of 1985 and summer of 1986 
appear to have been exceptionally acrimonious. Interferences from several outside 
actors added to the pressures placed on both musicians and management. Lew 
Waldeck, former tubist of the New York City Opera Orchestra and director of the 
AFM’s Symphonic Services division, encouraged orchestral musicians throughout the 
country to fight for better wages and working conditions. After joining the AFM staff 
in 1984, Waldeck helped many orchestras define their priorities in negotiations in the 
1980s. But he was also at the center of the collective strife felt by many smaller, 
regional orchestras in the late 1980s. Although the Oakland Symphony was the first 
to declare bankruptcy, the orchestras of Honolulu, Denver, Sacramento, Phoenix, and 
Oklahoma City, struggled through wage freezes, strikes, and concessions during the 
1986 season, and in New York, Waldeck led a collective strike of several New York 
orchestras, including the American Symphony Orchestra, American Composers 
Orchestra, Brooklyn Philharmonic, and the Orchestra of St. Luke’s.419 
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 Mark Drury recalls Waldeck as a galvanizing presence when he visited 
Oakland in the 1980s and spoke to members of the orchestra: “He gave us a long 
speech and answered questions, and then we went to work. We tried to raise 
awareness of the musicians and we all tried to get on board with the attitude that we 
deserved more and that there was more to be had.”420 
 Waldeck and the AFM’s involvement led the musicians to strike and delay the 
start of the 1985–86 season, but eventually management agreed to many of the 
musicians’ demands, lending credence to the what Melanie Beene calls the 
“credibility gap”: “The repeated pattern of the Association saying first ‘we can’t 
afford this,’ then agreeing to a contract which called for ever-expanding activity.”421 
According to Robert Hughes, Waldeck and the AFM argued that over decades the 
musicians were always let down by management: “We had gone through a number of 
decades where symphony orchestras in negotiations would back down on the 
conditions of a contract, and lose a little money and benefits.”422 
When in August 1986 the board announced its intention to file for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection—a technique typically used to restructure existing contracts—
the orchestra’s Players’ Committee accused the board of overstating its financial 
problems:  
The Association’s filing of a bankruptcy petition is meant as a guillotine 
suspended over the heads of the Players to force renegotiation. We will not 
succumb to the Association’s attempt to circumvent the democratic processes 
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by which we work and we are confident that the Bay Area community will not 
be misled by the Association’s irresponsibility.423 
 
 Although the endowment earned from the Ford Foundation was essentially 
exhausted, the lawyer for the players specifically noted the health of the orchestra’s 
balance sheet as justification that the organization was more stable than the board was 
letting on: 
David Rosenfeld, attorney for AFM Local 6 (to which orchestra members 
belong) states, “…There is a serious question as to the validity of the 
bankruptcy filing because the actual assets of the Oakland Symphony are far 
greater than its liabilities. As a result, the union’s view is that the only reason 
the bankruptcy was filed was to reject the union contract. This has become 
clear because less than one week after filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, a 
motion was filed to reject the musicians’ contract.”424 
 
Rosen was correct in stating that the reported assets of the orchestra were 
greater than its liabilities; the orchestra’s 1984 tax return shows assets of $2,897,123 
and liabilities of only $1,247,014, suggesting a degree of solvency.425 But in fact, the 
orchestra’s accountants—overseen by auditors at Price Waterhouse—had included a 
“future rent benefit” of $1,302,649, the estimated amount the orchestra would have 
paid to rent the Paramount if not for the forty-year free rent agreement established 
with the City in the 1970s. Thus, in the years leading up the bankruptcy, the orchestra 
reported the Paramount as an asset—as if it still owned the hall—and positively 
inflated its balance sheet. Melanie Beene considers this issue a key source of 
misunderstandings in the final days:  
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I fault as well as Ford, Price Waterhouse, the auditor…. They counted the free 
rent in the Paramount theater for the forty years as an unrestricted asset which 
skewed the bottom line, which made the musicians think they had more 
money than they had, and the board members didn’t know exactly how bad 
things were, because it kind of confused things on the audit.426 
 
Confusion over the solvency of the organization led to a ratcheting up of the 
rhetoric by the players and their allies. The International Conference of Symphony 
and Opera Musicians released a statement:  
Resolved: That the governing board and delegates of the International 
Conference of Symphony and Opera Musicians and their constituent 
orchestras…support the musicians of the Oakland Symphony in their struggle 
to maintain their orchestra as a major symphony with concomitant wages, 
benefits and working conditions in the face of their management’s appalling 
use of the Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to circumvent their hard-
won contract.427 
 
In a similar vein, American Federation of Musicians President Victor W. 
Fuentealba stated:  
 
What they did…was thumb their noses at musicians and audiences alike. But, 
at least, they are now out in the open. Anyone who believes they’d have done 
otherwise even if the musicians had knuckled under to Mr. Markham’s [the 
orchestra’s manager] blackmail, is naïve. They’d have kept whittling away at 
salaries, benefits and working conditions until they found an excuse to try and 
void the contract. By taking action, the musicians merely forced them to move 
up their schedule.428 
 
Beyond the basic financial misunderstandings, the caustic 1985 negotiations 
had solidified a deep antipathy between the musicians and management. Mark Drury 
recalls being deeply distrustful of Henson Markham in particular: “It was such a nasty 
                                               
426 Author’s interview with Melanie Beene, November 6, 2016. 
427 “Press Release: Musicians Call Oakland Symphony Bankruptcy Ploy to Sidestep Union Contract," 
The American Federation of Musicians, September 2, 1986, OAK. 
428 “Press Release: Musicians Call Oakland Symphony Bankruptcy Ploy to Sidestep Union Contract," 
The American Federation of Musicians, September 2, 1986, OAK. 
  
195  
 
negotiation and we had been such at odds that I basically didn’t believe anything that 
came out of Henson Markham’s mouth, and I essentially just waived him off when he 
told me that they were out of money.”429 Robert Hughes remembers Markham as an 
absentee manager who was seldom seen by the musicians, and also that there was a 
sense of distrust between Markham and the musicians: “I don’t think the management 
and Markham ever negotiated in good faith.”430 
In addition, Drury and the Players’ Committee hoped that Richard Buckley 
would offer his support and conduct concerts produced by the musicians: “We had 
asked Richard Buckley to speak out on behalf of the orchestra, but he had refused 
because he was concerned that he would be blacklisted. This was a huge 
disappointment to us.”431 Stuck in an extremely precarious position, Buckley recalls 
this situation with great regret:  
At that time in the business, being a music director—if a strike happened, 
management and the board expected you to not necessarily be on their side, 
but to not pick up against them. They were trying to do concerts together and I 
said, “I’m sorry but I’m being advised by everyone that I shouldn’t do that.” 
And I think that the musicians thought that I was against them which I was 
not. It’s still a very painful, emotional experience because I loved that 
orchestra.432 
 
Unfortunately for all involved, the situation was more dire than assumed by 
the musicians, and on September 13, the orchestra officially declared Chapter 7 
bankruptcy; the Chronicle reported grimly that there was little hope for those who 
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had already purchased tickets: “Subscribers who paid $600,000 in advance will be in 
line with other creditors.”433 
In addition to the central fiscal misunderstanding associated with the purchase 
and renovation of the Paramount, the Ford Foundation Program also had the effect of 
reinforcing the notion that the orchestra was financially secure because it had the 
foundation’s backing. And by relying on several donors—principally Edgar Kaiser 
and Stephen Bechtel—the orchestra failed to articulate a strong case for increased 
financial involvement by board and community members. The orchestra’s 
overreliance on Kaiser in particular resonates with a statement made to the New York 
Times in 1968 by Stewart Warkow, manager of the American Symphony Orchestra: 
“The Ford grant has become the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval for orchestras. 
We’ll get the money, by hook or by crook, because we must.”434 
 Although it is tempting to blame the fall of the Oakland Symphony on a 
variety of factors—not just the Ford Program—it is illustrative to imagine the 
Oakland Symphony as if the Ford Program had never happened. The first effects of 
the program were felt in the mid 1960s when musicians began demanding more work 
and higher pay, and it is clear that musicians were aware of the impending Ford 
windfall, and cognizant of the possibilities the Ford millions to come. The Oakland 
musicians, like most around the county, deserved a raise, and the Ford Foundation’s 
goal of raising salaries was a laudable one. But the Oakland Symphony’s unique 
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position across the bay from the bigger and better San Francisco Symphony put extra 
pressure on bargaining because the musicians as well as the board wanted to compete 
with their transbay rival. Thus, although salary increases were urgently needed, they 
were also a major factor in the rising costs that ultimately sunk the orchestra. 
By the late 1960s, the orchestra’s board had grown tired of Gerhard Samuel’s 
stubborn focus on new music and looked to move the orchestra in a new direction 
toward a more focused repertoire as well as “major” status. While Samuel became 
Associate Conductor of the Los Angeles Philharmonic, the Oakland board hired 
Harold Farberman to lead the orchestra toward a new degree of professionalism. 
Although he succeeded in re-orienting the orchestra and replacing many hold-over 
musicians from the orchestra’s more amateurish past, he did so at the expense of the 
unique identity that the orchestra enjoyed in the 1960s, and it is not clear that he 
improved the overall quality of the orchestra. Enabled by the impending distribution 
of the Ford endowment money, the orchestra purchased and renovated the Paramount 
Theater in Oakland in 1972. But having failed to expand its donor base and generate 
sustainable interest, the Paramount project was critically undercapitalized and quickly 
led to the pillaging of the newly received endowment. Finally, by the mid 1980s, with 
the endowment nearly depleted, labor relations strained, and audience interest 
waning, the association collapsed. 
 Thus, a clear causal relationship exists between the announcement and 
distribution of the Ford money in the 1960s, and the ultimate disbandment of the 
orchestra in the 1980s. But more broadly, the Oakland Symphony situation shows 
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how the Ford Foundation’s one-size-fits all approach of endowment and expendable 
funds didn’t fit in every case. Rather than a series of essentially blank checks, perhaps 
what the Oakland Symphony needed was several smaller project-oriented grants that 
developed its strength as a contemporary music ensemble. In addition to general 
support and salary increases, these funds could have been earmarked for specific 
commissions, recording projects, or tours that expanded the orchestra’s reputation and 
skill without exposing it to direct competition with the San Francisco Symphony. 
It is impossible to know what would have become of the Oakland Symphony 
if the Ford Foundation had not devised its Program for Symphony Orchestras, or if 
the Oakland Symphony had not been included, or if the money had been managed 
differently by the orchestra’s leaders. But it is clear that the money ultimately led in 
part to the orchestra’s bankruptcy, and the idealistic goals of the foundation 
ultimately undermined the stability of an institution it aimed to support and improve. 
 
Postlude 
 
 Although the Oakland Symphony Orchestra was disbanded in 1986, the story 
of the Oakland Symphony is incomplete without mention of the Oakland East-Bay 
Symphony Orchestra. Initially formed in 1988, Michael Morgan has served as the 
orchestra’s Music Director since 1990, and the orchestra has maintained a level of 
stability and continuity that the original Oakland Symphony never enjoyed. Hired at 
the age of thirty-three after serving as an assistant conductor with the Chicago 
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Symphony, Morgan has provided the Oakland East-Bay orchestra with not only the 
constancy of an unusually long tenure as music director, but also with a canny sense 
of relevance in the community that transcends the role of the orchestra as an “elite” 
institution.  
Whereas the leaders of the original Oakland Symphony valued expansion, 
Morgan and his orchestra have placed a premium on community engagement, through 
educational programs and bridge-building events, like the annual “nontraditional 
holiday tradition” Let Us Break Bread Together concert. Bringing together diverse 
performers—the 2016 version featured the Oakland Interfaith Gospel Choir, an a 
cappella ensemble, a Klezmer band, a local high school choir, and others—Morgan 
imagines his orchestra as an organization rooted firmly in the public interest.  
Although the Oakland East-Bay Orchestra does not perform as many concerts 
or compensate its musicians on the same scale that the original Oakland Symphony 
did, it is arguably more focused and relevant than its predecessor. Finally, in 2016, 
the Oakland East-Bay Symphony Orchestra officially changed its name; thirty years 
after bankruptcy, the Oakland Symphony Orchestra has returned both in spirit, and in 
name.  
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CHAPTER 5. 
The Symphony Orchestra Program in Context 2: The Minnesota Orchestra 
 
Introduction 
 
The Minnesota Orchestra’s work stoppage from October 2012 to February 
2014 was one of the most surprising orchestral crises in U.S. history. Hailed in 2010 
as sounding “like the greatest orchestra in the world” by New Yorker critic Alex Ross, 
the obstacles that emerged between the musicians and management of the Minnesota 
Orchestra in late 2012 highlight the often confusing and incongruous balance between 
artistic and financial success; whereas the orchestra received almost unanimous 
critical praise—culminating in a Grammy Award in 2013—the financial stability of 
the organization became tenuous in the long shadow of the economic downturn of the 
late 2000s. 
 In the wake of deficits of $2.9 million and $6 million in 2011 and 2012, 
Minnesota Orchestra President and CEO Michael Henson, with the support of his 
board, proposed a dramatic salary cut to the musicians, lowering the annual base 
salary from $113,000 to $78,000.435 As was the case in the original Oakland 
Symphony’s final negotiation, a credibility gap grew over the financial viability of 
the organization. Racked with deficits, Henson and Jon R. Campbell, the board 
chairman, saw the need to cut expenses to preserve the long-term health of the 
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endowment and thus the institution. But for the musicians, several factors poisoned 
negotiations. 
 The planned $50 million renovation of Minneapolis’s Orchestra Hall, 
eventually completed in Fall 2013, coupled with the orchestra’s $59 million 
endowment (as of the end of the 2011 – 2012 season), suggested to the musicians that 
management was being disingenuous with its financial figures.436 Musicians were 
also outraged to learn of Henson’s compensation package, which included a $202,500 
performance bonus in 2011. Osmo Vänskä, the orchestra’s music director since 2003, 
publicly sided with the musicians against Henson, in an unusual show of solidarity by 
a music director caught in a strike; after resigning his directorship in protest, Vänskä 
told Minnesota Public Radio that “for any healing to begin at the orchestra, Michael 
Henson must go.”437 The orchestra finally reached an agreement in January 2014 and 
organized a six-month season beginning in February. Vänskä returned to his role as 
music director in April 2014, only weeks after Henson’s announcement that he would 
step down in August of that year.438 
 Central to the crisis was the $50 million Orchestra Hall renovation, part of a 
broader, $100 million long-term fundraising effort called “Building for the Future.” 
Divided 40/30/30 among funds for renovations, endowment, and “artistic and 
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educational endeavors,” $82 million had already been raised toward the “Building for 
the Future” initiative by 2010.439 
 Although the Minnesota Orchestra ultimately survived what became the 
lengthiest orchestra labor dispute in modern U.S. history, the crisis serves as a potent 
example of the often-counterintuitive instability of U.S. symphony orchestras. The 
“Building for the Future” initiative was just the latest in a string of ambitious 
fundraising drives completed by the Minnesota Orchestra, dating back to its first 
endowment drive, launched on April 28, 1967, as part of the Ford Foundation’s 
Program for Symphony Orchestras. Setting off a string of large-scale fundraising 
campaigns, first to satisfy the terms of the Ford grant, then in the early 1970s to 
endow Orchestra Hall, next in the early 1980s to raise an additional $30 million for 
endowment, and finally in the late 2000s to fund the hall renovation, the Ford 
Foundation’s Program for Symphony Orchestras emboldened the leaders of the 
Minneapolis Symphony Orchestra—as it was known until 1968—to build one of the 
world’s premier orchestras. 
 This chapter approaches the influence of the Ford Program for Symphony 
Orchestras on the Minnesota Orchestra from three primary angles: the circumstances 
surrounding the name change from the Minneapolis Symphony to the Minnesota 
Orchestra in 1968, the orchestra’s unusual continuity of administrative and artistic 
leadership, and finally the long-range planning and effective fiscal stewardship that 
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defined the orchestra in the years before, during, and after the Ford Foundation’s 
Symphony Orchestra Program.  
 
Regionalization/Name Change 
 
 Founded by Munich-born choir director and organist Emil Oberhoffer, the 
Minneapolis Symphony performed its first concert on November 5, 1903. Established 
three years after the Philadelphia Orchestra, eight years before the San Francisco 
Symphony, and fifteen years before the Cleveland Orchestra, the Minneapolis 
Symphony was the eighth major orchestra founded in the United States. The 
orchestra’s first permanent hall was built by the Northwestern National Life 
Insurance Company in 1905 at the corner of Nicollete Mall and 11th Street, 
cattycorner to the orchestra’s current home in downtown Minneapolis.440  
From 1903 until 1945 lumber executive Elbert L. Carpenter was the 
Minneapolis Symphony’s sustaining patron. Carpenter proselytized on behalf of the 
orchestra with local business leaders and began touring the orchestra regionally in 
1907 to Moorhead and Duluth in Minnesota, as well as to Grand Forks, North 
Dakota.441 The orchestra performed in Chicago in 1911 and made its Carnegie Hall 
debut in 1912; in 1913 the New York Times noted that “The Minneapolis Symphony 
Orchestra seems to have a ‘wanderlust’ or mania for traveling far from home.”442 In 
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addition to touring, radio broadcasts and recordings brought the Minneapolis 
Symphony international acclaim. Under conductor Henri Verbrugghen, the orchestra 
first performed live radio broadcasts in 1923, and made its first recording while on 
tour in New York in 1924.443 
 Eugene Ormandy’s tenure as conductor from 1931 to 1936 further solidified 
the orchestra’s reputation. During an eleven–day period in January 1935, Ormandy 
made no less than twenty recordings with the Minneapolis Symphony on the Victor 
label, including the first American recording of Mahler’s Second Symphony.444 
Ormandy’s concert performance of the Mahler during the 1934–35 season was a 
polarizing extravaganza involving 350 singers, where the offstage brass musicians in 
the fifth movement received the beat via electrical lights that were manipulated by a 
push button under the foot of the assistant concertmaster. The Minneapolis Daily 
Star’s critic wrote a cantankerous review: “We can learn more about death and 
resurrection in five minutes of Bach than from ten times five minutes of Mahler.”445  
Dimitri Mitropoulos and Antal Dorati continued the recording tradition after 
Ormandy’s departure for the Philadelphia Orchestra in 1936; Dorati alone made more 
than fifty recordings from 1949 to 1960.446 Radio broadcasts of the orchestra’s 
recordings were also heard around the world; Richard Cisek, who managed the 
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orchestra from 1964 to 1990, first heard of the Minneapolis Symphony on Armed 
Forces Radio while stationed in Korea in the late 1950s.447 
 Frequent tours, especially in the upper Midwest region, remained a mainstay 
of the Minneapolis Symphony. The orchestra regularly performed more concerts on 
tour than it did at home; the 1945 annual report—released soon after Elbert 
Carpenter’s death—notes that the orchestra gave thirty-seven concerts in the Twin 
Cities and fifty-one concerts on tour.448 The 1944–45 season was also the first season 
in which the orchestra operated without a deficit; Carpenter’s last gift to the orchestra 
was $67,000 to completely eliminate the accumulated deficit.449 Incredibly, by 1952 
the orchestra had appeared in forty-five states, Canada, and Cuba.450 
 The Minneapolis Symphony’s constant touring exemplified Carpenter’s 
mission to make the orchestra available to listeners not only in the Twin Cities, but 
also throughout Minnesota and the upper Midwest. The 1905 death of Theodore 
Thomas—the impresario who toured the Midwest relentlessly in the late nineteenth 
century and founded the Chicago Symphony in 1891—left many areas of the region 
without regular symphonic concerts. The impact of the Minneapolis Symphony’s 
tours on small Midwestern towns should not be underestimated. John K. Sherman’s 
1952 Music and Maestros: The Story of the Minneapolis Symphony describes how the 
orchestra’s tours were often multi-day mini festivals that incorporated local 
musicians: 
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The unaccustomed sound of a symphony orchestra, in itself, was an alluring 
and even exotic importation for towns whose musical culture was sustained, if 
at all, by local choruses. These choruses, incidentally, were a large factor in 
the success of the orchestra in building up its tours, for they were eager to sing 
with instrumental support and spent many weeks before the orchestra’s visit in 
preparing…. The orchestra served many towns’ yearning for an annual music 
festival in the spring months, and its visit in many cases was the festival. 
Often several days were spent in a single community, with the musical diet 
varied by recitals given by the vocal and instrumental soloists of the 
orchestra.451 
 
Despite the Minneapolis Symphony’s reputation as a touring orchestra, the 
orchestra’s leaders began to feel that the organization’s name was an obstacle to an 
even richer regional identity. Board President Kenneth N. Dayton—head of Dayton 
Department Stores, the eventual parent company of Target Stores—described in his 
January 1955 President’s Report the necessity of expanding the orchestra’s reach and 
adding more donors: 
You will hear shortly of the very successful series of concerts which we gave 
in Rochester [Minnesota] this year. In addition to Rochester, the Orchestra 
played concerts in Faribault, Northfield, Fergus Falls, Moorhead and Virginia 
[Minnesota]; also suburban concerts were given in Richfield, Edina and 
Minnetonka…. If another eight or ten state communities could be added to the 
list, the Orchestra could make a highly successful state tour. This in turn 
should help enlarge the membership of the association in many communities 
throughout the State. I feel strongly that this is the direction in which we 
should and must move rapidly.452 
  
In addition, Dayton advocated for a change of the name of the orchestra’s 
parent organization to attract more patrons outside of Minneapolis: 
At some point in this program of increased membership and increased service 
to the whole State I think it would be well to change the name of the 
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Association from the Orchestral Association of Minneapolis to the Minnesota 
Orchestral Association, thus making it a truly statewide organization.453 
 
This subtle name change occurred in the late 1950s, while the orchestra still 
operated publicly as the Minneapolis Symphony Orchestra. The announcement of the 
Ford Foundation’s Program for Symphony Orchestras in 1966 gave the orchestra’s 
leaders, including Richard Cisek, who was appointed general manager in 1964, 
license to think more broadly about how the orchestra could appeal beyond 
Minneapolis.  
The Ford Foundation’s grant to the Minneapolis Symphony was a total of $2.5 
million, including $2 million in endowment funds and $500,000 in expendable funds. 
The orchestra was one of only eight—including Boston, New York, Chicago, 
Philadelphia, Cleveland, Los Angeles, and Detroit—included in the top tier of 
grantees who were required to match their Ford contributions at a 2:1 ratio. Thus, to 
earn the Ford Foundation’s $2 million, the Minneapolis Symphony had to raise $2 
million on its own. As we shall see, the orchestra succeeded in raising nearly $8 
million, or almost four times its required match; its closest competitor was the 
eminent Cleveland Orchestra, which raised only $6.5 million. 
As a young general manager at the start of the Ford Program, one of Cisek’s 
primary goals was to increase support from the neighboring “twin” City of St. Paul. 
Cisek described the relationship between St. Paul and Minneapolis in terms of the 
U.S. Congress, with St. Paulites as the august Senate and Minneapolitans as the 
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boisterous House of Representatives. By the 1960s, the two cities had long 
maintained a “foolish enmity.”454 
Although St. Paulites did patronize the orchestra, Cisek and the board felt that 
bringing more supporters from outside Minneapolis would help to bolster the 
orchestra’s finances. In the 1960s, although there were concerts in St. Paul as part of 
larger regional tours, there was no regular subscription series in Minneapolis’s twin 
city.455 To bring in more St. Paulites and solidify the orchestra’s reach throughout 
Minnesota, Cisek and the board worked to enact a name change of the orchestra itself.  
A formal name change study began in 1966, with a solicitation of opinions 
from Helen Thompson of the American Symphony Orchestra League, John S. 
Edwards, Manager of the Pittsburgh Symphony, Ronald Wilford of Columbia Artists 
Management Inc., and representatives of New York public relations firm Edgar 
Vincent Associates. These consultants recommended against the change: “The 
unanimous tenure of opinion seems to advise us to proceed with extreme caution in 
any plans we may have to change the name of the Minneapolis Symphony.”456 
Specifically, the consultants noted that “the general public in this country and abroad 
does not identify Minneapolis and Minnesota in the same light as far as cultural 
enlightenment….Minnesota has an image that is primarily agrarian with perhaps the 
Gophers [the University of Minnesota mascot] being the next most recognizable 
image one thinks of in identifying this state.”457 In addition, the consultants noted the 
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orchestra’s history of great conductors: “The history…as the Orchestra of Ormandy 
and Mitropoulos…probably would be lost in the transfer of names,” as well as the 
detrimental effect on recording and touring a name change could engender: “No 
appeal to record companies or foreign tours would be found in the new name of 
Minnesota, whereas the image of the Minneapolis Symphony carries with it 
considerable luster and attractiveness.”458 Although the consultants unanimously 
opposed incorporating Minnesota into the title of the orchestra, they expressed 
interest in renaming the orchestra the Minneapolis-St. Paul Symphony Orchestra, as a 
way to both preserve the Minneapolis name as well as bring St. Paulites into the 
fold.459 
By 1967, the Ford endowment drive placed added pressure on the board to 
decide whether or not to change the name. If managed effectively, the name change 
could frame the endowment drive as part of a larger transformation of the orchestra, 
rather than just as a typical fundraising effort. But if done ineffectively, the name 
change could alienate the core Minneapolis patrons who were the key subscribers and 
supporters of the orchestra itself. A poorly executed name change could also have the 
effect of confusing outside audiences and critics into thinking that the renamed 
orchestra was a new orchestra entirely, or that the Minneapolis Symphony had gone 
out of business. Echoing the 1966 consultants’ mention of “the Gophers,” at least one 
patron wondered “How many record hunters will assume that the symphony is a 
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University of Minnesota student orchestra? The name could confuse a very 
significant share of the public.”460 
Despite these concerns, the board seriously considered three possible new 
names: the Minnesota Philharmonic Orchestra, the Minnesota Orchestra, and the 
Minnesota Symphony. The Minnesota Orchestra was chosen, and announced to the 
public by Association President Judson Bemis on September 26, 1968: “As the 
MINNESOTA ORCHESTRA, ours becomes the first major regional orchestra in the 
county—with a name signifying its mission to bring the enjoyment and rewards of 
great music to increasing numbers of Upper Midwest residents.”461 
Although the name change had many influential supporters, including Elmer 
L. Andersen—longtime Minneapolis Symphony Patron and Governor of Minnesota 
from 1961 to 1963—it had many detractors as well. Many angry letter writers noted 
that all the “Big Five” orchestras of Chicago, Cleveland, Boston, and Philadelphia—
the New York Philharmonic’s name being somewhat ambiguous—were named after 
cities rather than states. Many also expressed elitist responses along the lines of the 
1966 consultants’ estimation that Minneapolis had a stronger artistic reputation than 
Minnesota: “‘Minneapolis Symphony’ connotes dignity, excellent musicians, and 
names like Mitropoulos, Ormandy, Dorati, and of course Skrowaczewski. ‘Minnesota 
Orchestra’ brings to mind a group of amateurs…. How could anyone seriously state 
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that ‘several years of careful deliberation and planning’ brought forth a name as 
unimaginative and hick-sounding as ‘Minnesota Orchestra’? Shame on Someone!”462 
The highest profile name-change detractor was the Music Director himself, 
Stanislaw Skrowaczewski. Cisek recalled to me the nature of Skrowaczewski’s 
distaste with the name change: “The musicians had great resentment over it, as did 
the conductor, Stanislaw Skrowaczewski. Because they felt they had come to this 
institution and piggy-backed on its reputation, and an orchestra with a new name had 
no reputation.”463 A memo from Skrowaczewski to the Board of Directors in 1971—
several years after the change of name—suggests that his concerns did not diminish 
over time:  
As much as I disliked and opposed the change of the name of our Orchestra, I 
am bothered more and more by this fact…. I personally and many of our 
musicians are approached by people who, if they know about our past, 
consider us a University or provincial team. Those who knew about the 
change believe that the Minneapolis Symphony collapsed and this is somehow 
new and without a fine tradition…. How much damage has already been done 
by this change…. It is not too late to switch back to the name of the 
Minneapolis Symphony Orchestra and not to cross out a very fine heritage and 
name which will never be restituted by the new one.464 
 
There does not appear to be any evidence that the name change hurt marketing 
efforts, or that anyone actually believed that the Minnesota Orchestra was a student 
orchestra. But as late as 1982 the myth that the name change had diminished the 
orchestra’s reputation still existed. In an otherwise positive article celebrating Cisek’s 
twenty-fifth anniversary with the orchestra, Minneapolis Star-Tribune music critic 
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Michael Anthony questioned Cisek on the name change: “Doesn’t this orchestra have 
a special problem in marketing itself outside the area? Didn’t the name change from 
Minneapolis Symphony—a name known throughout the United States and Europe via 
tours and recordings—to Minnesota Orchestra in the late ‘60s give the marketing a 
special handicap?” Cisek denied this claim: “’We continue to be active in the same 
arenas as before…. I don’t think we slid back because of it. It’s a matter of getting the 
name of this orchestra out before the public…. As a name, the Minneapolis 
Symphony was never a match for the Boston or the Philadelphia, but the orchestra 
today is a finer one than the Minneapolis Symphony was.”465 
Despite the misgivings, Cisek and the board worked hard to promote the new 
Minnesota Orchestra once the name was changed. A pamphlet from 1969 called 
“Music is Alive in Minnesota” is an example of the promotional materials the 
orchestra used to help small towns host the orchestra while on tour: “YOUR TOWN 
CAN BECOME one of many regional communities bringing the great Minnesota 
Orchestra for a special concert for all of its residents.”466 The pamphlet included 
guidance on potential venues: “High school auditoriums or gymnasiums, field houses, 
community theaters and outdoor recreations areas are often suitable,” as well as an 
offer to help with planning and promotion: “Minnesota Orchestra management staff 
will help you plan and promote your musical event.”467 Regarding repertoire, each 
town was given a list of four programs to choose from:  
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An Evening of Beethoven: A mighty experience! Music by one of the greatest 
composers in the history of Western civilization, presented in commemoration 
of the 200th anniversary of his birth. 
 
Music of the Romantic Masters: Music by Berlioz, Tchaikovsky and other 
18th and 19th century masters of melodic beauty and lyricism.  
 
A Night in Vienna: The gaiety and romance of the waltz and the splendor of 
Viennese music, with music by such renowned composers as Mozart, Strauss, 
Schubert, and others. 
 
The Orchestra Plays the Pops: A program of familiar, light classics and show 
tunes, performed by the full symphony orchestra, indoors or in a relaxed, 
informal outdoor setting.468 
 
As a direct result of these promotional efforts, the Minnesota Orchestra toured 
extensively in the late 1960s and early 1970s. During the 1970–71 season, for 
example, the orchestra performed concerts in thirty-one communities in Minnesota, 
Wisconsin, North Dakota, and Iowa, in addition to national touring that brought the 
orchestra to Colorado, Illinois, Florida, South Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, Alabama, 
West Virginia, Kansas, Nebraska, Ohio, Vermont, Connecticut, and New York. More 
than 100,000 people heard the Minnesota orchestra on tour during the 1970–71 
season, several thousand more than the combined attendance for the regular 
subscription series.469 Furthermore, the orchestra maintained a strong commitment to 
educational concerts under the sponsorship of WAMSO, the Women’s Association of 
the Minnesota Orchestra. Concerts for young audiences, which typically included 
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small ensembles in performances at elementary schools throughout the State, were 
heard by an additional 170,000 young people during the 1970–71 season.470 
One of Cisek’s primary goals was to bring the orchestra more regularly to St. 
Paul. To this end a full twenty-concert Thursday night subscription series was created 
in St. Paul during the 1970–71 season, meaning that for the first time, subscription 
concerts were performed twice each week. Unlike today, where subscription concerts 
are typically performed on Friday and Saturday nights often with a Sunday matinee, 
up until the early 1970s, the Minnesota Orchestra’s subscription concerts were solely 
on Friday nights because its home, the University of Minnesota’s Northrup 
Auditorium, was large enough—with a capacity of nearly 5,000—to accommodate 
two nights’ worth of audience. 
Although performing each concert only once offered various savings to the 
orchestra, Cisek believed that not performing more than once put the orchestra at an 
artistic disadvantage:  
We could accommodate the audience in one concert but it was silly to 
rehearse all week and do one concert and then start all over again. Basically it 
was a one concert per week season, whereas other orchestras in the larger 
cities had two or sometimes three concerts and it helped the artistry of the 
orchestra because they played it once and then played it again, really getting it 
into their fiber, whereas for us every concert was like opening night.471 
 
 Thus, starting in 1970, the orchestra performed each subscription concert 
twice: Thursday night at the newly constructed 1,800 seat O’Shaughnessy 
Auditorium at the College of St. Catherine in St. Paul, and then Friday night at 
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471 Author’s interview with Richard Cisek, June 23, 2017. 
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Northrup Auditorium. The orchestra’s 1971 report to the Ford Foundation 
triumphantly makes note of the orchestra’s reemergence in St. Paul: “The Orchestra 
thus took another dramatic step towards regional identification in extending its 
service to its neighboring city across the river. As a result of such expansion the 
orchestra now performs significantly more concerts outside of Minneapolis than it 
does in its city of origin.”472 
 The embrace of St. Paul also earned plaudits nationwide. Donal Henahan of 
the New York Times noted: 
For more than 120 years the Twin Cities have faced one another across the 
Mississippi River and nursed a sibling rivalry that today is still real and 
strong, though fading appreciably as the twins find themselves more and more 
entangled in each other’s commercial, social and cultural lives. 
 
Last night another strong strand in the alliance was woven—or rewoven, 
really—with the opening of the Minnesota Orchestra’s first regular concert 
series in St. Paul in 40 years. Formerly called the Minneapolis Symphony, the 
orchestra changed its name and, to some extent, its purpose in life two years 
ago. With the change has come a more ecumenical approach to art and St. 
Paul, and the concert here in the new 1,800 seat O’Shaughnessy Auditorium 
on the College of St. Catherine campus made the symphonic embrace of the 
rival cities official.473  
 
 Thus, although the Minnesota Orchestra’s continued practice of visiting small 
towns throughout the Midwest brought it popularity in its own backyard, it was its 
embrace of its “twin,” St. Paul, that brought it plaudits on the national stage. This 
expansion, both to St. Paul and elsewhere in the upper Midwest, coupled the fuller 
embrace of a regional concept accomplished through its name change, involved a 
                                               
472 "Narrative Account of Activities Minnesota Orchestra, 1970-71 Season," Series 5.8, MOAA. 
473 Donal Henahan, "Symphonic Embrace for Twin Cities," New York Times, October 10, 1970. 
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great deal of financial risk. The Ford expendable funds allowed for a degree of 
breathing room in the annual budget to take on new challenges, and the leaders of the 
Minnesota Orchestra were well positioned and prepared to capitalize on these funds. 
 
Artistic and Administrative Leadership 
 
 The workings of the first half century of the Minneapolis Symphony were 
dominated by Elbert L. Carpenter, but no figure was as influential during the 
subsequent half century as Richard Cisek. A native of Buffalo, New York, Cisek 
joined the orchestra as public relations director in 1958, became assistant managing 
director in 1960, general manager in 1964, and finally president from 1978 until his 
retirement in 1990. His tenure spans an incredible period of growth not only for the 
Minnesota Orchestra, but also for the entire U.S. orchestra business. 
 In 1964, when Cisek became “the man with the big desk”—as he describes his 
ascendancy to the position of general manager—the orchestra was still performing 
one night per week at the University of Minnesota’s Northrup Auditorium, had an 
endowment of less than $400,000, and guaranteed musicians a minimum of only 
$4,805 ($39,000 in 2018) per week for a thirty-one-week season.474 By the time of his 
retirement, orchestra members were guaranteed fifty-two-weeks of employment and 
$60,000 in annual wages ($118,000 in 2018); and the orchestra performed in 
                                               
474 "Economic Ranking of Orchestras," December 1, 1964, Series 2.2, MOAA.; "Annual Report - June 
30, 1965," Series 1.1, MOAA. 
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downtown Minneapolis’s Orchestra Hall, a 2,000-seat auditorium purpose-built in 
1974.475 
 One of Cisek’s proudest early achievements was his first contract with the 
orchestra’s musicians, negotiated in 1965. In addition to bolstering wages and 
guaranteed work weeks, and providing for a host of new workplace protections, the 
1965 contract was noted for its length of five years, and was at that time the longest 
contract negotiated by a major U.S. orchestra.476 Over the course of this ambitious 
arrangement, weekly minimums rose $10 each year from $165 to $205, the season 
grew from thirty-six to forty-five weeks, and the orchestra added twelve contracted 
musicians.477 The New York Times noted at the time of the contract’s ratification that 
the increases in season length and weekly pay would mean a 92 percent increase in 
the minimum wage, and nearly double the orchestra’s budget from $1.1 million in 
1964–65 to $2 million in 1969–70.478 
 By locking in the musicians for five years, management could more accurately 
estimate personnel expenses and plan for future seasons more effectively. The 
musicians benefited by knowing that their wages would greatly increase over the next 
five years, without the possibility of dropping in an economic downturn or a similar 
unexpected event. A report prepared by the board’s Personnel Committee in 1966 
described the benefits of a longer-term deal:  
In return for the manifest advantages in stability of a long-term contract, in 
reliance on which this Association could formulate a long-term program, this 
                                               
475 "Comparative Growth in Orchestra Annual Salaries - 1952 - 2000," Senza Sordino, March, 2001. 
476 Master Contract, July 21, 1965, Series 5.6, MOAA. 
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Association made substantial concessions to the musicians on minimum 
salaries, guaranteed total weeks of employment, and some incidental 
conditions of employment.479 
 
Furthermore, this five-year contract, negotiated on the eve of the Ford 
program, insulated the Minnesota Orchestra from much of the labor unrest that 
plagued orchestras in the early years of the program. Nonetheless, the 1965 
agreement dramatically increased the wages of the Minnesota musicians. Although 
the increase in base weekly scale from $165 to $205 over the five-year life of the 
contract constituted a 24 percent rise, the increase in season length—from thirty-six 
to forty-five weeks—accounted for a 55 percent rise in gross wages for a musician on 
minimum scale. In addition, a $14 cost of living adjustment amounted to $14 per 
musician during the last season of the contract, pushing the minimum annual salary in 
the 1969–70 season to $9,855, up from $5,940 in the first season of the contract, 
(1965–70) and $4,805 in the season before the contract (1964–65).480 
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Table 5.1: Historical Minnesota Orchestra Wage Data481 
 
                                               
481 See "Comparative Growth in Orchestra Annual Salaries - 1952 - 2000," Senza Sordino, March, 
2001; "Humanities and the Arts Staff Work--Interview with Boris Sokoloff, Jr., Manager, Minneapolis 
1952–53 2,600$              24,246$               
1956–57 110$             26 2,860$              25,342$               
1962–63 4,350$              35,396$               
1964–65 155$             31 4,805$              37,981$               
1965–66 165$             36 5,940$              45,684$               
1966–67 175$             38 6,650$              49,575$               
1967–68 185$             39 7,215$              51,623$               
1968–69 195$             41 7,995$              54,242$               
1969–70 205$             45 9,225$              59,200$               
1970–71 234$             45 10,530$            64,738$               
1971–72 244$             46 11,224$            66,858$               
1972–73 254$             48 12,192$            68,372$               
1973–74 280$             46 12,880$            65,051$               
1974–75 295$             48 14,160$            65,534$               
1975–76 320$             50 16,000$            70,015$               
1976–77 $           340/350* 50 17,250$            70,876$               
1977–78 $           365/380* 50 18,625$            71,127$               
1978–79 $           395/420* 52 21,190$            72,674$               
1979–80 $           415/440* 52  $           23,530** 71,101$               
1980–81 $           465/495* 52 $           26,260** 71,931$               
1981–82 544$             52 $           29,588** 76,343$               
1982–83 52 31,708$            79,267$               
1992–93 52 62,790$            108,195$             
2000–01 52 79,950$            112,468$             
* Three year contract with raises built in every six months
** Includes $1,300 annual electronic media guarantee
1979 Contract - 3 years
Minimum 
Weekly Wage Total Weeks
Minimum 
Annual Wage
 Minimum 
Annual Wage 
(Inflation 
Adjusted - 2018) 
Season
1965 Contract - 5 years
1970 Contract - 3 years - First Labor Strike
1973 Contract - 3 years
1976 Contract - 3 years
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In total, salary and benefit costs of orchestra members rose from $570,708 in 
1964–65 to $1,319,700 in 1969–70, for an increase of 131 percent.482 Salaries and 
benefits of orchestra members accounted for 52 percent of total costs in 1964–65, but 
60 percent in 1969–70; gross revenue as a percentage of total expenses dropped 
correspondingly during the same span from 56 percent to 41 percent, leading to a 
dramatic jump in operating deficit from $530,000 to $1,300,000.483 
The large increase in salary and benefit costs were largely due to an increase 
in work weeks. But as discussed in Chapter 1, orchestra expenditures have generally 
risen without a corresponding rise in performance revenues. Because the cost of 
orchestral labor has outpaced a growth in labor productivity in orchestras—a 
Beethoven symphony still “costs” the same amount of time and number of musicians 
as it did in 1850—rising wages in the Minnesota Orchestra widened the annual 
deficit.  
In addition to these gains in wages, the musicians made ambitious demands 
when the next round of negotiations began in January 1970. Believing that they had 
been financially injured by the length of the five-year arrangement, they demanded a 
two-year contract with an immediate rise to fifty weeks (up from forty-five) in the 
first year and a full fifty-two weeks in the second. Furthermore, the musicians sought 
                                               
Symphony Orchestra," July 12, 1957, box 30, WML; "The Minnesota Orchestral Association Minutes 
of the Executive Committee Held June 27 and 28, 1964," Series 1.4, MOAA; Master Contract, July 21, 
1965, Series 5.6, MOAA; "Narrative Account of Activities: Minnesota Orchestra, 1970-71 Season," 
Series 5.8, MOAA; "Narrative Report of 1972–1973 Season," 1973, MOAA; "Minnesota Orchestra 
Association Annual Report 1974/75," Series 1.1, MOAA; "Minnesota Orchestra Settles," Senza 
Sordino, October 1976; "Minimum Salary Comparisons," 1982, Series 2.2, MOAA. 
482 Letter from Paul Christopherson to Board of Directors, August 28, 1970, Series 2.2. 
483 Ibid. 
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a minimum weekly scale of $275 in year 1 and $300 in year 2, with a cost of living 
escalator to be determined in the second season. Finally, they argued for a dramatic 
expansion of benefits, including five weeks of paid vacation in the first year, and 
seven in the second, up from two weeks in the previous contract, as well as a bevy of 
new rules shortening the length of rehearsals, mandating on-stage temperatures for 
performances (68–85 degrees), and requiring all school concerts to be shorter than 
one hour.484 
Initial demands—from both sides of the negotiating table—generally 
represent exaggerations of actual expectations. Although the musicians probably did 
not expect to get everything that they asked for, they clearly intended to continue the 
momentum achieved in the 1965 agreement. After nine months of negotiations, 
though, the musicians and management were still far apart on many contract 
provisions, leading to the first work stoppage in the orchestra’s history.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the labor turmoil of the late 1960s was a major 
concern for the Ford Foundation and the American Symphony Orchestra League. 
Many orchestras refused to complete negotiations until the Ford Foundation disclosed 
the exact amount it would give to each orchestra, and one major orchestra manager 
wrote to the ASOL’s Helen Thompson in 1966: “Our musicians are of the opinion 
that a huge pot of Ford Foundation gold is being hoarded someplace and that the 
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orchestra association is simply refusing to give them the trust facts thereby denying 
the musicians benefit of sharing in the pot.”485 
Part of the problem was the complex distribution structure of the Ford 
Program itself. If one of the main goals of the program was to raise musician salaries 
quickly and sustainably, it might have been better to grant only expendable funds 
annually at a graduated rate and over a longer period of time than five years. In 
actuality, though, the Ford Program granted only five equal expendable fund 
distributions, meaning that as salary costs grew, the Ford grant stayed the same size. 
Furthermore, the larger portion of the grant—the endowment funds—were not 
actually handed over to the orchestras for ten years. So although the Ford Foundation 
was distributing $80 million dollars, it was doing so in a way where the bulk of the 
money wasn’t actually available to the orchestras until the late 1970s. 
Lasting only one week, the Minnesota Orchestra’s first strike was part of a 
larger trend throughout the county of increasingly tense negotiations. Members of the 
New York Philharmonic and the Chicago Symphony both held out on agreeing to 
contracts until shortly before the beginning of their 1970–71 seasons and settled 
nearly identical contracts through a great deal of coordination between their 
negotiating committees and officials from The International Conference of Symphony 
and Opera Musicians (ICSOM). ICSOM Chairman Ralph Mendelson noted the 
importance of cooperation in the October 1970 edition of the ICSOM newsletter 
                                               
485 Letter from Helen M. Thompson to Edward F. D’Arms, April 15, 1966, A Guide to the Ford 
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Senza Sordino: “The course of both negotiations and the results obtained bear witness 
to the absolute necessity of not only continuing this degree of cooperation but 
improving it. Collective bargaining in the symphony field has become highly 
sophisticated. We must meet the challenge.”486 Although Chicago and New York 
avoided strikes, the Cleveland Orchestra was on strike for the first forty-one days of 
its 1970–71 season, after striking for a week before its 1967–68 season. The 
Cleveland musicians benefitted from the support of ICSOM’s newly formed strike 
fund.487 
 Central to the resolution of the Minnesota situation was Phil Sipser, ICSOM’s 
legal counsel, who helped several orchestras in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A 
savvy and respected labor lawyer, Sipser appears to have creatively solved the 
Minnesota crisis by restructuring the orchestra’s pension plan in favor of the 
musicians. In addition, perhaps to avoid any further bad blood, the musicians were 
compensated for the strike week in the form of paid vacation.488 Cisek recalls Sipser 
with a great deal of respect: “Tough but fair. I liked him. No pushover by any means, 
but he brought out the best in me and also gave the musicians the best representation 
they’d had.”489 
 The final 1970 agreement spanned three years, with minimums of $234, $244, 
and $254 per week, as well as a gradual rise to forty-eight guaranteed weeks. Sipser’s 
work on the pension plan meant that not only would the association assume all 
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employer and employee contributions during the term of the agreement, but also that 
the previous employee contributions to the pension plan would be refunded over the 
following three years. In addition, the musicians also received the sought-after 
reduction in rehearsal length from 3 hours to 2.5.490 
 A graduate of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, the business 
school of the University of Pennsylvania, Cisek ably navigated the difficult role of 
manager—and later president—with an acute understanding of the lopsided balancing 
act of running a modern orchestra. Although many managers possess savvy business 
skills, few combine them with the necessary deference to the artistic side of the 
operation as successfully as Cisek, a balance he described to Star-Tribune critic 
Michael Anthony in 1982:  
An orchestra is run in a businesslike way but not really like a business. The 
bottom line is not to show the highest return on investment. Actually, there are 
two bottom lines: an artistic one and an economic one, with the artistic one 
predominating. It’s not too hard to achieve one or the other. But to keep them 
both in balance is where the risk and responsibility are—also the fun.491 
 
Orchestra leaders have the dual difficulty of justifying artistic decisions to 
donors and audiences, while simultaneously defending business decisions to 
musicians and audiences. A for-profit manager’s purpose is to profit by shareholders; 
when shareholders are unhappy the chief executive is almost always removed. But for 
the non-profit orchestra manager, it is not entirely clear who the shareholders are, or 
if there are shareholders at all. Thus, the orchestra manager has many constituencies 
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to which s/he can potentially run afoul, including audience members, board members, 
musicians, conductor, etc. The length of Cisek’s tenure is a testament to his ability to 
satisfy all of his various “shareholders.” 
In 1971, the Minnesota Orchestra appointed its first professional president, 
Donald L. Engle. Engle came to the orchestra after serving as director of the Martha 
Baird Rockefeller Foundation for Music from 1959 to 1971, and Manager of the 
Philadelphia Orchestra before that.492 Whereas the Minnesota Orchestra had 
previously had a volunteer president elected from by the board who came from the 
local business community, Engle’s hiring ushered in a greater degree of 
professionalism in the administrative arm of the organization.  
The press release describing Engle’s appointment in 1971 highlighted the 
orchestra’s strong foundation, as well as its achievement as the top fundraiser during 
the Ford challenge: 
In its 69-year history the Minnesota Orchestra has always been an innovative 
force in symphony orchestra development. Its Board of Directors feel that Mr. 
Engle’s appointment will further expand the activities of the Association. The 
orchestras is one of the few in the United States to adopt a regional concept. 
The first five-year labor contract in the musical field was negotiated by the 
orchestra, and the Minnesota Orchestra has been recognized as the most 
successful participant in the Ford Foundation Matching Grant Program.493 
 
                                               
492 Martha Baird Rockefeller (1895–1971) was a professional pianist and the second wife and widow 
of John D. Rockefeller, Jr. When she married Rockefeller in 1951, she became a philanthropist with a 
focus on music, and in 1957 she established the Martha Baird Rockefeller Fund for Music, which was 
dissolved in 1982. See “Martha Baird Rockefeller, 1895-1971,” The Rockefeller Archive Center, 
http://rockarch.org/bio/marthabaird.php. 
493 "Draft: Donald Engle Appointed First Professional President of Minnesota Orchestra: Will Assume 
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Engle acted as the chief executive of the orchestra, and his role was largely to 
define fund raising and development policies; Cisek, in contrast, managed the day-to-
day operations, including ticket sales, marketing, and labor relations. Thus, Engle’s 
appointment—and the orchestra’s willingness to create a new high-paying 
administrative role—encapsulated the increased emphasis placed on fundraising 
operations in top orchestras. Although by 1971 the Minnesota Orchestra had already 
successfully raised its Ford matching funds, the board rightly recognized that the Ford 
Program represented a stepping stone to a more secure financial future, not a panacea 
for all of the association’s problems. By identifying and hiring a professional 
president, the Minnesota Orchestra acknowledged that in the wake of the Ford 
Program the entire orchestra business was changing, and that new administrative staff 
were essential to capitalize on these new opportunities. 
Although Engle was not hired until 1971, the board’s considerable foresight is 
evident in the minutes from the Executive Committee’s formative meeting at the 
Lowell Inn in Stillwater Minnesota held in June 1964 at which Kenneth N. Dayton 
first articulated the need of a professional President. Dayton asked four prescient 
questions: who would work to attract new donors, who would direct and endowment 
campaign, who would work on a bequest program, and who would seek out 
innovative partnerships with local businesses, governmental organizations, and 
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nonprofits.494 Dayton argued that it would take more than a volunteer president to 
complete these tasks: 
We have become big business, and we must organize like a big business.… I 
recommend that we hire a full-time President who will direct the affairs of the 
Orchestral Association all day, every day of the year…. I visualize this man as 
the prime mover and director of everything we do….he would be the one who 
would bear the primary responsibility for finding the ways and means of 
fulfilling the mission of the Orchestra…. Without such a man I doubt that we 
are up to it, but with such a man (provided we choose wisely) I am convinced 
that we can do great things.495 
 
The Ford money made Dayton’s dream of hiring a full-time president a realty; 
Engle’s eventual hiring was a key point in the development and history of the 
Minnesota Orchestra. Upon Engle’s retirement in 1978, Cisek ascended the 
presidency where he remained until 1990. 
The Minnesota Orchestra’s musical identity during the 1960s and 1970s was 
dominated by Music Director Stanislaw Skrowaczewski, who headed the orchestra 
from 1960 to 1979, and occasionally conducted it thereafter until his death in 
February 2017 at the age of 93. Born in 1923 in Lwów, Poland, Skrowaczewski 
headed several orchestras in Poland before succeeding Antal Dorati in Minneapolis in 
1960. Incredibly, he conducted into his final year; his last concert was with the 
Minnesota Orchestra in October 2016, conducting Bruckner’s 8th Symphony.  
Although he never achieved the level of fame enjoyed by some of his 
contemporaries, Skrowaczewski was widely revered in Minnesota as an indefatigable 
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bridge between the old days of the Minneapolis Symphony and the modern 
Minnesota Orchestra; in addition to his concerts and recordings, he provided a spark 
for the fundraising and construction of Orchestra Hall. In many orchestras, the 
relationship between board, executive, and music director is most sensitive, and 
infighting can result in crippling disfunction, as exemplified by the Oakland 
Symphony’s bankruptcy and the Minnesota Orchestra’s lockout. But during the 
Skrowaczewski years, the Minnesota Orchestra appears to have avoided this 
unhealthy friction. 
Skrowaczewski’s successor in 1979 was Neville Marriner, who was by the 
late 1970s internationally renowned for his numerous recordings with the Academy 
of St. Martin in the Fields, which he founded in London in 1959. His profile was 
further enhanced when he supervised the music for the 1984 the film Amadeus. 
Alongside Marriner, the orchestra employed a particularly strong roster of assistant 
and guest conductors in the 1980s. Leonard Slatkin worked regularly with the 
orchestra in the 1970s and 1980s under the title of Principal Guest Conductor. In the 
mid 1970s, Slatkin—then in his early thirties—was known particularly for his “Rug 
Concerts,” a faddish concept pioneered by Pierre Boulez and the New York 
Philharmonic in 1973 in which auditorium seats were replaced by rugs for a more 
relaxed setting aimed at younger audiences. The music was eclectic to match the 
seating arrangement. A 1976 rug concert featured the “Melpomene” Overture by 
George Whitefield Chadwick, “The White Peacock” by Charles Tomlinson Griffes, 
an Intermezzo by Arthur Foote, “The Unanswered Question,” and “The Yale-
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Princeton Football Game” by Charles Ives, and an arrangement for piano and narrator 
of “Napoleon’s Last Charge,” by E.T. Paull with Richard Cisek serving as the 
narrator.496 
From 1971 to 1988 Henry Charles Smith served in various conducting roles, 
ending as Resident Conductor. Smith covered concerts when a regular conductor was 
sick, but also served ably in an educational capacity, conducting members of the 
orchestra in school concerts. In addition, Smith served as a capable occasional 
substitute on trombone; he had formerly served as the principal trombonist of the 
Philadelphia Orchestra.497  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the orchestra also employed the German 
conductor Klaus Tennstedt as a guest, who was noted for his enigmatic and effusive 
performances. In the words of Cisek, during his four-year tenure Tennstedt “set fire to 
the place every time, every week… He fired up the musicians and they looked 
forward to working with him.”498 
Thus, in the years during and directly following the Ford Program, the 
Minnesota Orchestra enjoyed a stable administration, as well as stable but varied 
musical leadership. Cisek described the situation during his tenure succinctly: “We’ve 
been blessed by good people.” 
 
Effective Long-Range Planning: The 1964 Stillwater Meeting and Orchestra Hall 
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A special meeting of the board’s Executive Committee in the summer of 1964 
at the Lowell Inn in Stillwater, Minnesota defined set the tone for the early years of 
Cisek’s tenure. Although the Ford Program for Symphony Orchestras had not yet 
been announced, the Minneapolis Symphony was already thinking along the lines of 
Ford’s broader goals, as articulated in the minutes of the Stillwater meeting; the 
effective long-range planning begun at Stillwater created a durable scaffold on which 
to build upon with the Ford money. 
 In addition to outlining the regional “opportunity” that would inform the name 
change in 1968, the Stillwater minutes note the importance of raising salaries, 
growing towards a fifty-two-week season, expanding the endowment, and hiring a 
full-time, professional president.499 Don Engle was hired as the first professional 
president in 1971, and the other goals were achieved by the end of the 1970s. Unlike 
the Oakland Symphony, which consistently failed to formulate realistic long-range 
plans, the Minnesota Orchestra, as evident by the Stillwater meeting minutes, 
carefully considered the long-term health of the organization and effectively executed 
its ambitious plans. In addition, the Stillwater minutes suggest an organization aware 
of the shifting tides in the orchestra business and cognizant of the opportunities and 
challenges that accompanied the greater sophistication of orchestra operations. 
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 Board President Judson Bemis began the meeting by articulating a statement 
of mission and purpose for the gathering: 
The mission of the Stillwater meeting is to launch a planning process of the 
Symphony’s next 10 to 15 years. Intensive planning of this nature appears 
necessary because of various indications that we are arriving at one of the 
crossroads in the life of this organization, that to do better or more intensively 
that which has been done will not be enough to keep the orchestra moving 
ahead under current and prospective conditions.500 
 
Bemis outlined a host of issues facing the orchestra, including competition 
with other orchestras regarding contracts and musicians’ pay, as well as several 
opportunities, including a substantial population increase in the Twin Cities in the 
1960s, and Minneapolis’s relative distance from other top-flight orchestras, with the 
Chicago Symphony 400 miles away.501 
 Cisek followed Bemis with a discussion titled “What Other Orchestras Are 
Doing” in terms of musician contracts. As discussed in Chapter 3, in the 1960s, there 
was considerable competition for quality orchestral musicians, particularly among the 
strings. Whereas today there is a glut of outstanding orchestral musicians graduating 
each year from conservatories, private colleges, and state universities, no such 
overabundance existed in the 1960s. Cisek recalls how difficult it was to find strong 
players in the 1960s: “I remember my first year of auditions, we were auditioning for 
violas and we just couldn’t find enough who could meet the standard. It was very 
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awkward. Same thing with cellos; strings were very, very precious and difficult to 
come by.”502 
 The difficulty finding string players was also noted by Stanislaw 
Skrowaczewski in a 1971 appeal to board members to add six string players to 
orchestra: “The string players could be hired within the next few years according to 
the possibility of……finding them! There is, namely, a world-wide acute shortage of 
string players, and our Orchestra has been having an enormous problem finding the 
proper candidates.”503 
 Furthermore, the Minnesota Orchestra, which was highly regarded but not 
considered one of the “Big Five,” had to contend with poaching from higher paying 
orchestras. In the 1960s, the Cleveland Orchestra was considered the premier 
orchestra in the United States, and its conductor George Szell exercised a unique 
degree of autonomy in orchestra operations. Szell was popular among audiences, but 
not so much among administrators like Cisek: “Szell would guest conduct and keep 
his eyes and ears open…. He would want musicians.”  
Rafael Druian (1923–2002) served as concertmaster in Minneapolis from 
1949–60 before taking on the same role with Szell’s Cleveland Orchestra from 1960–
69. In 1960, Szell also took the Minneapolis Symphony’s principal trumpet player 
Bernard F. Adelstein, who remained as principal in Cleveland from 1960 to 1988. 
Empowered by the largest endowment in the industry at his disposal—approximately 
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$14 million in 1964—Szell was not limited by money when attempting to recruit 
musicians. Cisek recalls: “He could offer any amount of money it would take, in 
some cases twice what they were getting in the other orchestras, depending on what 
orchestra they were coming from.”504 Because of this competitive environment, Cisek 
provided notes to the Executive Committee describing how similar orchestras were 
faring: 
  
                                               
504 Author’s interview with Richard Cisek, June 23, 2017. 
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Table 5.2: “What Other Orchestras are Doing”505 
 
                                               
505 "The Minnesota Orchestral Association Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting Held June 27 
and 28, 1964," Series 1.4, MOAA. 
MINNEAPOLIS
1964-65 31-week season, no summer season
$155 weekly minimum, $14.50 tour per diem, 91 musicians under contract
CLEVELAND
1964-65 35 weeks winter, 10 summer, 1 week paid vacation, $185 per week
1965-66 36 weeks winter, 10 summer, 2 weeks paid vacation, $185 per week
1966-67 38 weeks winter, 10 summer, 3 weks paid vacation, $190 per week
$18 per diem, 103 musicians under contract
DETROIT
1964-65 29 weeks at $165 per week, plus 8 weeks summer at lower scale
1965-66 30 weeks at $175 per week, plus 8 weeks summer at lower scale
$15 per diem, 93 musicians under contract, growing to 96 in 1965 and 100 in 1966
LOS ANGELES
1964-65 34 weeks at $157.50
1965-66 38 weeks at $180
104 men under contract
DALLAS
1964-65 28 weeks at $120 minimum
1965-66 30 weeks at $125 minimum
1966-67 31 weeks at $135 minimum
$14 per diem, 90 musicians under contract
PHILADELPHIA
1964-65 36 weeks plus Robin Hood Dell at $200 a week minimum
$18 per diem, 52 weeks n 1966–1967, 4 weeks paid vacation, 105 under contract
SAN FRANCISCO
1964-65 26 weeks, plus opera season, at $160 per week
1965-66 28 weeks, plus opera season, at $170 per week
1966-67 30 weeks, plus opera season, at $182.50 per week
98 men under contract
NATIONAL SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
1964-65 34 weeks at $160
$15 per diem, 96 musicians under contract
CINCINNATI
1964-65 31 weeks at $137.50, plus May Festival of Opera (6 weeks)
93 musicians under contract
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 With a thirty-one-week season, ninety-one contracted musicians, no paid 
vacation, and $155 weekly minimum for the 1964–65 season, the Minnesota 
Orchestra trailed the Cleveland and Philadelphia Orchestras, but was comparable to 
Detroit, Los Angeles, Dallas, San Francisco, the National Symphony Orchestra in 
Washington D.C., and Cincinnati.506  
 Cisek continued by outlining the endowments of several competing 
orchestras, and noted that his orchestra lagged considerably behind not just Cleveland 
($14 million) and Chicago ($12 million), but also Cincinnati ($4.5 million) and 
Pittsburgh ($5 million).507 With an endowment of less than $400,000, the 
Minneapolis Symphony could expect to earn less than $20,000 in annual endowment 
income—assuming an approximately 5 percent rate of return—when its annual deficit 
was $500,000 in the 1964–65 season. By contrast, Szell’s $14 million endowment 
earned his orchestra $512,000 during the same season, which went a considerable 
length toward covering the Cleveland Orchestra’s nearly $800,000 deficit. Even the 
Cincinnati Symphony—an orchestra considered a peer by Cisek—had a $4.5 million 
endowment that earned it more than $200,000 per year, which covered half of that 
orchestra’s $400,000 deficit. 508 
 Although the Minnesota Orchestra’s endowment grew steadily from $80,000 
in 1952 to nearly $400,000 in 1964, it became clear at the Stillwater meeting that a 
                                               
506 "The Minnesota Orchestral Association Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting Held June 27 
and 28, 1964," Series 1.4, MOAA. 
507 Ibid. 
508 Ibid. 
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major endowment campaign was needed to ensure the stability of the organization. 
Nonetheless, not having a large endowment—and relying on annual maintenance 
fundraising to cover deficits—had forced the Minneapolis Symphony and WAMSO, 
its prolific women’s fundraising arm, to successfully fundraise year over year, relying 
predominantly on smaller donors. The maintenance fund drive of the 1963–64 season 
consisted of 1,460 contributions made by individuals or families, and 319 gifts by 
business organizations, foundations, and other organization. Of the total raised of 
$391,855, 1,108 gifts were of less than $100. The largest single gift, which was raised 
by WAMSO, was $55,800.509 
 This fundraising ability proved important when the Ford Foundation’s 
endowment matching program was announced on July 6, 1966. In a confidential 
memo to board members sent one day before the public announcement of the Ford 
Program, board president Judson Bemis defined the Ford Program in terms of the 
goals established two years prior at Stillwater: “The Ford Foundation’s program 
provides major and most welcome assistance toward the objectives which were 
formulated at Stillwater and endorsed by the Board of Directors shortly thereafter.”510 
The opportunities and challenges of the Ford Program were more publicly noted by 
Bemis at a board meeting on July 15, 1966: 
This grant presents the Association with a great opportunity and challenge. 
The opportunity is threefold: (1) it is a financial boost in the direction that the 
Association is trying to go; (2) It is an endorsement for the need of an 
Endowment Fund; and (3) By receiving the maximum amount that may be 
                                               
509 "The Minnesota Orchestral Association Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting Held June 27 
and 28, 1964," Series 1.4, MOAA. 
510 Memo from Judson Bemis to Board of Directors, July 5, 1966, Series 1.3, MOAA. 
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allocated to any orchestra in the Ford program, recognition is given to the 
quality of our Orchestra. There are some dangers that the program creates. 
False impressions may arise that financial support of the Association is now 
assured…. Every effort must be made to increase our efforts in all areas.511 
  
 Although the Ford Program did not explicitly align with the Minnesota 
Orchestra’s name change and regional concept or the hiring of Don Engle as its first 
professional president, the expendable funds contributed from 1967 to 1971 created 
breathing room in the budget to service these objectives. Where the goals of the Ford 
Program and the Minnesota Orchestra truly resonated was in the pursuit of 
endowment. 
 The first gift to the orchestra dedicated to establishing a permanent 
endowment had been made by the Citizens’ Aid Society of Minneapolis in December 
1944, totaling $50,000 in memory of George H. Christian, a Minneapolis mill tycoon 
and philanthropist who had died in 1918.512 The endowment gradually grew in the 
following years, and an organized endowment drive was discussed in the 1960 annual 
report.513 But it was not until the Stillwater meeting, and then the Ford Program, that 
orchestra leaders took a large-scale endowment campaign seriously. Like other top 
orchestras, Minnesota was required to double the Ford endowment contributions; four 
million dollars would need to be raised to earn Ford’s two. 
 Most participating orchestras used the Ford Foundation matching requirement 
as the goal for their endowment campaigns. The Minnesota Orchestra alternatively 
                                               
511 "The Minnesota Orchestral Association Minutes of the Board of Directors Meeting July 15, 1966," 
Series 1.3, MOAA. 
512 "Annual Report - June 30, 1945," Series 1.1, MOAA. 
513 "Annual Report - June 30, 1960," Series 1.1, MOAA. 
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approached the Ford match as a means to an end; the board decided on a desired 
amount of income that was needed from the endowment each year and then backed 
into the amount of endowment required to earn the targeted income. In February 
1966—several months before the Ford Program was announced to the board and the 
public—a consultant estimated that by the mid 1970s the orchestra would have an 
annual budget shortfall of around $450,000, requiring a permanent capital fund of at 
least $12.5 million.514  
Richard Cisek corroborated the existence of this approach when planning the 
Ford endowment drive:  
I worked with board members to put together our strategy in regard to not 
only matching Ford…but going beyond that, because our plan showed that we 
needed more money…. So it [the $12.5 million goal] was not pulled out of the 
air, or a nice round number, but what we felt we would need.515 
 
Upon the announcement of the Ford match, the Investment Committee 
consulted with several banks to conclude that an endowment of $10 million raised by 
1971—including Ford’s $2 million—would grow to the desired $12.5 million figure 
by 1977 and meet the orchestra’s income goal.516 
                                               
514 Various Financial Figures for 1977-1978 Season, Series 4.1, MOAA. 
515 Author’s interview with Richard Cisek, September 8, 2016. 
516 "Investment Committee of the Minnesota Orchestral Association Meeting July 11, 1966," Series 
1.4, MOAA. 
  
 
 
 
Table 5.3: Ten–Year Budget Projection 1965–74:517 
 
                                               
517 “Minnesota Orchestral Association: 10-Year Budget Projection,” May 13, 1966, Series 1.3, MOAA. 
1965–66 743,900$    1,320,200$ (576,300)$     515,000$ (61,300)$   1,702,778$                
1966–67 786,800$    1,409,400$ (622,600)$     550,000$ (72,600)$   2,016,667$                
1967–68 806,500$    1,450,500$ (644,000)$     550,000$ (94,000)$   2,611,111$                
1968–69 851,500$    1,568,300$ (716,800)$     550,000$ (166,800)$ 4,633,333$                
1969–70 891,000$    1,714,000$ (823,000)$     550,000$ (273,000)$ 7,583,333$                
1970–71 938,200$    1,799,700$ (861,500)$     560,000$ (301,500)$ 8,375,000$                
1971–72 987,900$    1,889,700$ (901,800)$     570,000$ (331,800)$ 9,216,667$                
1972–73 1,040,300$ 1,984,100$ (943,800)$     575,000$ (368,800)$ 10,244,444$              
1973–74 1,095,400$ 2,083,400$ (988,000)$     585,000$ (403,000)$ 11,194,444$              
1974–75 1,153,500$ 2,187,500$ (1,034,000)$  590,000$ (444,000)$ 12,333,333$              
*Estimated 3.6% rate of return per Minnesota Orchestra Executive Committee
Season
Capital Fund 
Required to Cover 
Estimated Annual 
Shortfall*
Annual 
Shortfall
Guaranty 
Fund
Surplus 
(Deficit)ExpensesIncome
23
9 
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The Endowment Campaign, titled “New Dimensions,” was formally launched 
on April 28, 1967; by September of the same year more than $4 million had already 
been raised.518 The orchestra generated interest by offering naming rights for the 
nineteen principal chairs in the orchestra; all chairs required a minimum contribution 
of $250,000, with the concertmaster chair requiring $500,000. The endowed chairs 
program gained approbation nationally, with Time magazine describing it as “the 
success formula of the former Minneapolis Symphony Orchestra.”519 The 
concertmaster, principal cello, principal oboe, and principal harp chairs were 
endowed immediately, with a total of eleven chairs endowed by December 1968.520 
By December 1968, the orchestra had met its goal of $10 million (including Ford’s $2 
million) in pledges, with payments on pledges already at more than $3 million.521 The 
Ford endowment match was easily raised, and an endowment of more than $10 
million sustained the orchestra through more than $600,000 in annual income upon 
the final distribution of the Ford Trust in 1977.522 
Beyond spurring the $10 million endowment drive, the Ford Program directly 
influenced the Minnesota orchestra’s next large project: the construction of Orchestra 
Hall in downtown Minneapolis. The old performing venue, the University of 
Minnesota’s Northrop Auditorium —across the Mississippi river from Downtown 
                                               
518 "The Minnesota Orchestral Association Minutes of the Board of Directors Meeting April 28, 1967," 
Series 1.3, MOAA.; "The Minnesota Orchestral Association: Minutes of the Board of Directors' 
Meeting September 15, 1967," Series 1.3, MOAA. 
519 "Annual President's Report 1968 - 1969," Series 1.1, MOAA. 
520 "The Minnesota Orchestral Association Minutes of Board of Directors Meeting," June 9, 1967, 
Series 1.3, MOAA. 
521 "Proposed New Dimensions Funds Report December 20, 1968," Series 1.2, MOAA. 
522 "Endowment and Investment Funds and Pension Trust February 28, 1977," Series 1.4, MOAA. 
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Minneapolis—had been completed in 1929 and thereafter served as the Minneapolis 
Symphony’s home until 1974. Seating nearly 5,000, Northrup’s considerable size 
prevented the orchestra from holding concerts on multiple nights of the week. In 
Cisek’s estimation, performing only one night per week prevented the orchestra from 
progressing artistically, whereas other orchestras would perform a concert of the same 
music two or three times a week and “really get it into their fiber.”523  
Furthermore, beginning in the mid 1960s Music Director Stanislaw 
Skrowaczewski argued that Northrup was holding the orchestra back acoustically, 
and that a new hall could and should be built to house the orchestra. In a presentation 
to executive committee members in 1966, Skrowaczewski warned that Northrop was 
an acoustic liability: “The acoustic problem could be helped somewhat if we were to 
rehearse in another hall more suitable to rehearsing and then have a dress rehearsal 
and concert in Northrup. Many changes are noted as we play in other halls on 
tours.”524 Skrowaczewski emphatically pressed the issue in a memo to the board in 
1971:  
 
I am calling with my strongest plea to understand that the only way to provide 
the survival of this fine ensemble and to put the existence of the musical 
culture on the proper level both for the Orchestra and for the public is to end 
decades of having the Orchestra homeless on wheels and to organize a 
committee for the establishment of a new hall. There must be a way to appeal 
to the entire state of Minnesota to build such a hall once in this century. 
Because it is a community which defines its own aspirations. If a cultural 
institution is absolutely necessary but too expensive, then either it is not 
essential or it is not too expensive.525 
                                               
523 Author’s interview with Richard Cisek, June 23, 2017. 
524 "The Minnesota Orchestral Association Minutes of Meeting of the Executive Committee October 
23, 1966," Series 1.3, MOAA. 
525 Memo from Stanislaw Skrowaczewski to Board of Directors, May 25, 1971, Series 1.3, MOAA. 
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 Skrowaczewski’s goal of a permanent home for the orchestra was realized 
extraordinarily quickly through an innovate partnership with the City of Minneapolis. 
The orchestra bought the land and built the hall. Once complete, the city bought the 
land and the completed hall from the orchestra for $9.2 million and leased it back to 
the orchestra for a term of twenty years. Once the twenty-year lease term was 
complete, the hall would reverted to the Association’s ownership. Of the $9.2 million 
paid from the city to the orchestra in 1975, $400,000 was applied to the debt acquired 
by the orchestra to build the hall, and $1 million was used to construct Peavey Plaza 
adjacent to the hall. The remaining amount, $7.8 million, was used to establish an 
investment fund which would provide enough annual income to pay the annual rent 
on the hall.526 
 The city funded the purchase of the hall by issuing $9.2 million of municipal 
bonds, with the annual rent payments from the orchestra—ranging from $460,000 to 
$640,000 annually—covering the amount required to amortize the principal and 
interest of the bonds.527 
 The funds to build Orchestra Hall were acquired via a funding drive started in 
1971, with nearly $2 million left over after the construction used to create an 
Orchestra Hall Endowment fund for the annual maintenance and operations of the 
hall. By 1977—when the Ford Foundation trust fund was finally distributed to its 
                                               
526 "Minnesota Orchestra Association Annual Report 1974/75," Series 1.1, MOAA. 
527 "Resolution by the Executive Committee of the Minnesota Orchestral Association," 1973, Series 
1.3, MOAA. 
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trustee orchestras—the Minnesota Orchestra enjoyed a total endowment of more than 
$22 million separated into several restricted and non-restricted funds: 
 
Table 5.4: Minnesota Orchestra Endowment as of February 28, 1977528 
 
 
 
Thus, during the ten years of the Ford Program, the Minnesota Orchestra grew 
its endowment from less than $400,000 to more than $22 million. Although much of 
the endowment income was restricted—including the Orchestra Hall funds and the 
pension trust fund—the annual income from the aggregate endowment far exceeded 
the executive committee’s 1966 ten-year estimate (Table 5.3). But the expenses of the 
orchestra also far exceeded the ten-year budget projection, and thus the annual 
shortfall also increased. In the 1973–74 and 1974–75 seasons expenses rose to $3.16 
million and $4 million respectively, while concert revenues earned by the orchestra 
                                               
528 "Endowment and Investment Funds and Pension Trust," February 28, 1977, Series 1.4, MOAA. 
Fund Market Value Est. Annual Income*
New Dimensions Endowment 9,259,916$                   682,574$                      
Ford Foundation Trust 2,498,401$                   149,904$                      
Orchestra Hall Endowment Fund 2,166,007$                   106,960$                      
Orchestra Hall Investment Fund** 7,545,006$                   639,579$                      
Pension Fund 1,289,456$                   87,662$                        
Totals 22,758,786$                 1,666,679$                   
*Estimated per Minnesota Orchestra Investment Committee
**Income restricted for rent payments on Orchestra Hall
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were only $1.4 million and $2.2 million, respectively, and annual fundraising from 
the Guaranty Fund and WAMSO, coupled with endowment income accounted for 
$1.4 million in both seasons, leading to deficits of $400,000 in both years.529 
 In the following two seasons, though, as a result of the Ford Foundation trust 
distribution, as well as rising revenues, the orchestra operated at a net surplus:  
                                               
529 "Minnesota Orchestra Association Annual Report 1974/75," Series 1.1, MOAA. 
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Table 5.5: Minnesota Orchestra Income Statements for 1973–76:530 
 
During the 1977–78 season, the Minnesota Orchestra was one of only eleven 
major orchestras (out of a total of thirty-four) to operate at a surplus, suggesting that 
the orchestra had navigated with aplomb the distribution of the Ford Foundation trust 
in 1977.531 
                                               
530 "Minnesota Orchestra Association Annual Report 1974/75," Series 1.1, MOAA; “Minnesota 
Orchestra Association Annual Report 1976–77,” Series 1.1, MOAA. 
531 "The Net Surplus (Deficit) at End of Season," Series 4.1, MOAA. 
1973–1974 1974–1975* 1975–1976 1976–1977
Program Revenue
Concert Revenue/Presentations 1,051,335$  1,789,450$  2,169,972$  2,451,450$  
Hall Rentals to Others -$            99,365$       134,433$     115,821$     
Grants for Specified Purposes 279,892$     215,225$     241,690$     367,826$     
Other Income 32,328$       68,652$       70,474$       92,140$       
Total Program Revenue 1,363,555$  2,172,692$  2,616,569$  3,027,237$  
Expenses
Concert Expenses/Presentations 2,657,616$  3,097,595$  3,185,887$  3,499,480$  
General/Admin 506,554$     783,229$     1,090,481$  1,290,694$  
Building Operations/Utilities -$            181,198$     169,482$     195,547$     
Interest -$            -$            55,318$       40,034$       
Total Expenses 3,164,170$  4,062,022$  4,501,168$  5,025,755$  
Surplus (Deficit) from Operations (1,800,615)$ (1,889,330)$ (1,884,599)$ (1,998,518)$ 
Contributions and Other Income
Guaranty Fund 538,775$     549,540$     693,284$     784,658$     
WAMSO 93,114$       118,324$     135,876$     120,801$     
Endowment Fund Income 651,376$     630,148$     807,036$     856,632$     
Investment Income -$            29,271$       -$            -$            
General Support Grants 120,000$     160,000$     270,000$     238,855$     
Total Contributions and Other 
Income
1,403,265$  1,487,283$  1,906,196$  2,000,946$  
Net Surplus (Deficit) (397,350)$    (402,047)$    21,597$       2,428$        
43% 53% 58% 60%
*First Season in Orchestra Hall
Program Revenue as Percentage 
of Expenses
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The Ford Foundation Program formally concluded for the Minnesota 
Orchestra in early March 1977: on January 13 the Ford Foundation’s 41,697 Ford 
Motor Company shares were distributed to the orchestra, and in March the shares 
were sold, for a total of $2,498,401.14.532 Upon the sale of the shares, Minnesota 
Orchestra President Donald Engle wrote to Program Officer Marcia Thompson: 
As I reflect on the impact of the Foundation’s belief in the merit of the 
nation’s symphony orchestras and the justification for such a tremendous 
investment toward assuring their futures, I can only commend you and your 
associates most sincerely for your faith and your generosity. I hope the results 
as they are being reported to you will give all of you a sense of deep 
satisfaction.533 
 
Conclusion 
  
After the end of the 2012–14 lockout, longtime Minnesota Opera leader Kevin 
Smith replaced besieged CEO Michael Henson and returned to the key principles that 
had helped the Minnesota Orchestra function smoothly in the past. Not long after 
assuming leadership of the orchestra, Smith began reforming the orchestra’s inner 
workings where “Board, staff, musicians, and oftentimes other community members 
really work together in terms of planning, fundraising, and execution.”534 
                                               
532 "Executive Committee of the Minnesota Orchestral Association 28 March 1977," Series 1.3, 
MOAA. 
533 Letter from Donald L. Engle to Marcia Thompson, March 28, 1977, Ford Foundation records, 
Grants Them-Tw, RAC. 
534 Author’s interview with Kevin Smith, March 2, 2018. 
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Smith’s approach was codified in a strategic plan for the years 2017–2020 
called “Building the Minnesota Model.”535 Formulated during strategic planning 
sessions in the fall of 2015 with board members, musicians, and staff, “Building the 
Minnesota Model” describes a sense of shared ownership that has defined the 
organization during its rapid rebound: “This approach constitutes a unique 
organizational model for the American orchestral field, empowering every 
stakeholder to take ownership to ensure the joyful relationship between artists and 
audiences.”536 
The strategic plan continues by outlining five components: 
1. A Great Virtuoso Orchestra 
2. An Electric Connection to Community 
3. Targeted Audience Engagement and Expansion 
4. An Outstanding, Integrated Organization 
5. A Strong Financial Foundation 
 
Although none of these five considerations is particularly revolutionary in 
terms of orchestra strategic planning, Smith and his team began by getting people 
back to talking to one another. Smith recalls that when he took over the orchestra: 
A lot of the turnaround had to do with just building the dynamics, and the 
culture and trust within the organization, and getting people to not only talk to 
one another, but actually get them to know one another…. There was a lot of 
bitterness…and just a lot of antagonism in the organization. People literally 
didn’t interact, board members didn’t go to concerts, and it was just an odd, 
dysfunctional culture.537 
 
                                               
535 "Building the Minnesota Model: Strategic Plan Summary 2017–2020," The Minnesota Orchestra, 
2016. 
536 Ibid. 
537 Ibid. 
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Post-lockout, musicians have been given the opportunity to serve on board 
committees and are featured more prominently in promotional materials. During the 
lockout the musicians incorporated as a nonprofit and produced their own concerts. In 
Smith’s estimation, this process made the musicians come away from the lockout 
with a better appreciation of their roles within the community.538 
Upon the resolution of the lockout, as a sign of good faith, the musicians 
donated the proceeds from their nonprofit—about $250,000—to the revived 
Minnesota Orchestra. Kathryn Nettleman, a member of the bass section who served 
as president of the musicians’ lockout organization, said that the donation represented 
“our committed ongoing investment in the mighty Minnesota Orchestra…. 
Collaborating as a team, in concert with our greater community…we know that our 
orchestra will continue to shine brightly far into the future.”539 
Whereas Henson approached the financial downturn from a cost cutting 
perspective, Smith, like Richard Cisek, approaches financial issues primarily as a 
revenue challenge: “The result of the lockout was that there’s still a five or six million 
dollar gap each season but we raise the money to pay those bills, and we view it as a 
revenue and fundraising challenge, instead of trying to right-size the organization for 
the community, which was the previous plan…the board accepted the responsibility 
to fund this orchestra to scale.”540 
                                               
538 Author’s interview with Kevin Smith, March 2, 2018. 
539 Michael Cooper, "Minnesota Orchestra is Getting $250,000 From Musicians," The New York Times, 
December 3, 2015. 
540 Author’s interview with Kevin Smith, March 2, 2018. 
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The true test of Smith’s “Minnesota Model” began in fall 2018—when Smith 
retired and ceded his post to Michelle Miller Burns, formerly an executive vice 
president of the Dallas Symphony. Assuming the stock market stays strong, the post-
lockout reforms should continue unabated. But if there is an economic downturn, as 
there inevitably will be at some point, the organization’s fragile new balance will be 
tested. Acording to Smith: “As long as everyone works together and continues to 
share we’ll be great. There is going to be some time when the heat is on financially 
and then that’s really going to be the big stress test.” Smith understands that his 
successor could be the one to navigate the next financial crisis: “We’ve had a couple 
really strong years and we’ve pushed the organization in all kinds of ways, and we’re 
in relatively excellent shape, but that could change in a minute.”541 
The Ford Program for Symphony Orchestras did not create the strong 
leadership or effective long-term planning that characterized the Minnesota Orchestra 
in the 1960s or 1970. In addition, many of the key successes of the orchestra during 
this period—the name change in 1968, the hiring of Don Engle in 1971, and the 
construction of Orchestra Hall in 1974—were ideated years before the Ford 
Foundation’s involvement began.  
It is possible that all of these improvements would have come to fruition 
without the Ford Foundation’s intervention. Nonetheless, as in the case of the 
Oakland Symphony, this study of the Minnesota Orchestra illustrates how the Ford 
Foundation’s Program for Symphony Orchestras hastened the direction in which the 
                                               
541 Author’s interview with Kevin Smith, March 2, 2018. 
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orchestra was already oriented. For Minnesota, Ford’s involvement tipped the scale in 
the positive direction in which the orchestra—through effective long-range planning 
and stable artistic and administrative leadership—was oriented. By contrast, for 
Oakland, the foundation’s grant reinforced a self-destructive direction and actually 
hastened the orchestra’s demise. 
When asked about the impact of the Ford Foundation’s Program on the 
Minnesota Orchestra, Richard Cisek initially demurred, suggesting that the program 
had little influence on the successes of the orchestra in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
But when pressed about the concurrence of the Ford money and the orchestra’s 
specific successes, Cisek noted that the Ford Foundation’s intervention gave 
orchestras a new degree of legitimacy, particularly regarding fundraising. Ultimately, 
for Cisek, the foundation’s action was a galvanizing one: “It gave us the courage to 
try other big fund drives because we knew how well we’d done in the previous 
one.”542 
 
 
  
                                               
542 Author’s interview with Richard Cisek, June 23, 2017. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 On May 16, 1987, at the Cleveland Institute of Music’s graduation ceremony, 
longtime Los Angeles Philharmonic manager Ernest Fleischmann made an unusual 
and provocative request:  
I really need to ask you to commit a crime. I want you to become arsonists, to 
join me and lots of musicians, administrators, and trustees in setting the 
symphony orchestra ablaze. If the music we care about so deeply is to survive, 
we must accept that the orchestra is burnt out, but from its ashes something 
infinitely richer, more varied, more satisfying can arise if we all work together 
to create it – ladies and gentlemen, the symphony orchestra is dead – long live 
the Community of Musicians!543  
 In his famous 1987 address, Fleischmann argued that the symphony orchestra 
in its enduring form was dead, and that everything about orchestras, including their 
structures, schedules, and repertoires needed to be re-evaluated. What he proposed 
was local “communities of musicians” embodying both generalist and specialist 
musicians who would be called to perform varying repertoire and styles, including 
“ethnic music, folk music, jazz”  in different settings, depending on the wants and 
needs of the local community.544 This arrangement, Fleischmann argued, would break 
apart the monotony of a career in the symphony orchestra experienced by musicians, 
and embed the orchestral organizations more firmly in the local community through 
more responsive and diverse programming.545 
                                               
543 Ernest Fleischman, “The Orchestra is Dead. Long Live the Community of Musicians,” 
commencement address given at the Cleveland Institute of Music, May 16, 1987. 
544 Fleischman, “The Orchestra is Dead.” 
545 Ibid. 
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 Fleischmann’s call to arms must have been a bit dismaying to the Cleveland 
Institute’s graduates, many of whom, presumably, were more interested in winning a 
job in an orchestra than burning the orchestral firmament to the ground. But 
Fleischmann was not the first, and certainly not the last to argue that symphony 
orchestras would disappear without radical change. In fact, Fleischmann’s concept of 
a “community of musicians”—a flexible body of musicians—was preceded by two 
decades by composer and teacher Walter Piston, who said in the 1960s that 
a flexibility in the symphony orchestra would be helpful in many ways. It 
would be very beneficial to the orchestra because the single players would be 
drawn from all the ranks: they would have the responsibility of being soloists 
in a chamber-music sense; and they would also have the opportunity to get 
acquainted with the newest music in all forms and would thus increase their 
musical knowledge as well as their technique.546 
 
The concept articulated by Piston and then by Fleischmann is a compelling 
one, in which musicians and audiences are stimulated by a diversity of repertoire. On 
an amateur level, I can attest to the satisfaction of this kind of arrangement; as an 
undergraduate at Arizona State University in the late 2000s I enjoyed a 
transformation of the instrumental music program in which the orchestras and bands 
were changed from a tiered, meritocratic system that gathered the best musicians 
permanently into the best large ensembles, into one where musicians were ranked and 
then placed into “projects” of various size and scope with varying schedules 
throughout the year. As a result of this change, I went from sitting in one ensemble all 
year, playing the same role, to moving from ensemble to ensemble, sometimes in 
                                               
546 Henry Swoboda, The American Symphony Orchestra (New York: Basic Books, 1967), 18. 
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traditional large ensemble settings, sometimes in very small chamber settings. It was 
a thrilling artistic experience, because it put me in the position to play different roles 
in different ensembles, with a constantly changing roster of musicians, conductors, 
performance venues, and repertoire. 
But student ensembles and conservatories have very different goals, and a 
different set of stakeholders, than professional symphony orchestras. Reorganizing 
the instrumental music program at a state university is a much simpler task than 
disassembling the Boston Symphony. My fellow students and I were not being paid, 
we weren’t represented by a union, and as a state-funded university, we weren’t 
beholden to ticket sales, or, more importantly, wealthy donors. 
As of 2018, the symphony orchestra model criticized by Piston, Fleischmann, 
and my undergraduate instructors has not changed much since the 1960s, when the 
Ford Foundation began its Program for Symphony Orchestras. In fact, criticisms of 
orchestras, and calls for orchestras to change, have continued essentially without 
interruption since before the 1960s to the present day. One example, during the Ford 
Program, when there should have been at least some optimism about the future of 
orchestras, came from Amyas Ames, Chairman of the New York Philharmonic. In 
1970 Ames invoked Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in an essay in the Saturday 
Review:  
There is more than one way to kill. A lake or a river can be killed by the 
outpouring of our wastes; birds—the singing of the oriole—can be stilled by 
our enthusiastic use of DDT; we can kill music by starving our orchestras, 
leaving our cities dreary places indeed…. The silent spring came 
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inadvertently. In the same way, music and dance can be stilled without 
intent.547 
 
Apocalyptic warnings in this vein are too frequent to cite, with shifting 
bogeymen ready to eliminate orchestras attributed to a variety of diagnoses: musician 
dissatisfaction (Fleischmann 1987), the cost disease (Baumol and Bowen 1966), 
subscription marketing (Knight Foundation 2002), administrative bloat (Lipman 
1987), and lack of diversity (Anne Midgette, Washington Post 2016).548  
Amid this nearly constant stream of pessimism regarding the prospects of 
symphony orchestras in the United States, it may appear evident that the Program for 
Symphony Orchestras had at best no effect on the orchestras business, or at worst a 
negative overall effect. But as shown in my case studies of the Oakland Symphony 
and the Minnesota Orchestra, the Ford Foundation’s impact has been much more 
nuanced than one may think. This conclusion is an attempt to evaluate the effects of 
the Ford Foundation’s Program for Symphony Orchestras, and a search for 
reverberations of the program, now more than fifty years old, in the modern orchestra 
scene. I begin by evaluating the success of the Program based on McNeil Lowry’s 
original four main goals for the Program in 1964, and conclude with ruminations on 
the broader impact of the Ford Foundation and philanthropy in general. In closing, I 
                                               
547 Cited in George Seltzer, The Professional Symphony Orchestra in the United States (Metuchen, 
N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1975), 380. 
548 See Fleischmann, “The Orchestra is dead;” William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen, Performing 
Arts: The Economic Dilemma; a Study of Problems Common to Theater, Opera, Music, and Dance 
(New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1966); Audience Insight LLC, “Classical Music Consumer 
Segmentation Study: How American Relate to Classical Music and Their Local Orchestras,” Johns S. 
and James L. Knight Foundation, 2002; Samuel Lipman, “Is the Symphony Orchestra Dead,” The New 
Criterion, September 1987; Anne Midgette, “Desperately Seeking Relevance, Orchestras Grapple with 
Existential Questions, The Washington Post, June 13, 2016. 
  
255  
 
seek to address one of the questions I am asked most often when presenting and 
discussing this research: could a program like the Ford Foundation’s Program for 
Symphony Orchestras be repeated today? 
 
Lowry’s Goals 
  
 In Chapter 3 I listed McNeil Lowry’s four main goals for the Symphony 
Orchestra Program:  
1) To maintain and improve the quality of performance of fine music by the 
leading orchestras in the country; 2) to increase the amount of quality music 
played by these orchestras; 3) to improve the financial situation of orchestral 
musicians and so to ensure an adequate supply of fine players both now and in 
the future; and 4) to stabilize the financial position of the leading American 
orchestras.549 
 
 To evaluate the overall efficacy of the Program, I will examine each of 
Lowry’s goals individually. 
 
1. “To Maintain and Improve the Quality of Performance of Fine Music by the 
Leading Orchestras in the Country” 
 
Lowry’s first goal is difficult to assess, since it is challenging to compare the 
quality of orchestras in the 1960s to orchestras in 2018. By the late 1940s, the top 
American orchestras were widely considered among the finest in the world. In 1949, 
                                               
549 "Humanities and the Arts Program Discussion Paper: Program for Symphony Orchestras," 
September 24–25, 1964, box 63, Ford Foundation records, Education and Public Policy Program 
(EPP), Office of the Arts, Program Files, RAC. 
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fresh from a European tour with his Cleveland Orchestra, George Szell told the 
Chicago Daily Tribune that “no European orchestra today can equal the leading 
American orchestras. The orchestras in Vienna and Amsterdam are the two leading 
ones in Europe, and although they have fine qualities they cannot compare with the 
best American orchestras.”550 Leading European orchestras, principally the Vienna 
and Berlin Philharmonic Orchestras and the Amsterdam Concertgebouw visited the 
United States regularly, and reviews from the 1950s and 1960s suggest that the best 
American orchestras had developed distinctive identities like their European peers. In 
1956, on the occasion of a visit from the Vienna Philharmonic, New York Times critic 
Howard Taubman compared American orchestras favorably to the Austrian orchestra: 
“Indeed, American orchestras at their best have made profound impressions on the 
most experienced, knowing and sensitive listeners abroad. They deserved such 
success. Brilliance of execution backed up by valid conceptions added a fresh and 
stimulating dimension to listening.”551 
In 1955, the conductor Georg Solti, then in his early 40s, remarked to The Los 
Angeles Times that “none of the German orchestras except the Berlin Philharmonic 
has strings equal to the best American orchestras,” and that “Europeans think 
American orchestras are excellent technically but cold, but I do not find it so.”552 Solti 
ascribed European feelings of musical superiority to be unfounded: 
                                               
550 “George Szell Lauds American Orchestras as the World’s Best,” Chicago Daily Tribune, December 
13, 1949. 
551 Howard Taubman, “No Two Alike: Visit of Vienna Philharmonic Points Up Differences in 
Orchestral Styles,” The New York Times, November 18, 1956. 
552 Albert Goldberg, “The Sounding Board: Solti Ranks L.A. Philharmonic Among World’s 10 Best 
Orchestras, Likes the American Spirit,” The Los Angeles Times, December 25, 1955. 
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Some European orchestras have a long tradition and they get to think they 
discovered Beethoven and Mozart. The Vienna Philharmonic, for example, 
thinks it knows Mozart better than Mozart. American musicians have a more 
naïve, childlike feeling toward music. They are unspoiled and it is a good 
thing. I prefer the spirit of the American orchestras.553  
 
Furthermore, orchestras were widely distributed throughout the United States, 
and there were already many fine orchestras outside of the traditional coastal centers. 
In 1950, Chauncey Kelley, a young professional American conductor who had 
worked with orchestras in England, France, and Italy, wrote to The New York Times 
to offer some comparisons between American and European orchestras. Kelley noted 
major disparities between continental European orchestras:  
In most of the continental orchestras the artistic standards are considerably 
lower than in America. Nearly always, the tuning and intonation (except in the 
strings) is a hit or miss affair. An otherwise excellent brass section may be 
embarrassed by an unbelievably bad trombone. A first oboe of artistic stature 
may feel compelled to apologize for the rhythmic understanding (or rather, 
misunderstanding) of the rest of his section. The conductor is often faced with 
a deficiency in the instruments themselves; it is rare to discover a completely 
equipped percussion section.554 
 
Thus, based on press reports, it is clear that U.S. orchestras were generally 
well regarded when compared to their European rivals. But the Ford Foundation was 
not just interested in improving the quality of leading American orchestras; it was 
concerned with improving the perception of U.S. orchestras, particularly among 
international audiences. Lowry’s 1955 memo, described in Chapter 2, noting “a very 
distorted picture of American culture, and even in some quarters a disbelief that an 
                                               
553 Goldberg, “The Sounding Board.” 
554 Chauncey Kelley, “Comparing Orchestras: U.S. Conductor Contrasts ours with Europe’s,” The 
New York Times, September 3, 1950. 
  
258  
 
American culture in fact existed,” identified a particularly European elitism in regard 
to U.S. orchestras.555 This belief, of a general disrespect for American culture in 
Europe, tracks with Chauncey Kelley’s observation that “Most of the European 
orchestras seem to be unaware of the development of musical culture in America. 
Naturally, they know of the achievements of our older generation of transplanted 
conductors. But they do not seem to realize the excellence of American 
orchestras.”556 
In her 2006 book New Music, New Allies: American Experimental Music in 
West Germany from the Zero Hour to Reunification musicologist Amy Beal describes 
the overarching German opinion of U.S. culture in the wake of the end of World War 
II: 
Most depictions of the United States, Americans, and American culture were 
still based on century-old views…. Germans tended to characterize American 
music as young, innocent, and fresh, but also naïve, second-rate, and 
historically ignorant. The United States was seen as free from tradition while 
Europe was burdened by it…. Such descriptions haunt reviews of American 
music even today.557 
 
Although it is incredibly difficult to objectively compare many orchestras at 
any given point in time—a critic can only be in one place at once—a ranking of the 
top twenty orchestras worldwide compiled in 2008 by Grammophone suggests that 
the perception of top U.S. orchestras has changed very little over the decades. With 
input from critics from the United Kingdom, the United States (Alex Ross of the New 
                                               
555 "A Program of Philanthropic Support of Cultural Affairs Through Institutions in the Humanities and 
Creative Arts," W. McNeil Lowry, November 11, 1955, box 5, WML. 
556 Kelley, “Comparing Orchestras.”. 
557 Amy C. Beal, New Music, New Allies: American Experimental Music in West Germany from the 
Zero Hour to Reunification (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 48. 
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Yorker and Mark Swed of the Los Angeles Times), Austria, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, China, and Korea, the Grammophone list serves not necessarily as a 
rank of actual quality, but as one of perceived quality. Seven of the top twenty come 
from the United States: The Metropolitan Opera Orchestra (18), San Francisco 
Symphony Orchestra (13), New York Philharmonic (12), Boston Symphony 
Orchestra (11), Los Angeles Philharmonic (8), Cleveland Orchestra (7), and the 
Chicago Symphony Orchestra (5). Topping the list are the London Symphony (4), 
Vienna Philharmonic (3), Berlin Philharmonic (2), and Royal Concertgebouw of 
Amsterdam (1). Notably missing is the Philadelphia Orchestra, the only of the 
original “Big Five” not included.558 
It is a dubious task to ask critics to rank the top twenty orchestras in the world 
because it is unlikely that all the critics surveyed even heard all twenty of the 
orchestras ranked, let alone the many other fine orchestras around the world that 
didn’t make the top twenty, like the Philadelphia Orchestra. Even if Alex Ross or 
Mark Swed did hear all twenty of these orchestras, it is unlikely that they heard them 
all in their home auditoria, and more likely that they heard the orchestras on tour or in 
recent recordings. 
In addition, because orchestras—and musical culture in general—are bound so 
closely with patriotism and national identity, it is difficult to separate objective 
observation from biased criticism. There is so much subjectivity enveloping the 
                                               
558 “The World’s Leading Critics Rank the World’s 20 Greatest Orchestras,” Gramophone, December 
2008. 
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aforementioned comparisons between American and European orchestras that it is 
difficult to take them seriously. After all, what does a naïve orchestra sound like, and 
conversely what does an orchestra with a long tradition sound like? These adjectives 
do little to describe actual sounds or performances. Instead, they vigorously repurpose 
and reinforce nationalistic stereotypes ingrained on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. 
 Thus, lists like this one should only be taken as a measure of perception and 
not of actual quality. But the Grammophone list, flawed as it necessarily is, does 
suggest that top American orchestras are considered on par with top European 
orchestras, and that this general opinion has not changed drastically since the 1960s. 
 
2. “To Increase the Amount of Quality Music Played by These Orchestras” 
 
Lowry’s second goal was to lengthen symphony orchestra seasons, and 
therein increase the amount of “quality music” accessible to U.S. listeners. When the 
Ford Foundation intensified its research into symphony orchestras in the early 1960s, 
there were no U.S. orchestras with full fifty-two-week season. But by the end of the 
1970s, when the Ford Foundation Program for Symphony Orchestras formally came 
to an end, sixteen U.S. orchestras enjoyed full-year seasons:
  
 
 
Table 6.1: Weeks of Guaranteed Employment in U.S. Symphony Orchestras559 
 
 
                                               
559 Wage Charts: 1962 – 2000, Senza Sordino, accessed January 29, 2019, https://www.icsom.org/senza/. 
62–63 64–65 65–66 66–67 67–68 68–69 69–70 70–71 71–72 72–73 73–74 74–75 75–76 76–77 77–78 78–79 79–80 84–85 89–90 94–95 99–00
Atlanta Symphony Orchestra 22 22 30 36 38 39 39 40 41 42 44 46 48 48 48 48 52 52 52 52
Baltimore Symphony Orchestra 26 29 30 34 35 34* 38 38 31* 42 42 44 44 45 45 45 45 52 52 52 52
Boston Symphony Orchestra 48 50 50 50 50 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Buffalo Philharmonic 28 29 30 34 35 35 36 36 39 42 42 43 44 46 44 47 48 42 46 37 37
Chicago Symphony Orchestra 39 47 50 50 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra 34 32 33 45 43 48* 50 52 47* 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Cleveland Orchestra 40 48 45 49 51 52 52 46* 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Dallas Symphony Orchestra 37 28 29 32 35 35 36 37 40* 45 45 33* 46 49 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Denver/Colorado Symphony Orchestra 21 24 28 29 31 33 34 34 40 42 42 44 46 42 52 38 41 ? 37 42
Detroit Symphony Orchesra 40 29 30 47 47 48 46 49 49 49 50 21 52* 52 52 52 52 52 48 44 52
Honolulu/Hawaii Symphony Orchestra 30 30 30 30 30 32 32 32 32 34 35 36 33 36 38 38 41 42 33
Houston Symphony Orchestra 37 28 28 30 40 41 41 45 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra 25 27 28 31* 33 34 35 36 24* 38 40 42 43 43 43 43 44 48 52 52 52
Kansas City Symphony Orchestra 34 24 26 30 30 30 20* 34 23* 26 32 38 28 35 35 36 37 ? ? ? 42
Los Angeles Philharmonic Orchestra 34 34 37 42* 44 46 47 48 50 51 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Milwaukee Symphony Orchestra 31 32 38 39 41 42 42 44 44 46 47 48 49 49 49 50 46 50 42 44
Minnesota Orchestra 30 31 32 38 39 41 45 45 46 48 48 48 50 50 50 52 52 52 52 52 52
New Orleans Symphony Orchestra 31 27 30 32 33 35 ? 36 37 38 38 38 38 38 38 39 40 37 34 ? ?
New York Philharmonic Orchestra 47 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Oakland Symphony Orchestra 72** 72** 80** 86** 93** 148** ? ? ?
Philadelphia Orchestra 42 47 52 44* 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra 36 30 30 40 42 44 47 48 49 50 51 51 51 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Rochester Philharmonic Orchestra 30 32 32 32 34 36 36* 36 41 41* 38 38 38 42 42 45 46 48 49 41 40
San Antonio Symphony Orchestra 29 30 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 34 52 35 38 39 39 39
San Francisco Symphony Orchestra 24 26 28 30 30* 36 37 44 49 49 50 52 52 52 52 ? 52 52 52 52 52
St. Louis Symphony Orchestra 37 30 28 36 37 44 47 49 49 51 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Seattle Symphony Orchestra 30 28 28 29 29 32 32 32 34 34 38 40 40 40 40 ? 43 44 ? ? ?
Syracuse Symphony Orchestra 30 31 33 34 35 37 37 38 39 41 44 44 36 38
Utah Symphony Orchestra 42 46 46 52 52 52 52 52
Washington (National) Symphony Orchestra 32 34 36 40 42 45 40* 47 50 50 51 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Number of Orchestras at 52 Weeks 0 1 2 1 3 5 5 5 6 7 9 11 11 13 14 16 16 18 18 18 19
*Work Stoppage
**Annual Services
26
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 Although there is a clear correlation between the beginning of the Ford 
Program and the expansion of orchestra season length, it is difficult to assume a 
causal relationship because there was momentum towards fifty-two-week seasons 
before the Ford Foundation announced its intentions. The New York Philharmonic 
was the first U.S. orchestra to enjoy a full-year season, including four weeks of paid 
vacation, during the 1964–65 season. But in September 1963, the Philadelphia 
Orchestra was the first to negotiate a fifty-two-week contract, to begin in the 1965–66 
season.560  
 In 1963, the International Conference of Symphony and Opera Musicians 
(ICSOM) began publishing its quarterly journal Senza Sordino, with detailed wage 
charts describing individual orchestras’ contracts. The publication and distribution of 
these wage charts, coupled with Senza Sordino’s editorials on bargaining around the 
country, contributed greatly to a heightened awareness among musicians of what 
musicians in peer orchestras were doing. Undoubtedly, the sharing of information 
contributed to orchestras’ growing leverage in collective bargaining; because elite 
musicians, especially string players, were in such short supply, administrators like 
Dick Cisek in Minnesota were under great pressure to ratify musician-friendly 
agreements. Thus, the infusion of Ford Foundation cash, coupled with resources like 
Senza Sordino, created the conditions that led to a dramatic increase in season length.  
                                               
560 “Orchestras Given Year-Round Work: Musicians Winning more Pay and Extended Seasons,” New 
York Times, September 12, 1965. 
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3. “To Improve the Financial Situation of Orchestral Musicians and so to Ensure 
an Adequate Supply of Fine Players both Now and in the Future” 
 
The Ford Foundation’s goal to improve the financial situation of orchestral 
musicians was, in concert with the goal of extending seasons, intended to increase 
musician wages, and in turn help rectify the lack of quality musicians entering the 
field of orchestral playing. As with the extended season lengths, it is clear that wages 
were on the rise in the 1960s and through the 1970s. Again, though, it appears that a 
multitude of factors, not just the Ford Foundation’s intervention, contributed to this 
change: 
  
 
 
Table 6.2: Historical Growth in Minimum Annual Salaries in Current Dollars561  
 
  
                                               
561 "Comparative Growth in Orchestra Annual Salaries: 1952–2000," Senza Sordino, March, 2001. 
1952–53 1962–63 1972–73 1982–83 1992–93 2000–01
Atlanta Symphony Orchestra 1,210             -                9,553             26,027           52,000           62,504           
Baltimore Symphony Orchestra 1,400             3,185             9,660             22,340           53,560           62,400           
Boston Symphony Orchestra 4,830             8,880             16,640           37,068           63,960           88,920           
Buffalo Philharmonic 1,882             3,388             9,975             18,039           33,000           31,650           
Chicago Symphony Orchestra 4,505             7,500             16,640           37,108           65,000           88,400           
Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra 2,660             4,185             11,960           31,697           57,250           78,910           
Cleveland Orchestra 3,270             6,120             14,820           34,016           66,144           85,280           
Dallas Symphony Orchestra 1,600             4,500             11,700           28,346           54,600           71,760           
Denver/Colorado Symphony Orchestra 1,660             -                8,600             21,002           25,350           34,356           
Detroit Symphony Orchestra 3,040             4,940             12,855           32,212           61,672           80,834           
Honolulu/Hawaii Symphony Orchestra -                -                5,280             12,974           27,616           25,740           
Houston Symphony Orchestra 2,560             3,998             11,180           28,346           51,480           69,940           
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra 1,400             2,250             7,980             20,858           43,290           61,872           
Kansas City Symphony Orchestra 1,560             3,474             5,300             11,894           -                29,805           
Los Angeles Philharmonic Orchestra 3,050             5,011             14,790           38,020           66,480           89,880           
Milwaukee Symphony Orchestra -                -                9,020             21,899           46,080           52,008           
Minnesota Orchestra 2,600             4,350             12,192           32,418           62,790           79,950           
New Orleans Symphony Orchestra 1,300             2,830             7,828             20,312           -                -                
New York Philharmonic Orchestra 4,200             8,720             17,160           39,961           63,960           88,920           
Oakland Symphony Orchestra 7,826             -                -                
Philadelphia Orchestra 4,995             7,770             17,180           38,594           65,980           88,400           
Phoenix Symphony Orchestra 10,997           24,500           31,210           
Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra 2,500             5,230             13,500           32,856           65,260           82,940           
Rochester Philharmonic Orchestra 2,640             4,125             9,225             23,311           35,210           32,400           
San Antonio Symphony Orchestra 1,470             5,760             14,877           22,698           28,548           
San Diego Symphony Orchestra 13,217           26,730           25,200           
San Francisco Symphony Orchestra 2,200             4,010             13,720           35,304           65,780           88,400           
St. Louis Symphony Orchestra 2,214             4,380             10,965           28,346           53,560           72,280           
Seattle Symphony Orchestra -                -                6,800             19,406           -                -                
Syracuse Symphony Orchestra -                3,960             12,572           21,715           24,659           
Utah Symphony Orchestra 892               -                -                23,193           31,980           42,380           
Washington (National) Symphony Orchestra 2,080             4,480             13,500           29,575           58,240           79,690           
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Table 6.3: Historical Growth in Minimum Annual Salaries in Real Dollars (Inflation-Adjusted for 2018)562 
                                               
562 "Comparative Growth in Orchestra Annual Salaries: 1952–2000," Senza Sordino, March, 2001. 
1952–53 1962–63 1972–73 1982–83 1992–93 2000–01
Atlanta Symphony Orchestra 11,314           -                57,605           68,451           93,080           91,881           
Baltimore Symphony Orchestra 13,090           26,308           58,250           58,754           95,872           91,728           
Boston Symphony Orchestra 45,161           73,349           100,339         97,489           114,488         130,712         
Buffalo Philharmonic 17,597           27,985           60,149           47,441           59,070           46,526           
Chicago Symphony Orchestra 42,122           61,950           100,339         97,594           116,350         129,948         
Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra 24,871           34,568           72,119           83,362           102,478         115,998         
Cleveland Orchestra 30,575           50,551           89,365           89,461           118,398         125,362         
Dallas Symphony Orchestra 14,960           37,170           70,551           74,551           97,734           105,487         
Denver/Colorado Symphony Orchestra 15,521           -                51,858           55,236           45,377           50,503           
Detroit Symphony Orchestra 28,424           40,804           77,516           84,717           110,393         118,826         
Honolulu/Hawaii Symphony Orchestra -                -                31,838           34,121           49,433           37,838           
Houston Symphony Orchestra 23,936           33,023           67,415           74,551           92,149           102,812         
Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra 13,090           18,585           48,119           54,857           77,489           90,952           
Kansas City Symphony Orchestra 14,586           28,695           31,959           31,281           -                43,813           
Los Angeles Philharmonic Orchestra 28,518           41,391           89,184           99,991           118,999         132,124         
Milwaukee Symphony Orchestra -                -                54,391           57,594           82,483           76,452           
Minnesota Orchestra 24,310           35,931           73,518           85,259           112,394         117,527         
New Orleans Symphony Orchestra 12,155           23,376           47,203           53,421           -                -                
New York Philharmonic Orchestra 39,270           72,027           103,475         105,099         114,488         130,712         
Oakland Symphony Orchestra -                -                -                20,583           -                -                
Philadelphia Orchestra 46,703           64,180           103,595         101,503         118,104         129,948         
Phoenix Symphony Orchestra -                -                -                28,921           43,855           45,879           
Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra 23,375           43,200           81,405           86,411           116,815         121,922         
Rochester Philharmonic Orchestra 24,684           34,073           55,627           61,308           63,026           47,628           
San Antonio Symphony Orchestra 13,745           -                34,733           39,127           40,629           41,966           
San Diego Symphony Orchestra -                -                -                34,760           47,847           37,044           
San Francisco Symphony Orchestra 20,570           33,123           82,732           92,849           117,746         129,948         
St. Louis Symphony Orchestra 20,701           36,179           66,119           74,551           95,872           106,252         
Seattle Symphony Orchestra -                -                41,004           51,038           -                -                
Syracuse Symphony Orchestra -                -                23,879           33,063           38,870           36,249           
Utah Symphony Orchestra 8,340             -                -                60,997           57,244           62,299           
Washington (National) Symphony Orchestra 19,448           37,005           81,405           77,783           104,250         117,144         
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 Tables 2 and 3 suggest a dramatic overall increase in musician salaries in both 
current and real (inflation adjusted dollars) during the second half of the twentieth 
century. Among the top twenty-four U.S. symphony orchestras, real minimum annual 
wages have more than quadrupled, from $23,696 during the 1952–53 season to 
$100,773 in 2000–01. The largest ten-year jump occurred during the years 1962–63 
and 1972–73, when the average real minimum annual wage for the top twenty-four 
orchestras jumped 103% from $35,561 to $72,220.  
This increase is related at least partly to the increase in work weeks during the 
same period, in addition to the increased pressure placed on managers and boards 
because of ICSOM’s influence. But salaries were also greatly on the rise during the 
span 1952–53 to 1962–63; during this period the average real minimum annual wage 
for the top twenty-four orchestras increased 50%, and this was before both the 
founding of ICSOM and the implementation Ford Foundation’s Program for 
Symphony Orchestras. 
 Although it is difficult to pin down a clear causal relationship between the 
intervention of the Ford Foundation and the rise in both guaranteed work weeks and 
salaries, it is nonetheless clear that musicians in leading symphony orchestras, and not 
just in the “Big Five,” experienced tremendous gains in compensation during the 
second half of the twentieth century. And these gains greatly outpaced those of 
public-school teachers, a group of professionals cited regularly in the 1950s and 
1960s when discussing orchestra compensation. 
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As discussed in Chapter 3, many orchestra managers expressed concern that 
musicians were choosing careers as public-school teachers instead of pursuing careers 
in orchestras. The Ford Foundation’s 1966 press release announcing the Program for 
Symphony Orchestras noted the benefits of public-school teaching over orchestra 
playing: “Any player in a major symphony has had to spend at least as much time, 
money, and effort on his education as a teacher. Furthermore, the conditions of 
employment are more favorable to schoolteachers than to orchestra musicians.”563  
Orchestral administrators explicitly targeted teacher salaries as a target for 
orchestra musicians. In California, for example, the average public school teacher’s 
annual salary during the 1969–70 school year was just over $10,000 ($73,000 in 2018 
dollars).564 The Los Angeles Philharmonic’s average salary rose dramatically during 
the early years of the Symphony Orchestra Program from $10,086 in 1966–67 to 
$12,742 in 1968–69.565 By 1972, the orchestra’s minimum salary had risen to nearly 
$15,000, by 1982 $38,500, by 1992 $66,480, and by 2000 $89,880.566 By the 2014–
15 season, the musicians of the Los Angeles Philharmonic were guaranteed the 
highest base salary of any orchestral musicians in the United States, with an annual 
minimum of $150,124, outpacing even the traditional “Big Five” orchestras of 
                                               
563 "News from the Ford Foundation: Ford Foundation Program for Symphony Orchestras," July 6, 
1966, Box 3, Series 1.3, MOAA. 
564 “Estimated Average Annual Salary of Teachers in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, by 
State or Jurisdiction: Selected Years, 1969-70 through 2009-10,” National Center for Education 
Statistics, March 2010, accessed December 2018, 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/tables/dt10_083.asp. 
565 “Symphony Orchestra Program Questionnaire: 1966-1969,” July 29, 1970, Los Angeles 
Philharmonic Archives. 
566 “Comparative Salaries—1952-2002,” Senza Sordino, March 2001, 8. 
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Chicago, New York, Boston, Cleveland, and Philadelphia.567 By contrast, a certified 
music teacher beginning her career in the Los Angeles Unified School District during 
the 2014–15 school year could expect a minimum salary of just over $47,000.568 
In his 1972 oral history, McNeil Lowry recalled that “the average wage of 
symphony orchestra musicians in the year in which we made the grant [1967] equaled 
the average wage of secondary school teachers only in seven cities of the United 
States, and most orchestra players were moonlighting to beat hell.”569 During the 
1965–66 season, only in the “Big Five” orchestras were average musician salaries 
higher than those of public-school teachers.570 But by the early seventies—when the 
Ford Foundation completed its distribution of expendable funds—salaries in many 
orchestras matched or exceeded local teacher salaries. Today, teacher salaries serve as 
an altogether ineffectual yardstick for the salaries of musicians in top orchestras; in 
none of the school districts containing the eight highest paying U.S. orchestras do the 
base public-school teacher’s salary approach the minimum salary enjoyed by 
orchestra members:  
 
                                               
567 Jeffrey Fleishman, “Tales of Obsession and Perfection: The Musicians of the L.A. Phil,” Los 
Angeles Times, February 12, 2015, accessed July 2016, http://graphics.latimes.com/la-phil-2/ LA 
Times, Tales of Obsession and Perfection: The Musicians of the L.A. Phil. 
568 “Salary Tables – Archive,” Los Angeles Unified School District, accessed September 2016, 
http://achieve.lausd.net/Page/8569. 
569 Charles T. Morrissey, "Interview with W. McNeil Lowry for the Ford Foundation Oral History 
Project," January 14, 1972, box 3, Ford Foundation Records, Oral History Project, RAC, 532. 
570 “The Ford Foundation: Millions for Music—Music for Millions,” Music Educators Journal, Vol. 
53, No. 1 (Sep., 1966), 84. 
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Table 6.4: Base Salaries of Eight Highest Paid Symphony Orchestras Compared to 
Base Salaries of Local Public School District Teachers571 
 
 
These data are not intended to compare the work done by orchestra musicians 
or public-school teachers, but instead to illustrate how dramatically orchestral salaries 
have risen since the 1960s, when the Ford Foundation as well as orchestra executives 
cited comparisons between musician and teacher salaries. Concerning this dramatic 
increase in musician salaries, it is clear that the situation of top orchestral musicians 
                                               
571 See Drew McManus, “Top-Tier Musicians Compensation 2018,” Adaptistration, May 25, 2018, 
https://adaptistration.com/2018/05/25/top-tier-musician-compensation-2018; Boston Public Schools, 
Biweekly Pay Schedule: 09/02/17 – 8/31/18, accessed January 28, 2019, https://btu.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/BTU_Teacher_Salary_Grids_16-18_CBA_no_highlights.pdf;  
Chicago Teachers Union, “2017–18 School Year: Salary Schedule for Full-Time Appointed Teachers 
in 208-day Positions,” accessed January 28, 2019, https://ctulocal1.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/CTU_Contract_2015-19_Appendices_Only.pdf; Cleveland Teachers Union, 
“2017–2018: Teacher’s Differentiated Compensation Salary Schedule,” accessed January 28, 2019, 
https://www.nctq.org/dmsView/Cleveland_16-19_tentative; Los Angeles Unified School District, 
“2017–2018 Salaries for Teachers with Regular Credentials (T) C Basis,” accessed January 28, 2019, 
https://achieve.lausd.net/cms/lib/CA01000043/Centricity/Domain/280/Salary%20Tables/salary%2017-
18/T%20Table%20Annual.pdf; Washington Teachers’ Union, “FY 2017–2018 ET 15 Salary 
Schedule,” accessed January 29, 2019, 
https://dcps.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/dcps/publication/attachments/WTU-
DCPS%20Contract%202016-2019.pdf; United Federation of Teachers, “Teacher Salary Schedule: 
May 1, 2017,” accessed January 29, 2019, http://www.uft.org/files/attachments/secure/teacher-
schedule-2009-2018.pdf; The School District of Philadelphia, “Salary Schedule,” accessed January 29, 
2019, https://jobs.philasd.org/opportunities/teachers/salary-schedule/; San Francisco Public Schools, 
“2017–2018 Salary Schedule,” accessed January 29, 2019, http://www.sfusd.edu/en/assets/sfusd-
staff/contract%20and%20salary%20schedules/2017-18%20Teachers%20Salary%20Schedules.pdf. 
2017–18 2017–18
Boston Symphony 153,400$ Boston Public School District 55,295$ 
Chicago Symphony 159,016$ Chicago Public Schools 51,666$ 
Cleveland Orchestra 135,096$ Cleveland Metro School District 44,686$ 
Los Angeles Philharmonic 164,476$ Los Angeles Unified School District 50,368$ 
National Symphony 143,208$ DC Public Schools 55,209$ 
New York Philharmonic 147,550$ NYC Department of Education 54,000$ 
Philadelphia Orchestra 134,420$ School District of Philadelphia 46,267$ 
San Francisco Symphony 166,400$ San Francisco Unified School District 53,328$ 
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benefitted dramatically—in terms of salary increases—during and after the 
Symphony Orchestra Program.  
 Beyond just public-school teachers, a famously low-paid cohort of college 
educated professionals, orchestral salaries have also outgrown other non-supervisory 
employees throughout the labor market. Table 6.3 shows how in real dollars 
orchestral salaries generally doubled from the early 1960s to the early 2000s. During 
the same span, according to the Pew Research Center, average hourly wages for non-
supervisory employees on private non-farm payrolls have increased only about 10% 
in real dollars from 1964 to 2018, suggesting that orchestral musicians have enjoyed 
salary gains out of step with typical workers.572 And these gains have continued 
through the first two decades of the twenty-first century; as Table 6.4 shows, salaries 
in the top eight orchestras have grown dramatically since 2000, despite major 
economic crises like the early 2000s dot-com crash and the financial crisis of 2007 to 
2008. 
 It is clear that orchestral musicians enjoyed growing wages during the 1960s 
and 1970s as the Ford Foundation spread millions to orchestras around the country. 
But in raising salaries the foundation intended not only to help individual musicians, 
but also to present a more compelling argument for young musicians to pursue 
careers in orchestras.  
                                               
572 DeSilver, Drew, “For Most U.S. Workers, Real Wages have Barely Budged in Decades,” Pew 
Research Center, August 7, 2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/07/for-most-us-
workers-real-wages-have-barely-budged-for-decades/.  
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By extending seasons and raising salaries, this argument has been made 
effectively; today, there is no shortage of qualified musicians graduating from 
conservatories and music schools auditioning for seats in professional orchestras. The 
situation is now reversed. Whereas in the 1950s and 1960s many musicians eschewed 
orchestral auditions and became teachers, now the audition process is so competitive 
and grueling that many outstanding musicians end up as teachers because they cannot 
succeed in an audition. 
In 2015 the Cincinnati Enquirer published an article about the ordeal of a 
violist auditioning for a section (non-principal) role with the Cincinnati Symphony 
Orchestra. The applicant, a member of two smaller Ohio professional orchestras, was 
one of 140 applicants. Through a pre-screening process the orchestra invited fewer 
than half of the applicants to formally audition, and forty-nine total violists came to 
Cincinnati for the audition. Although he made the final four, the violist highlighted by 
the Enquirer was not chosen, and as of 2018, according to his personal website, he 
still has not landed a role with a major orchestra.573 
Accounts like these, suggesting the sheer volume of qualified people 
auditioning for section roles in major, but not top tier, orchestras like the Cincinnati 
Symphony suggest that there is no longer a shortage of qualified string players 
looking for jobs in top orchestras. For this reason, many professional musicians 
freelance with multiple orchestras to earn a living. The 2008 documentary film 
“Freeway Philharmonic,” broadcast nationally by the Public Broadcasting Service, 
                                               
573 Janelle Gelfand, “Inside a Symphony Audition,” The Cincinnati Enquirer, November 24, 2015. 
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documents several of these musicians who drive throughout the San Francisco Bay 
Area piecing together their livings from many part-time gigs. Without full-time jobs 
in an orchestra like the San Francisco Symphony, “Freeway Philharmonic” musicians 
are paid per service, without the paid vacation, pensions, and other fringe benefits of 
employment in a major orchestra.574 
The scarcity of auditions in major orchestras leads many fine musicians, like 
those in freeway philharmonics around the country, to bide their time waiting for the 
rare openings in larger orchestras. Although this surplus leaves many of these 
musicians without the personal satisfaction and remuneration of joining a major 
orchestra, their collective labor results in a collection of fine smaller orchestras in 
smaller towns and distant suburbs. Of the development of this new wealth of talent, 
former Minnesota Orchestra President Richard Cisek remarked to me about one of the 
positive consequences of the Ford Program: “America’s rich tradition of high-quality 
symphony orchestras in almost any city of any size blossomed…. Now you have 
professionals filling the ranks of orchestras in cities of all sizes. And that makes a 
significant difference in the talent pools that exist in all cities.”575 
 
4. “To Stabilize the Financial Position of the Leading American Orchestras” 
 
                                               
574 Tal Skloot, dir, Freeway Philharmonic: The Classical Road Warriors (El Sobrante, CA: Tritone 
Films, 2007). 
 
575 Author’s interview with Richard Cisek, September 8, 2016.  
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The Ford Foundation’s final goal—to “stabilize the financial position of the 
leading American Orchestras”—is the most vague of the four, and thus the most 
difficult one to evaluate. Although it is clear that the salaries in the top twenty to 
thirty orchestras have increased dramatically since the early 1960s, it is hard to judge 
whether the orchestra business is in aggregate on more stable financial footing than it 
was fifty years ago. During the late 1980s, many smaller orchestras experienced great 
instability; because of factors explored in Chapter Four, the Oakland Symphony 
became the first major orchestra to declare bankruptcy in 1986. 
 Although the period in the late 1980s when the Oakland Symphony went 
bankrupt was jarring, the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 had wider reaching 
implications. In April 2011 the Philadelphia Orchestra filed for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 11 to negotiate with creditors and reduce its debts. The Philadelphia 
Orchestra did not cease operations—unlike the Oakland Symphony which filed 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the more draconian form—but its bankruptcy was nonetheless 
an example of how even top orchestras are vulnerable to economic realities. 
Furthermore, the Minnesota Orchestra’s unprecedented work stoppage from 2012 to 
2014 demonstrates how decades of harmonious operations can be soured by 
economic recession.    
 Thus, the impact of the Ford Foundation’s Program for Symphony Orchestras 
is somewhat mixed; although wages have increased, the foundation’s reliance on 
endowments and success in building fundraising mechanisms has tightened the link 
between orchestras and the performance of the economy and the stock market. As of 
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mid 2019, the U.S. stock market is basically healthy, endowments are growing, and 
orchestras are generally expanding operations and paying musicians more than ever 
before. In addition, the 2017 U.S. tax reform further incentivizes charitable giving for 
wealthy Americans by raising the charitable deduction limit from 50% of adjusted 
gross income to 60% and eliminating the Pease phaseout on itemized deductions for 
taxpayers with high adjusted gross incomes. This tax reform, coupled with a bullish 
stock market, should trickle down to orchestra and musicians in the form of growing 
salaries, more experimental programming, and extraordinary touring opportunities. 
 Inevitably, though, the U.S. will enter another recession, endowments with 
shrink, and orchestras will have to make hard decisions. Donors will have less to 
donate, and concertgoers will have less expendable income to buy tickets. Symphony 
orchestras have shifted toward greater reliance on wealthy donors, and they have not 
succeeded in diversifying their audiences or widening their appeal. The high salaries 
enjoyed by top orchestral players have risen without a corresponding market-driven 
mandate, and orchestral musicians are especially vulnerable to recessions because 
they depend so greatly on wealthy donors rather than ticket sales. Unless orchestras 
succeed in expanding their audiences, it is likely that the next major recession will 
negate the meteoric wage gains of the last five years. 
 
“Towards a New Gospel of Wealth:” A Symphony Orchestra Program Today 
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There is still a great deal of foundation support for symphony orchestras in the 
United States, but for many of the biggest foundations symphony orchestras are no 
longer a priority. Instead, many of the largest foundations, like Rockefeller, Carnegie, 
and Gates, are focusing on basic needs, like medical research and education 
availability, particularly in Africa and elsewhere outside the United States. The Ford 
Foundation is involved in these issues as well, but Ford’s current president, Darren 
Walker, has taken dramatic steps to re-orient the Ford Foundation towards the 
singular issue of income inequality. 
 In 2015 Walker, then in his third year as Ford Foundation President, wrote an 
essay entitled “Toward a New Gospel of Wealth,” in reference to Andrew Carnegie’s 
oft-cited 1889 “Wealth.” Without explicitly repudiating Carnegie, and thus by 
extension the inequalities of the gilded-age that produced the conditions for the 
creation of the Ford Foundation, Walker deftly argued that it was time for 
philanthropy to evolve in its thinking:  
Where Carnegie might have identified illiteracy as a source of inequality, for 
example, we now understand that the reverse is true—or, at the very least, that 
a complex symbiosis is at work. We understand, in a way he did not, that 
social, cultural, political, and economic inequalities set in place reinforcing 
conditions from the very start of life—in homes, in neighborhoods, and in 
schools—that create cycles of poverty, illiteracy, and lack of opportunity.576  
 
Walker argues that it is time to bring new voices and perspectives into the fold 
to re-imagine the role of endowments, particularly those of legacy foundations like 
Ford, and cites Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. as the ideological root of his philosophy: 
                                               
576 Darren Walker, “Toward a New Gospel of Wealth,” The Ford Foundation, 2015. 
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“My thinking on this issue has been shaped by the words of Dr. Martin Luther King 
Jr., who made a profound statement not long before his death: ‘Philanthropy is 
commendable,’ he wrote, ‘but it must not cause the philanthropist to overlook the 
circumstances of economic injustice which make philanthropy necessary.’”577 
Walker’s concern coincides with a growing popular interest in income 
inequality, epitomized by French economist Thomas Piketty’s 2013 book Capital in 
the Twenty-First Century, published in English translation in April 2014. An unlikely 
New York Times No. 1 best seller in the hardcover nonfiction category, Piketty’s 
central thesis in Capital is that the private rate of return of capital has outpaced the 
rate of growth of income and output, resulting in an increasingly large concentration 
of capital in the hands of the wealthy, and a widening gap between rich and poor: 
“Once constituted, capital reproduces itself faster than output increases. The past 
devours the future.”578 
For legacy foundations like Ford, in which the founder is long dead, the 
specter of the past devouring the future can loom large, and radical introspection in 
the vein of Walker and his Ford Foundation is rare. But several recent books, in the 
wake of Piketty’s Capital and Walker’s “New Gospel” question the problematic 
relationship between private charitable foundations and inequality. This relationship 
is girded by the charitable tax deduction, which incentivizes charitable giving to not-
for-profit corporations, as defined by the Internal Revenue Service. As discussed in 
                                               
577 Darren Walker, “Toward a New Gospel of Wealth,” The Ford Foundation, 2015. 
578 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2014), 
571. 
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Chapter 1, Stanford Political Scientist Rob Reich, in his 2018 book Just Giving: Why 
Philanthropy is Failing Democracy and How it Can Do Better, argues that the 
charitable deduction introduces a “plutocratic” element into society because it allows 
for money that would otherwise be subject to democratic preference to be directed for 
the private purposes of individuals. Because the wealthy pay taxes at a higher 
marginal income tax rate than the poor, they have more to gain in charitable 
deductions. Thus, the charitable donations of the wealthy—those who itemize their 
deductions and are in the top marginal income tax brackets—are cheaper than the 
donations of those who are in lower tax brackets and do not itemize. Reich considers 
this fact a fundamental inequality of the U.S. tax code. If the purpose of the charitable 
deduction is to provide subsidy to noble causes, as is the conventional wisdom, then 
“why should two donors who make identical donations to identical organizations, 
ostensibly producing the identical social good, be treated differently by the tax 
code?579  
In addition, Reich interrogates the public praise offered philanthropists— 
exemplified by the December 26, 2005 cover of Time Magazine naming “the good 
Samaritans” Bill and Melinda Gates, and U2 singer Bono as persons of the year—in 
relation to the general subsidies that voters (we) offer them: 
In many countries philanthropy is a tax-subsidized activity, partly paid for by 
all taxpayers. Strictly speaking, then, donors are not exercising a liberty to 
give their money away; they are subsidized to exercise a liberty they already 
possess.580 
                                               
579 Rob Reich, Just Giving: Why Philanthropy is Failing Democracy and How It Can Do Better 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 2018), 120. 
580 Reich, Just Giving, 8. 
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 In fact, as Reich describes, there once was greater public opposition to 
philanthropists and industrial alms-givers like Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller. When 
John D. Rockefeller began his eponymous foundation in 1911, he was met with 
staunch opposition in Washington because his charitable efforts were considered an 
attempt to launder his ill-gotten Standard Oil gains. Former president Theodore 
Roosevelt remarked that “no amount of charities in spending such fortunes can 
compensate in any way for the misconduct in acquiring them,” while sitting president 
William Taft derided the effort as an attempt to “incorporate Mr. Rockefeller.”581 
Although some of this animus was residual anger from the lengthy, and ultimately 
successful, federal effort to breakup Standard Oil in 1911 under the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, Reich argues that opposition to Rockefeller’s charitable endeavors 
were also principled in nature: 
For many Americans, foundations were troubling not because they 
represented the wealth, possibly ill-gotten, of Gilded Age robber barons. They 
were troubling because they were considered a deeply and fundamentally 
antidemocratic institution, an entity that would undermine political equality, 
convert private wealth into the donor’s preferred public policies, could exist in 
perpetuity, and be unaccountable except to a handpicked assemblage of 
trustees.582 
 
A public mistrust of private foundations re-emerged forcefully in the 1960s, 
when the enlarged wealth and influence of the Ford Foundation—as a result of the 
public offering of Ford Stock as described in Chapter 2—spurred congressional 
interest. In 1965, at the joint request of the Senate Committee on Finance and the 
                                               
581 Ibid., 4. 
582 Reich, Just Giving, 5. 
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House Committee on Ways and Means, the U.S. Treasury Department produced a 
report examining the activities of private foundations. Based on a survey of more than 
a thousand U.S. foundations, the Treasury Report noted three broad criticisms: “It has 
been contended that the interposition of the foundation between the donor and active 
charitable pursuits entails undue delay in the transmission of the benefits which 
society should derive from charitable contributions; that foundations are becoming a 
disproportionately large segment of our national economy; and that foundations 
represent dangerous concentrations of economic and social power.”583 
The Treasury Report led to a wider Congressional investigation of 
foundations, resulting in a 1969 hearing in which Ford Foundation President 
McGeorge Bundy testified before the House Ways and Means Committee concerning 
the foundation’s political biases, specifically grants to former aides of Robert 
Kennedy after his assassination in 1968. The Congressional investigation, coupled 
with Bundy’s arrogant demeanor during his hearing, subsequently led to major 
regulations in the Tax Act of 1969 limiting the activities of foundations.584 
The 1969 Tax Act created several requirements limiting the operations of 
private foundations. First, it imposed a 4 percent excise tax on the investment income. 
This levy yielded more than $76 million in tax year 1974, but the rate has 
subsequently been lowered to 2 percent, although many foundations actually pay 
                                               
583 Treasury Department Report on Private Foundations (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Ways and 
Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 1965), 5. 
584 Patricia Rosenfield and Rachel Wimpee, “The Ford Foundation: Constant Themes, Historical 
Variations” (Tarrytown, N.Y.: Rockefeller Archive Center, 2015), 23. 
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less.585 Second, the Act established a minimum annual payout amount of 5 percent 
investment assets. Third, the Act put restrictions on grants to individuals, making it 
the responsibility of the foundation to assume oversight of program development and 
accounting by individual grantees. Finally, the Act established a new penalty scheme 
to sanction noncomplying foundations.586 
Despite this modest congressional oversight, private foundations have only 
grown in wealth and influence since the 1960s. David Callahan, founder and editor of 
the website insidephilanthropy.com and author of the 2017 book The Givers: Wealth, 
Power, and Philanthropy in a New Gilded Age, writes that nonprofits have changed 
greatly in the hundred years since the charitable deduction was created in 1917. 
Callahan argues that nonprofits are increasingly involved in activities resembling 
partisan politics, and that because the money is flowing to causes on both sides of the 
political aisle, there is little incentive for either side to reform the system: 
When donors hold views we detest, we tend to see them as unfairly tilting 
policy debates with their money. Yet when we like their causes, we often view 
them as heroically stepping forward to level the playing field against powerful 
special interests or backward public majorities. These sorts of a la carte 
reactions don’t make a lot of sense. Really, the question should be whether we 
think it’s okay overall for any philanthropists to have so much power to 
advance their own vision of a better society?587 
 
                                               
585 Internal Revenue Service, “Tax on Net Investment Income,” accessed January 27, 2019, 
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/private-foundations/tax-on-net-investment-income. 
586 Homer C. Wadsworth, “Private Foundation and the Tax Reform Act of 1969,” Law and 
Contemporary Problems 39, no. 4 (Autumn 1975): 255-262. 
587 David Callahan, The Givers: Wealth, Power, and Philanthropy in a New Gilded Age (New York: 
Knopf, 2017), 166. 
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Journalist Anand Giridharadas, a former analyst at international consulting 
firm McKinsey and Co., contends in his 2018 book Winners Take All: The Elite 
Charade of Changing the World that philanthropists see in Carnegie’s “Wealth” the 
kernel of the dangerous idea that “after-the-fact benevolence justifies anything-goes 
capitalism…. That generosity is a substitute for and a means of avoiding the necessity 
of a more just and equitable system and a fairer distribution of power.”588 
Income inequality appears to be playing a major role in growing populist and 
anti-elite sentiments in the United States and Europe. Because the Ford Foundation 
does not accept donations—it only spends income generated from its endowment—
and Walker doesn’t need to fundraise, he can take programmatic risks. But part of his 
role as the leader of one of the most prestigious charitable organizations in the world 
is to evangelize on behalf of his foundation’s mission and convince other 
philanthropic leaders to follow suit. One might think that battling economic inequities 
wouldn’t be a hard sell for philanthropists. But alleviating poverty and thwarting 
income inequality are two very different concepts; the former euphemistically isolates 
the poor as a problem population to be fixed, without allusion to the sources of 
poverty. By contrast, the very concept of income inequality puts the wealthy 
(philanthropists) squarely in the equation as agents of imbalance. 
For this reason, Walker’s crusade against income inequality places him at 
odds with many philanthropists who seek to apply the methods that made them 
                                               
588 Anand Giridharadas, Winners Take All: The Elite Charade of Changing the World (New York: 
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wealthy to solve intractable problems like poverty and global health. But as with 
Andrew Carnegie, it is unlikely that current titans of industry—such as Mark 
Zuckerberg, Charles Koch, George Soros, Bill Gates, etc.—will see a reason to 
radically reform our increasingly unequal system, because it was this very system that 
made them so spectacularly rich in the first place. Giridharadas writes that “the 
people with the most to lose from genuine social change have placed themselves in 
charge of social changes, often with the passive assent of those most in need of it.”589 
Furthermore, Giridharadas suggests that the public can sense that elites are 
wielding domineering influence over society, and that the 2016 presidential election, 
in which the populist outsider Donald Trump defeated centrist insider Hillary Clinton, 
is a product of this growing dissatisfaction:   
It is no wonder that the American voting public—like other publics around the 
world—has turned more resentful and suspicious in recent years, embracing 
populist movements on the left and right, bringing socialism and nationalism 
into the center of political life in a way that once seemed unthinkable, and 
succumbing to all manner of conspiracy theory and fake news. There is a 
spreading recognition, on both sides of the ideological divide, that the system 
is broken and has to change.590 
  
Darren Walker and the Ford Foundation’s recognition of this fissure is evident 
by the Ford Foundation’s re-assessment of its grantmaking around seven thematic 
areas: civic engagement and government; creativity and free expression; gender, 
racial, and ethnic justice; internet freedom; natural resources and climate change; just 
cities and regions; and the future of work. Under this rubric it is difficult to see how a 
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large endowment program like the Program for Symphony Orchestras would be 
possible within the Ford Foundation’s current mission. A program for symphony 
orchestras would need to be justified in relation to the problem of income inequality. 
But orchestras have done very little to transcend their aristocratic roots; the courtly 
orchestras of Europe were patronized by unelected elites (monarchs), and the modern 
orchestras of the United States are supported by a similarly privileged, unelected class 
of wealthy philanthropists. The artistic quality of the top American orchestras is 
undisputed, but as instruments for equity and social justice, their utility is less 
apparent. 
Thus, the question of whether or not a program of the scope and scale like the 
Program for Symphony Orchestras could happen today is perhaps not the one that 
needs to be asked. There is still great financial instability among even the top U.S. 
orchestras, but maybe the correct question to ask is should a program like this one, 
which would cost more than $600 million in 2019, happen today? If we accept the 
thesis that income inequality is the root problem causing wider disfunction in our 
society, then we must consider whether or not symphony orchestras can diminish 
income inequality, or—to repurpose Darren Walker’s argument that it is not illiteracy 
that creates inequality but vice versa—is inequality a fundamental barrier preventing 
greater interest in symphony orchestras? 
In conclusion, as part of a broader discussion about the role of arts 
philanthropy in an age of rising inequality, Henry Ford II’s comment during the Ford 
Foundation board’s discussion of the Program for Symphony Orchestra—“why 
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should we decide that we should give eighty-million to the symphony and not the 
same amount to the Beatles?”—becomes an interesting question. Although it is 
difficult to know if Ford II was being flippant or profound, this question, uttered 
among a cloistered group of elites, highlights the undemocratic nature of the Ford 
Foundation’s proceedings; a small group, through no openly democratic process, was 
endowed with the funds to shape American culture. 
But the Program for Symphony Orchestras should be considered in the 
environment in which it was born: the dynamic and optimistic period following the 
Second World War. In this context the efforts of the Ford Foundation to raise the 
salaries of orchestral musicians, a chronically underpaid group of professionals, and 
to endow symphony orchestras as bedrock cultural institutions, was a noble cause. 
Although the Ford program had its limitations and was not a panacea for all the ills 
plaguing orchestras and orchestra musicians, it is an artifact of a time when it seemed 
like anything was possible in America.   
  
 
 
APPENDIX 1. 
 
Financial Position of the Ford Foundation, 1952 to 1981 (all values in millions)591 
 
                                               
591 All figures are derived from the Ford Foundation’s Annual Reports, https://www.fordfoundation.org/about/library/?filter=Annual%20Report, 
accessed January 14, 2019.  
Year End 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
Investment Income 32.56$       48.13$       19.57$        133.53$     165.89$        102.86$     92.45$       84.48$        127.57$     130.83$     
Other 0.05$         0.12$         0.39$          0.04$         0.00$            0.05$         0.12$         0.14$          -$          -$          
Total Income 32.61$       48.25$       19.96$        133.58$     165.89$        102.91$     92.57$       84.62$        127.57$     130.83$     
Grant Expense 37.87$       58.91$       49.44$        64.96$       557.78$        153.39$     79.03$       110.84$      160.75$     144.55$     
Other Expense 3.41$         4.71$         4.07$          5.17$         5.68$            6.24$         5.88$         5.11$          7.48$         8.44$         
Total Expenses 41.27$       63.62$       53.51$        70.12$       563.46$        159.63$     84.91$       115.94$      168.24$     152.99$     
Excess of Income over Expenses (8.66)$       (15.37)$     (33.55)$       63.45$       (397.57)$      (56.72)$     7.66$         (31.32)$       (40.66)$     (22.16)$     
Ford Securities
Number of Shares 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09 36.13 36.13 36.13 34.07 31.91 29.00
Book Value 417.14$     417.14$     417.14$      417.14$     325.19$        325.19$     325.19$     1,328.88$   1,499.78$  1,507.74$  
Per Share Valuation 135.04$     135.00$     135.00$      135.00$     9.00$            9.00$         9.00$         39.00$        47.00$       52.00$       
Other Securities/Bonds 95.83$       97.39$       39.14$        132.37$     658.96$        415.28$     434.16$     522.17$      683.75$     897.08$     
Other Assets 5.46$         5.71$         36.94$        31.41$       14.95$          7.70$         8.12$         8.16$          11.98$       17.95$       
Total Assets 518.42$     520.23$     493.21$      580.92$     999.11$        748.17$     767.47$     1,859.20$   2,195.51$  2,422.77$  
Change in Assets over Prior Year n/a 1.81$         (27.02)$       87.70$       418.19$        (250.93)$   19.30$       1,091.73$   336.31$     227.26$     
Percent Change n/a 0.35% -5.19% 17.78% 71.99% -25.12% 2.58% 142.25% 18.09% 10.35%
Ford IPO
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Year End 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Investment Income 136.87$     140.61$     147.21$      145.69$     157.83$        158.50$     155.51$     149.82$      106.91$     195.31$     
Other -$          -$          -$            -$          -$             -$          -$          -$            -$          -$          
Total Income 136.87$     140.61$     147.21$      145.69$     157.83$        158.50$     155.51$     149.82$      106.91$     195.31$     
Grant Expense 223.26$     212.29$     225.14$      281.59$     341.63$        234.08$     175.73$     198.97$      199.39$     185.16$     
Other Expense 10.44$       14.57$       16.67$        18.25$       20.92$          29.00$       35.43$       39.13$        38.85$       52.02$       
Total Expenses 233.69$     226.86$     241.81$      299.84$     362.55$        263.08$     211.16$     238.10$      238.24$     237.19$     
Excess of Income over Expenses (96.83)$     (86.24)$     (94.60)$       (154.16)$   (204.72)$      (104.58)$   (55.64)$     (88.28)$       (131.33)$   (41.87)$     
Ford Securities
Number of Shares 50.638 50.436 46.283756 39.361465 34.673 32.530936 30 27 23.7 18
Book Value 1,417.87$  1,513.08$  1,527.36$   1,417.01$  1,386.94$     1,398.83$  1,231.34$  1,217.19$   1,226.25$  1,231.48$  
Per Share Valuation 28.00$       30.00$       33.00$        36.00$       40.00$          43.00$       41.04$       45.08$        51.74$       68.42$       
Other Securities/Bonds 1,220.61$  1,194.00$  1,332.01$   1,574.01$  1,616.42$     1,663.93$  1,685.04$  1,705.44$   1,607.24$  2,028.49$  
Other Assets 17.55$       18.51$       22.84$        24.03$       30.19$          61.23$       59.04$       54.97$        68.05$       110.55$     
Total Assets 2,656.02$  2,725.59$  2,882.21$   3,015.06$  3,033.55$     3,124.00$  2,975.42$  2,977.61$   2,901.55$  3,370.52$  
Change in Assets over Prior Year 233.25$     69.57$       156.63$      132.84$     18.49$          90.45$       (148.58)$   2.19$          (76.06)$     468.97$     
Percent Change 9.63% 2.62% 5.75% 4.61% 0.61% 2.98% -4.76% 0.07% -2.55% 16.16%
2 for 1 
Stock Split
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Year End 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Investment Income 125.46$     113.72$     110.72$      94.51$       96.55$          98.01$       103.35$     124.84$      164.93$     196.74$     
Other -$          -$          -$            -$          -$             -$          -$          -$            -$          -$          
Total Income 125.46$     113.72$     110.72$      94.51$       96.55$          98.01$       103.35$     124.84$      164.93$     196.74$     
Grant Expense 176.05$     197.10$     210.70$      167.73$     127.37$        92.23$       97.51$       70.05$        78.28$       91.82$       
Other Expense 57.51$       49.68$       50.38$        46.24$       42.17$          41.80$       41.13$       48.31$        47.60$       37.37$       
Total Expenses 233.56$     246.77$     261.08$      213.97$     169.54$        134.03$     138.64$     118.36$      125.88$     129.19$     
Excess of Income over Expenses (108.10)$   (133.05)$   (150.36)$     (119.46)$   (72.99)$        (36.03)$     (35.28)$     6.49$          39.05$       67.56$       
Ford Securities
Number of Shares 11 6.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Book Value 722.33$     401.37$     -$            -$          -$             -$          -$          -$            -$          -$          
Per Share Valuation 65.67$       59.02$       -$            -$          -$             -$          -$          -$            -$          -$          
Other Securities/Bonds 2,557.47$  2,647.69$  1,698.97$   2,003.92$  2,289.25$     2,091.10$  2,211.87$  2,346.90$   2,583.03$  2,445.50$  
Other Assets 143.46$     96.53$       131.11$      66.81$       64.90$          68.34$       79.61$       88.18$        199.91$     120.07$     
Total Assets 3,423.26$  3,145.58$  1,830.08$   2,070.73$  2,354.15$     2,159.44$  2,291.48$  2,435.08$   2,782.94$  2,565.57$  
Change in Assets over Prior Year 52.74$       (277.68)$   (1,315.50)$  240.65$     283.42$        (194.71)$   132.04$     143.60$      347.86$     (217.37)$   
Percent Change 1.56% -8.11% -41.82% 13.15% 13.69% -8.27% 6.11% 6.27% 14.29% -7.81%
OPEC Oil Crisis
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APPENDIX 2. 
 
Works Performed by Gerhard Samuel as Music Director of the Oakland Symphony, 1959 to 1971592
 
 
Allanbrook, Douglas 
 Four Orchestra Landscapes (Symphony No. 3) 
 
Aldrovandini, Giuseppe 
 Sinfonia con Trombe 
 
Austin, Larry 
 Improvisations for Orchestra and Jazz Soloists 
 “Catharsis and Open Form” 
 
Bach, C.P.E. 
 Cello Concerto No. 3 
 
Bach, J.C. 
 Sinfonia in B flat 
Sinfonia for Double Orchestra, Op. 18, No. 3 
 
Bach, J.S. 
 Brandenburg Concertos No. 4 and No. 5 
Piano Concerto in F. Minor 
Magnificat 
Passion According to St. John 
Passion According to ST. Matthew 
Suite for Orchestra No. 3 
Violin Concerto No. 1 
Sinfonia in D, Op. 18, No. 4 
Suite No. 2  
 
                                               
592 This repertoire list was compiled from Oakland Symphony Orchestra concert calendars from 1959 to 1971 held at the Museum of Performance 
and Design in San Francisco, CA. 
 
 
Barber, Samuel 
 Adagio for Strings 
 
 
 
Bartók, Béla  
Piano Concerto No. 3 
Violin Concerto No. 2 
Concerto for Orchestra (1944) 
Suite No. 2, Op. 4 
Two Portraits for Orchestra, Op. 5 
Hungarian Sketches, Op. 77 
Divertimento for String Orchestra 
 
Beethoven, Ludwig van 
Piano Concertos No. 1 (Op. 15), No. 3 (Op. 37), No. 5 (Op. 
73) 
 
 
Violin Concerto, Op. 61 
Triple Concerto, Op. 56 
Symphony No. 2 (Op. 36), No. 3 (Op. 55), No. 4 (Op. 60), 
No. 5 (Op. 67), No. 7 (Op. 92), No. 8 (Op. 93), No. 9 (Op. 
125) 
Overture to "Fidelio," Op. 72b 
Overture to "Egmont," Op. 84 
"Nameday" Overture, Op. 115 
"Consecration of the House" Overture, Op. 124 
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"Leonore" Overture No. 1, Op. 138 
"Leonore" Overture No. 3, Op. 72A 
Missa Solemnis, Op. 123 
 
Berg, Alban 
 Violin Concerto 
Drei Orchesterstucke, Op. 6 (1929 Revision) 
Symphonic Pieces from the Opera "Lulu" 
Three Fragments from "Wozzeck," Op. 7 
 
Berger, Arthur 
 Polyphony for Orchestra 
 
Berio, Luciano 
 Sinfonia 
 
Berlioz, Hector 
 Symphonie Fantastique, Op. 14 
"Romeo and Juliet," Part II, Op. 17 
Overtures to "Roman Carnival" (Op. 9), "Corsaire" (Op. 
21), "Benvenuto Cellini" (Op. 23), and "Béatrice et 
Bénédict" 
“The Damnation of Faust” 
 
Bizet, Georges 
 "L'Arlesienne" Suite No. 2 
 
Bloch, Ernest 
 Violin Concerto 
"Schelomo" 
Boccherini, Luigi 
 Symphony in C Minor 
 
Boone, Charles 
 Matrix II: "The Edge of the Land" 
Starfish 
 
Brahms, Johannes 
 Piano Concertos No. 1 (Op. 15) and No. 2 (Op. 83) 
Violin Concerto, Op. 77 
Concerto for Violin and Cello, Op. 102 
Tragic Overture, Op. 81 
Symphony No. 1 (Op. 68), No. 2 (Op. 75), No. 3 (Op. 90) 
and No. 4 (Op. 98) 
 
Brant, Henry 
 “Kingdom Come” 
 
Britten, Benjamin 
 Nocturne for Tenor, Strings and Solo Instruments 
Three Sea Interludes from "Peter Grimes" 
 
Bruckner, Anton 
 Symphony No. 4 
Te Deum 
 
Chávez, Carlos 
 "El Sol" 
 
Chopin, Frédéric 
 Piano Concerto No. 1, (Op. 11), and No. 2 (Op. 21) 
 
Christou, Jani 
 Enantiodromia 
 
Cilea, Francesco 
 "Lo son L'umile" from "Adriana Lecouvreur” 
 
Copland, Aaron 
 Orchestral Variations 
Statements (1934) 
Short Symphony (No. 2) 
Music for the Theater 
A Lincoln Portrait 
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Corelli, Arcangelo 
 Concerto Grosso, Op. 6, No. 6 
 
Dahl, Ingolf 
 Aria Sinfonica 
 
Debussy, Claude 
 Jeux 
La Mer 
Le Martyre de St. Sebastien (Symphonic Fragments) 
Nocturnes 
Prelude a L'Apres-midi d'Un Faune 
 
De Falla, Manuel 
 Suite from "The Three-Cornered Hat" 
 
Dvořák, Antonín 
 Slavonic Dances, Op. 46, Nos. 5,6,7,8 
Violin Concerto, Op 53 
Cello Concerto, OP. 104 
 
Ellston, Arnold 
"Great Age Behold Us," Cantata for Mixed Chorus and 
Orchestra 
  
Felciano, Richard 
 Mutations for Orchestra 
 
Foss, Lukas 
The Song of Songs, Cantata for Soprano and Orchestra 
 
Glinka, Mikhail 
 Overture to "Russlan and Ludmilla" 
 
Gounod, Charles 
 Petite Symphonie 
 
Gutche, Gene 
 Holofernes Overture, Op. 27, No. 1 
 
Handel, George Frideric 
 Judas Maccabaeus 
"Awake Saturnia" from "Semele" 
"Defend Her Heaven" from "Theodora" 
"Di ad Irene" from "Atalanta" 
"No, oh Dio" from "Calpurnia" 
Suite from the Water Music 
Concerto Grosso, Op. 6 No. 1 
 
Harbison, John 
 Sinfonia for Violin and Double Orchestra 
 
Harrison, Lou 
 Cello Concerto in C Major 
Concerto in D for Harpsichord 
Miss Solemnis 
"The Seasons" 
Symphonies No. 44, 86, 88, 95, and 101 
Seven Pastorales 
 
Haydn, Joseph 
 Symphonies No. 22, 24, and 52 
 
Henze, Hans Werner 
 Symphony No. 4 
 
Hindemith, Paul 
 Mathis der Maler 
Nobilissima Visione 
Herodiade 
Violin Concerto No. 3 
 
Hoffman, Richard 
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 Orchestra Piece 1961 
 
Imbrie, Andrew 
 Drum Taps 
Little Concerto for Piano Four Hands and Orchestra 
 
Ives, Charles 
 Symphony No. 4 
The Unanswered Question 
 
Kennedy, John Brodbin 
 Symphonic Fantasy 
 
Kirchner, Leon 
 Toccata for Strings, Solo Winds and Percussion 
 
Kodály, Zoltán 
 Budavári Te Deum 
 
Kohn, Karl 
 Episodes for Piano and Orchestra 
 
Krenek, Ernest 
 Symphonic Elegy for Strings 
 
Lalo, Édouard 
 Symphonie Espagnole, Op. 21 
 
Lazarof, Henri 
 "Mutazione" 
 
Liszt, Franz 
 Piano Concerto No. 1 
 
Lutoslawski, Witold 
 Jeux Venitiens 
 
Mahler, Gustav 
 Das Lied von der Erde 
Kindertotenlieder 
Lieder eines fahrenden Gesellen 
Symphonies No. 1, 2, 3, and 4 
Blumine 
 
Martinů, Bohuslav 
 String Quartet with Orchestra 
Concerto da Camera 
 
Mascagni, Pietro 
 "Assio" from Cavalleria Rusticana 
 
Massenet, Jules 
 Gavotte from "Manon" 
Final Scene from "Don Quixotte" 
 
Mendelssohn, Felix 
Incidental Music to Shakespeare's "Midsummer Night's 
Dream," Op. 61 
Violin Concerto, Op. 64 
Symphony No. 4, Op. 90 
 
Menotti, Gian Carlo 
 "The Unicorn, the Gorgon, and the Manticore" 
 
Milhaud, Darius 
 Aubade 
Cortege Funebre 
Murder of a Great Chief of State 
Serenade 
Three Rag Caprices 
Les Charmes de la Vie 
 
Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus 
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Piano Concertos No. 9 (K.271), No. 14 (K. 449), No. 17 (K. 
453), No. 21 (K. 467), No. 24 (K. 491), No. 25 (K. 503), 
No. 27 (K. 595) 
Concerto for Two Pianos, K. 364 
Symphonies No. 1 (K. 16), No. 25 (K. 183), No. 28 (K. 
200), No. 29 (K. 201), No. 31 (K. 297), No. 33 (K. 319), 
No. 35 (K. 385), No. 36 (K. 425), No. 39 (K. 543), No. 40 
(K. 550), No. 41 (K. 551) 
Motet Exultante, Jubilate, K. 165 
Sinfonia Concertante, K. 165 
Serenade for 13 Wind Instruments, K. 361 
Mass in C Minor, K. 427 
Masonic Funeral Music, (K. 477) 
Adagio and Fugue for String Orchestra, (K. 546) 
Requiem Mass, (K. 626) 
"The Marriage of Figaro" (Concert Version) 
"Il mio tesoro in tanto" from "Don Giovanni" 
"Non piu di fiore" from "La Clemenza di Tito" 
Violin Concerto No. 5, (K. 219) 
Symphony No 38, (K. 504) 
Overtures to "Titus," (K. 621), and “The Magic Flute” (K. 
620) 
 
Myrow, Fredric 
 Symphony Variations 
Music for Orchestra 1-11 
 
Nono, Luigi 
 Memento—Epitaph No. 3 
 
Orff, Carl 
 Carmina Burana 
 
Paganini, Niccolò 
 Violin Concerto No. 1 
 
Penderecki, Krzysztof 
 Threnody for the Victims of Hiroshima 
 “Dies Irae” 
 
Pergolesi, Giovanni Battista 
 Violin Concerto in B Flat Major 
 
Perry, Julia 
 Stabat Mater 
 
Peterson, Wayne 
 Exaltation—Dithyramb and Caprice 
 
Prokofiev, Sergei 
 Piano Concerto No. 3, Op. 26 
Violin Concerto, Op. 19 
 
Puccini, Giacomo 
 "Vissi d'Arte" from "Tosca" 
 
Purcell, Henry 
 Trumpet Voluntary 
 
Quantz, Johann Joachim 
Concerto in E Minor for Flute, String Orchestra and 
Continuo 
 
Rachmaninoff, Sergei 
 Piano Concerto No. 3, Op. 30 
 
Rameau, Jean-Philippe 
 Music from “Hippolyte et Aricie” 
 
Ravel, Maurice 
 Tzigane 
Alborada del Gracioso 
"Daphnis et Chloe" Suite 
"Ma Mere et Chloe" 
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Pavane pour une Infante Defunte 
Piano Concerto in D Major for the Left Hand 
Rapsodie Espagnole 
Sheherazade 
Le Tombeau de Couperin 
 
Ricciotti, Carlo 
 Concertino in F Minor 
 
Riley, Terry 
 “In C” 
 
Rossini, Gioachino 
 Overture to "La Scala di Seta" 
Stabat Mater 
 
Saint-Saëns, Camille 
 Piano Concerto No. 2, Op. 22 
 
Sammartini, Giovanni Battista 
"lo, di celemenza e pace" from "Tre Angeli Che Cantano" 
 
Samuel, Gerhard 
 “Looking at Orpheus Looking” 
 
Scheinfeld, David 
 “Confrontation” 
 
Schoenberg, Arnold 
 Music for a Film Scene, Op. 34 
 
Schubert, Franz 
 Symphonies No. 2, 5 and 7 
Mass in G 
Rondo for Violin and Orchestra in A Major 
 
Schumann, Robert 
 Piano Concerto, Op. 54 
Concerto for Violoncello, Op. 129 
Symphonies No. 2, No. 3, and No. 4 
Overture to "Genoveva" 
 
Schuman, William 
 New England Triptych 
 
Scriabin, Alexander 
 Symphony No. 3 (“Divine Poem”) 
 
Shapero, Harold 
 Adagietto 
 
Sheinkman, Mordecai 
 "Passi" 
 
Shifrin, Seymour 
 Three Pieces for Orchestra 
 
Sibelius, Jean 
 Violin Concerto, Op. 47 
 
Stockhausen, Karlheinz 
 Mixtur 
 
Strauss, Richard 
 Don Juan, Op. 20 
Till Eulenspiegel, Op. 28 
Salome's Dance, Op. 54 
Rosenkavalier Suite, Op. 59 
 
Stravinsky, Igor 
Feu d'Artifice, Op. 4 
Oedipus Rex 
Requiem Canticles 
Scherzo a la Russe 
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Symphony in Three Movements 
Suite from "The Firebird" 
"Suite de Pulcinella" 
Orpheus 
Persephone  
Petrouchka 
The Rite of Spring 
Symphony of Psalms 
“Le Rossignol” in concert form 
 
Subotnick, Morton 
 Play No. 2 
 
Swift, Richard 
 "Tristia" 
 
Takahashi, Motoyuki 
 Aspen Concertante 
 
Torelli, Giuseppe 
"Sinfonia con Trombe, oboe et altre strumenti per 
l'accademia del 1707" 
 
Tchaikovsky, Pyotr Ilyich 
 Piano Concerto No. 1, Op. 23 
Symphonies No. 3 (Op. 29), No. 4 (Op. 36), No. 5 (Op. 64), 
and No. 6 (Op. 74) 
Suite No. 3 (Op. 55) 
Overture Fantasy, "Romeo and Juliet" 
Rococo Variations for Violoncello and Orchestra 
 
Varèse, Edgard 
 Arcana 
 
Verdi, Giuseppe 
 Requiem 
Te Deum 
"Quando le sere al Placido" from "Luisa Miller" 
Overtures to "La Forza del Destino" and "The Sicilian 
Vespers" 
 
Vieuxtemps, Henri 
 Violin Concerto No. 4, Op. 31 
 
Villa-Lobos, Heitor 
 Choros No. 10 
 
Vivaldi, Antonio 
 Concerto in F Minor for Violin 
Gloria for Chorus and Orchestra 
 
Weber, Carl Maria Von 
Overtures to "Euryanthe," "Der Freischutz" and "Oberon" 
Konzertstuck for Piano, Op. 79 
 
Webern, Anton Von 
 Im Sommerwind 
 Six Orchestra Pieces, Op. 6 
 Fuga Ricercata a 6 Voci 
  
Wagner, Richard  
Songs for Mathilde Wesendonck 
Overture to "Die Meistersinger" 
Good Friday Spell from "Parsifal" 
Prelude and Love Death from "Tristan und Isolde" 
Siegfried Idyll 
Siegfried's Rhine Journey and Siegfried's Funeral March 
from " Götterdammerung " 
Entrance of the Gods into Valhalla from "Das Rheingold" 
 
Yun, Isang 
 Fluctuations for Orchestra 
 
29
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APPENDIX 3. 
 
Ford Foundation Press Release Announcing the Program for Symphony 
Orchestras593 
 
 
News from the Ford Foundation 
477 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y.  10022 
Office of Reports Plaza 1-2900 
 
For Release Wednesday, P.M., July 1966 
For further information: Richard Magat or Robert Seaver 
 
New York, July 6 – The recipients of grants in the Ford Foundation’s national 
program to aid symphony orchestras were announced today.  Grants totaling $80.2 
million are being made to sixty-one orchestras in thirty-three states, the District of 
Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 
 
The program seeks to consolidate the nation’s rich orchestral resources, 
advance the quality of orchestras by enabling more musicians to devote their major 
energies to orchestral performance, attract more young people of talent to 
professional careers in orchestras by raising the income and prestige of symphony 
musicians, and extend the range of orchestras’ services to larger and more diversified 
audiences. 
                                               
593 This press release was shared with all participating orchestras and the public. "News from the Ford 
Foundation: Ford Foundation Program for Symphony Orchestras," July 6, 1966,  Box 3, Series 1.3, 
MOAA. 
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About three-fourths of the funds—$58,750,000—is in the form of 
endowments that the orchestras must match within five years with funds raised from 
other sources.  The rest of the funds do not require matching. 
The non-matching funds will be distributed in five annual installments 
beginning this month.  Interest on the endowment portion will be paid over the next 
ten years.  The principal of the endowment will be distributed in 1976. 
The required matching funds total $76,750,000, and, together with the grants 
and interest on the endowment, bring the expected total of new support for American 
symphonic development to at least $195 million over the next ten years. 
The grants range from $2.5 million each for fourteen of the major* orchestras 
to $325,000 each for seven of the smaller orchestras. 
The allocations reflect detailed analysis of orchestras’ artistic quality, volume 
and diversity of activities, future plans, stability and continuity of operations, and 
other characteristics.  
The proportions by which orchestras must match the endowment portion of 
their grants range from two dollars to one Foundation dollar to one-to-one. 
With the exception of the grant to the Symphony Orchestra of Puerto Rico, the 
grant to each orchestra will comprise an endowment portion, and a smaller 
supplemental fund that does not require matching.  The supplemental funds (totaling 
$17.3 million) are intended to relieve the orchestras form the necessity of increasing 
                                               
* There are twenty-five major orchestras, so classified by the American Symphony Orchestra League on 
the basis of engaging their players on seasonal contracts and having annual budgets of $250,000 or more. 
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their annual fund-raising drives in the period during which they are conducting capital 
drives to raise matching funds. Orchestras will be expected, however, to continue 
their annual maintenance campaigns at current levels. 
A second category of funds (totaling $4,150,000) that do not require matching 
– called “developmental funds” – will be granted to twenty-five orchestras that 
evidenced special potentialities or opportunities for advances in quality, each on the 
basis of a particular plan for upgrading. 
Studies leading to the design of the program had been carried out for several 
years by the Humanities and the Arts staff of the foundation. The director was W. 
McNeil Lowry, now a vice president of the Foundation. Edward F. D’Arms, associate 
director, said today, “After announcement of the program last October 22, the 
Foundation engaged in further explorations to determine the eligibility of orchestras 
and the exact allocation funds. Interviews were conducted with hundreds of orchestra 
representatives, and many orchestras were asked to submit ten-year plans. 
“This extensive examination both confirmed the assumptions on which the 
program was designed and afforded a detailed vision of a promising future the 
nation’s musical enterprise. 
“As our preliminary analyses suggested, the financial condition of most 
American orchestras contrasts sharply with their rich artistic quality. As a result, 
orchestra players are underpaid and too many must work at other, often nonmusical, 
jobs for most of their income. This, in turn, tends to discourage talented young people 
from undertaking professional symphonic careers. The fact that orchestras—the 
 
 
 
298  
 
oldest and best supported of our noncommercial institutions in the performing arts—
are in great need dramatizes the plight of other artistic institutions. This program, 
therefore, highlights the massive requirements of all of the arts in our society. 
“At the same time, exciting prospects were disclosed. More musicians will be 
employed for longer seasons. Many smaller orchestras plan to achieve major status 
over the next decade. Dramatic changes in the quality and diversity, as well as 
quantity of musical activity are likely. Orchestras will expand their programs for 
children and young people.  They will be able to reach more people in the 
communities and regions they serve. They will collaborate more extensively with 
ballet companies and choral groups and participate in more operas, both in concert 
form and in association with full-scale productions. And—in a variety of special 
programs—they will provide more training, not only by auditioning and teaching 
young musicians but also by affording them rehearsal and performance opportunities. 
“Though the Foundation program (including the anticipated matching funds 
and interest) will work towards these ends, their attainment will depend far more on 
increasing support of orchestras by their communities.” 
Outside the category of “major” orchestras, thirty-six orchestras were 
selected.  Important among the criteria of their eligibility were: the quality of 
performance and repertoire; the degree of professionalism as indicated by the players’ 
training and the proportion of their time spent in orchestral performance; the volume 
and scope of an orchestra’s services to its community, especially to young audiences; 
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proximity to other orchestras; and the qualities of vision and realism shown in the 
orchestra’s plan for the coming decade. 
When the Foundation announced the program last October, it is estimated that 
some two dozen “metropolitan” orchestras might be selected in addition to major 
orchestras. (The American Symphony Orchestra League classifies metropolitan 
orchestras as those with annual budgets of at least $100,000.)  The further inquiry into 
individual orchestras’ needs, capabilities, and plans, however, made it clear that a 
total of thirty-six orchestras beyond the major qualified for participation. Though the 
$100,000 budget minimum was only one of the criteria for qualification, it correlated 
well with the variety of other bases for selection. 
 The Foundation emphasized that the scale of grants should not be interpreted 
as its ranking of the status of American orchestras. Since a variety of factors in 
addition to artistic quality entered in to the allocations, such a conclusion would be 
unwarranted.  Orchestra X, for example, which may objectively outrank orchestra Y 
in sheer artistic quality, may have received a smaller allocation because it is located 
in a community with less promising prospects for assimilating or supporting any 
marked expansion of its services, or because it is one of several good orchestras in its 
region competing for audience and financial support. 
The participating orchestras, and the grants they are to receive, are as follows: 
 Total Grant Endowment 
(share of trust 
fund) 
Nonmatching 
Grant Funds 
ALABAMA    
Birmingham Symphony Orchestra 
 
$800,000 $600,000 $200,000 
ARIZONA    
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Phoenix Symphony 
 
850,000 600,0000 250,000* 
CALIFORNIA    
Los Angeles Philharmonic 2,500,000 2,000,000 500,000 
Oakland Symphony Orchestra 1,350,000 1,000,000 350,000 
Sacramento Symphony Orchestra 700,000 500,000 200,000 
San Diego Symphony Orchestra 600,000 500,000 200,000 
San Francisco Symphony Orchestra 
 
1,750,000 1,000,000 750,000* 
COLORADO    
Denver Symphony Orchestra 
 
1,750,000 1,000,000 750,000* 
CONNECTICUT    
Hartford Symphony Orchestra 1,350,000 1,000,000 350,000* 
New Haven Symphony Orchestra 
 
600,000 500,000 100,000 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA    
National Symphony 
 
2,500,000 2,000,000 500,000 
FLORIDA    
Florida Symphony Orchestra 
(Orlando) 
600,000 500,000 100,00 
Jacksonville Symphony Orchestra 
 
325,000 250,000 75,000 
GEORGIA    
Atlanta Symphony Orchestra 
 
1,750,000 1,000,000 750,000* 
HAWAII    
Honolulu Symphony 
 
1,100,000 750,000 350,000* 
ILLINOIS    
Chicago Symphony Orchestra 
 
2,500,000 2,000,000 500,000 
INDIANA    
Fort Wayne Philharmonic Orchestra 325,000 250,000 75,000 
Indianapolis Symphony 
 
2,500,000 2,000,000 500,000 
KANSAS    
Wichita Symphony Orchestra 
 
700,000 500,000 200,000* 
LOUISIANA    
New Orleans Philharmonic 
Symphony  
Orchestra 
1,750,000 1,000,000 750,000* 
Shreveport Symphony Orchestra 
 
425,000 350,000 75,000 
MARYLAND    
Baltimore Symphony Orchestra 
 
1,750,000 1,000,000 750,000* 
MASSACHUSETTS    
Boston Symphony Orchestra 
 
2,500,000 2,000,000 500,000 
MICHIGAN    
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Detroit Symphony Orchestra 1,500,000# 1,000,000 500,000 
Kalamazoo Symphony Orchestra 
 
600,000 500,000 100,000 
MINNESOTA    
Minneapolis Symphony 
 
2,500,000 2,000,000 500,000 
MISSOURI    
Kansas City Philharmonic 1,750,000 1,000,000 750,000* 
St. Louis Symphony Orchestra 
 
2,500,000 2,000,000 500,000 
NEBRASKA    
Omaha Symphony Orchestra 
 
500,000 400,000 100,000 
NEW JERSEY    
New Jersey Symphony (Newark) 
 
650,000 500,000 150,000* 
NEW YORK    
American Symphony Orchestra  
(New York City) 
1,500,000 1,000,000 500,000* 
Brooklyn Philharmonic 325,000 250,000 75,000 
Buffalo Philharmonic Orchestra 1,750,000 1,000,000 750,000* 
Festival Orchestra of New York City 425,000 350,000 75,000 
Hudson Valley Philharmonic 
Orchestra (Poughkeepsie) 
325,000 250,000 75,000 
Little Orchestra  
(New York City) 
425,000 350,000 75,000 
New York Philharmonic  
(New York City) 
1,500,000# 1,000,000 500,000 
Rochester Philharmonic Orchestra 1,750,000 1,000,000 750,000* 
Syracuse Symphony Orchestra 
 
1,000,000 750,000 250,000 
NORTH CAROLINA    
North Carolina Symphony Orchestra  
(Chapel Hill) 
 
1,000,000 750,000 250,000 
OHIO    
Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra 2,500,000 2,000,000 500,000 
Cleveland Orchestra 2,500,000 2,000,000 500,000 
Columbus Symphony Orchestra 
 
650,000 500,000 150,000* 
OKLAHOMA    
Oklahoma City Symphony Orchestra 750,000 600,000 150,000 
Tulsa Philharmonic Orchestra 
 
600,000 500,000 100,000 
OREGON    
Portland Symphony Orchestra 
 
1,250,000 1,000,000 250,000 
PENNSYLVANIA    
Philadelphia Orchestra 2,500,000 2,000,000 500,000 
Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra 2,500,000 2,000,000 500,000 
                                               
# Supplements a previous Ford Foundation grant. 
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PUERTO RICO    
Symphony Orchestra of Puerto Rico 
 
375,000 None 375,000* 
RHODE ISLAND    
Rhode Island Philharmonic Orchestra  
(Providence) 
 
500,000 350,000 150,000* 
TENNESSEE    
Memphis Symphony Orchestra 500,000 400,000 100,000 
Nashville Symphony 
 
700,000 500,000 200,000* 
TEXAS    
Dallas Symphony Orchestra 2,500,000 2,000,000 500,000 
Houston Symphony Orchestra 2,500,000 2,000,000 500,000 
San Antonio Orchestra 1,750,000 1,000,000 750,000* 
UTAH    
Utah Symphony Orchestra  
(Salt Lake City) 
 
1,500,000 1,000,000 500,000* 
VIRGINIA    
Richmond Symphony 
 
650,000 500,000 150,000* 
WASHINGTON    
Seattle Symphony Orchestra 
 
1,750,000 1,000,000 750,000* 
WISCONSIN    
Milwaukee Symphony Orchestra 1,250,000 1,000,000 250,000 
 
 
  
                                               
* Includes developmental funds. See explanation below. 
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Ford Foundation 
Program for Symphony Orchestras 
 
Background 
 
FOR RELEASE WEDNESDAY, P.M., JULY 6, 1966 
For further information: Richard Maget or Robert Seaver, Plaza 1-2900 
 
NOTE: This is a revised version of a background paper released October 22, 1965, 
when the program for symphony orchestras was initially announced. 
 
  
I. Setting 
 
The Ford Foundation has been studying the place of the symphony orchestra 
in the arts since it began a program in the Humanities and the Arts in 1957. By 1964 – 
against a backdrop of growing interest in orchestras and changing conditions in the 
musical world – a plan for a national program to support symphonic development had 
reached an advanced stage. 
Burgeoning artistic activity around the country was placing heavier demands 
upon symphony orchestras to lengthen their season and to diversify their activities. 
Attendance at symphony concerts given by the twenty-five major* orchestras grew 
from 5,714,206 in 1962–63 to 6,752,617 in 1964–65. In demand as well for opera, 
ballet, and choral concerts, symphony orchestras were central to the expanding 
cultural life of the United States. 
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Efforts to bring serious music to the children and youth of the country had 
also increased. Nearly every major and metropolitan* orchestra either brought young 
people to their own halls, or visited their schools or (in small ensembles) classrooms. 
Meanwhile, the quality of musical instruction and performance in the schools 
had reached a level far beyond that of pre-World War II days. The school repertory 
also reflected rising tastes. While facing these numerous demands for expanded 
services, orchestras where confronted with the problem of raising 20 to 70 per cent of 
their annual budgets through private contributions in their communities. Only two of 
the largest had endowments of sufficient size to provide any guarantee of stability. 
All orchestras were under pressure to expand their seasons and to pay their musicians 
more. 
 
II. Characteristics of Symphony Orchestras in the United States 
 
The American symphony orchestra is surprisingly pre-eminent in terms of 
age, numbers of concerts, and ubiquity. The New York Philharmonic was founded in 
1842, the same year as the Vienna Philharmonic. The Boston Symphony came into 
existence in 1881, a year before the Berlin Philharmonic. The St. Louis Symphony 
was founded in 1885, before the Amsterdam Concertgebouw, and the Chicago and 
                                               
* Classifications of the American Symphony Orchestra League, based on size of budget.  
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Cincinnati orchestras before the London Symphony.  The average age of the twenty-
five major orchestras in the United States is fifty and one-half years. 
Most European orchestras are connected with, or are outgrowths of, opera 
houses. The number of concerts of symphonic music they play is limited. The Vienna 
Philharmonic gives twenty-three concerts in a year. The London Symphony 
performed sixty-six concerts in 1963–64. In the same year the Boston Symphony 
gave 121 concerts; the Philadelphia Orchestra, 159; the New York Philharmonic, 183. 
Furthermore, the thirty-three largest cities of the United States and almost as 
many smaller ones have symphony orchestras of some stature. In France, there are 
only two professional symphony orchestras outside Paris; in England there are five 
outside London.  
Aside from the orchestras maintained by the Italian state radio, there is only one 
symphony orchestra in Italy.  
 American symphony orchestras are unique in that they are all private, 
nonprofit organizations that depend primarily on private contributions. The twenty-
five major orchestras showed total expenditures for 1965–66 or $31,375,000. In the 
same year, these orchestras received $7.4 million in contributions to annual 
maintenance campaigns, or approximately 23.6 per cent of their budgets. Even these 
figures are somewhat misleading, since two orchestras received more than 50 per cent 
of their total expenditures from their annual maintenance drives; four other received 
more than 40 per cent, and seven received 30 per cent to 40 per cent. 
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 The amount of governmental support received is small in comparison. The 
total income from tax sources to the twenty-five major orchestras (a large part of 
which is for the performance of specific services, usually concerts given for 
schoolchildren) amounted to $1,564,000 for 1965–66, or approximately 4.9 per cent 
of their total budgets. Five of the twenty-five receive no public money. 
 In contrast, professional orchestras in Britain, France, Italy, and Germany 
receive virtually all their support from governmental sources. 
 Thirty years ago most players in the great American orchestras came to the 
United States after receiving their musical training in their native countries. Today 
this is no longer true. 
 Even in the much-discussed area of conducting personnel, seven of the 
conductors of the twenty-five major orchestras mentioned above are native 
Americans and ten are naturalized Americans. 
 
III. The Economic Status of the Symphony Orchestra Player 
 
Orchestra musicians are one of the most underpaid professional groups in 
American society. 
The five leading orchestras paid an average annual salary of approximately 
$11,600 in 1965–66. The remaining twenty major orchestras paid an average of 
approximately $4,900, and the next thirty-six orchestras paid an average annual salary 
of less than $1,500. 
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As recently as 1964–65, the average length of season for the twenty-five 
major orchestras was 30.4 weeks. Only seven orchestras offered employment for 
forty or more weeks per year, as compared with twelve which provided less than 
thirty weeks. 
A comparison of the average salaries of orchestra players in the twenty-five 
major symphonies with the median salaries paid to public school teachers for 1963–
64 shows that in five cities the musicians were better paid than the classroom 
teachers.  These cities are Boston, Philadelphia, New York, Chicago, and Cleveland, 
the so-called Big Five of the orchestral world. In Los Angeles, the salaries of both 
groups were almost identical; in the remaining nineteen cities the classroom teachers 
received larger annual salaries than the orchestra players. 
Any player in a major symphony has had to spend at least as much time, 
money, and effort on his education as a teacher. Furthermore, the conditions of 
employment are more favorable to school teachers than to orchestra musicians. The 
New York Philharmonic, for example, has discontinued its Sunday afternoon concerts 
in the 1965–66 season to give the players one day off per week; the players had not 
objected to their schedules until they moved to a fifty-two week season, but then they 
found it too exhausting to play, or to be on call to play, every day in the year. Most 
major symphonies go on tour for periods ranging from three to nine weeks; and this 
travel is not only tiring but takes the musician away from teaching or other extra jobs 
he may have. 
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Fortunately, most symphony musicians love music and love playing in an 
orchestra even though many endure penalties due to their meager salaries. As a 
genuine professional, the orchestra player is willing to do his best under less than 
ideal conditions of salary, rehearsal time, or acoustics, but he wants the opportunity to 
show himself and his orchestra at their best. A musician with a metropolitan 
orchestra, commenting recently on the loss of players to major orchestras said, “I 
think what draws the people away is not so much that they can make more money, 
but that they can play; they can play music and not work at other jobs. We are losing 
fine string players for that reason.” 
Even on a short vacation, a symphony player must practice his instrument 
regularly every day to maintain and improve his proficiency. This is one of the 
reasons a long break between the end of one season and the beginning of the next is 
so hard on players. 
The present movement to extend the seasons of orchestras stems largely from 
the economic needs of the players. The boards of trustees of orchestras are 
sympathetic to the players’ need for larger incomes and better living conditions. To 
make this possible, however, orchestra boards and managers face formidable 
problems. 
 
IV. The Financial Situation of Orchestras 
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The financing of symphony orchestras in the United States has always been 
difficult. In the early days there were a few well-known benefactors who either paid 
the annual deficit personally, as Henry L. Higginson did for many years in Boston, or 
who formed part of a group like the supporters of Walter Damrosch in New York. 
Efforts to make an orchestra self-sustaining have been frequent but unsuccessful. 
As noted above, government support of symphony orchestras in the United 
States has always been small – in 1965–66 4.9 per cent of the annual expenditures of 
the twenty-five major orchestras, and 9.5 per cent for thirty-six other orchestras, a 
total of some $2.3 million in all. 
The bulk of the deficits of American orchestras is met from the private sector. 
The twenty-five major symphonies report total income from endowment in 1965–66 
as $2,432,000 or approximately 7.7 per cent of their total expenditures. But three of 
these orchestras have no endowment income at all, and another eleven receive 
$10,000 or less from this source. The picture for the thirty-six orchestras of 
“metropolitan” scale is even bleaker – a total of $45,000, or less than 1 per cent of 
their total expenditures. 
Current studies show there has been a steady increase of approximately 5 per 
cent in annual total expenditures of a sample of major orchestras over a twenty-seven-
year period since 1937, and annual increases of more than 6 per cent per year during 
the whole period, with a consequent widening of the gap between balanced books and 
the constant scramble to meet rising costs. 
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Within the last three years there has been a strong movement on the part of 
musicians to press for full employment. Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, New York, and 
Philadelphia have moved to year-round contracts with paid vacations of several 
weeks. Other orchestras are taking large steps in the direction of full employment. 
All of this will require more money, but first activities for the orchestras must 
be developed. No orchestra could find audiences for only pairs of subscription 
concerts fifty-two or even forty-eight weeks in the year. (That is, the same program 
twice a week.) Nor could the conductor and the orchestra prepare programs for such a 
long series. 
In order to find different kinds of engagements and audiences, it is necessary 
to have flexibility in the use of the orchestra. For example, breaking the orchestra into 
halves, or thirds, or other groupings, makes it possible to play in auditoriums which 
could not seat the full orchestra; to form chamber orchestras; or to include opera 
seasons in the annual contract, provided work can be found for the half or third or the 
orchestra which cannot be fitted into the opera pit. 
Great ingenuity and energy are being shown by managers in developing new 
activities and audiences. The New York Philharmonic has not only added pops 
concerts but free summer concerts in the city parks. The outdoor concerts at Oakland 
have added five weeks to the season of the Detroit orchestra. Minneapolis will 
emphasize touring in Minnesota and nearby states. San Francisco established a series 
of five concerts per season in a college town about seventy-five miles from its base. 
Seattle has plans to tour in Washington, Idaho, and Montana. 
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It will take several years to develop these and similar programs to the point of 
maximum financial return to the orchestras. Meantime, they are faced with meeting 
the increased weekly salaries over a longer season. Many of them are turning their 
thoughts to capital fund drives – either for endowment or for major expenditures to 
make possible a summer season. 
The general atmosphere is one of excitement and optimism. Great efforts will 
be needed, but significant assistance at this particular juncture in orchestral history 
might prove decisive in stabilizing or raising the levels of most of the nation’s 
professional orchestras. That is the basis of the Ford Foundation program. 
 
V. The Ford Foundation Program 
 
A. Objectives 
• To advance quality by enabling more musicians to devote their major 
energies to orchestral performance. 
• To strengthen symphonic organizations and enlarge the audience for 
orchestral music by permitting the orchestras to increase their seasons. 
This increase may include more tours and more school, neighborhood, 
and suburban concerts. 
• To attract more young people of talent to professional careers by 
raising the income and prestige of orchestra members. 
 
The Foundation hopes the general improvement of the conditions of the 
symphony 
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player will serve as an inducements to the many fine musicians now in training to go 
into this field, rather than to turn to music teaching or to leave music altogether. 
 
B. Schedule 
 
The Foundation staff broached the national program for symphony orchestras 
to the Foundation’s board of trustees in 1964. On October 1, 1965, the trustees 
approved an appropriation of $85 million, which was publicly announced October 22. 
The appropriation was set as an order of magnitude for the program. The final 
allocation of $80.2 million reflects the more intensive gathering of data and 
individual orchestra profiles that became feasible once the program was publicly 
known. The Foundation does not anticipate the participation of additional orchestras 
in the program. 
Final selections and allocations were made on the basis of questionnaires and 
interviews late in 1965 and early in 1966. The grants are effective as of July 1966. 
 
C. Terms 
 
 Sixty-one American orchestras have been granted $80.2 million as follows: 
1. Expendable and developmental funds totaling $21,450,000 that the 
orchestras are not required to match. 
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2. Endowment funds based on a $58,750,000 trust established by the 
Foundation, which the orchestras are required to match from other 
sources. 
The selection of each orchestra and the amount it received reflected its artistic 
quality, the character of its musical program, the level of its operations, and its 
managerial stability. Criteria were used that sought to respond to these factors in such 
a way as to achieve a balance between the needs of each organization and its capacity 
for growth. 
All but one of the orchestras has been assigned a proportional participation in 
the trust fund, which it will be required to match in ratios varying from $1 to $2 for 
each dollar of its trust fund participation. At the end of ten years, the principal of the 
trust fund will be shared proportionately by the orchestras, to be used as an 
endowment. In addition, each orchestra will receive its proportional share of the 
annual income earned by the trust fund. 
The nonmatching funds ($21,450,000), which will be paid in annual 
installments over five years beginning July 1966, are intended to lessen the strain on 
the orchestras during that period, when they are required to match their portion of the 
trust fund. 
The orchestras will be expected to continue their annual maintenance 
campaigns while they are engaged in their fund drives to meet the matching 
requirements. Orchestra managers believe that it would be fatal for them to give up 
their annual maintenance campaigns even for a year or two and try to revive them 
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later. Furthermore, the income from the endowment funds cannot meet the needs now 
covered by the maintenance campaigns. In fact, there will be a need constantly to 
augment the annual maintenance campaigns over the years, as costs of all kinds are 
likely to increase. 
 
D. Design 
 
In formulating its program, the Foundation studied, and ruled out, a number of 
alternatives. If the Foundation had limited its assistance to the four or five leading 
orchestras, for example, it would have worked to the hardship of many more 
orchestras than it would have helped. The next rank of orchestras would be likely to 
lose their best players to the grant recipients because they could not compete in 
salaries. Quality and morale would suffer. 
Had assistance been limited to orchestras just below the so-called “Big Five,” 
the top orchestras would have been deprived of assistance they need at this time when 
they are moving to full employment; and the orchestras just below the second rank 
would suffer from loss of their finest players. 
If the Foundation confined its grants only to the twenty-five major orchestras, 
whole sections of the country might be left without good symphonic music. Other 
orchestras have appreciable artistic merit, and American musical life would lose 
much of its richness and diversity without them. The statewide touring of the Utah 
and Honolulu orchestras, the extensive commissioning series of Louisville, the 
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programming of Oakland, and the cultural leadership of the Phoenix and Portland 
(Oregon) orchestras are all significant contributions to the musical scene. 
Furthermore, the smaller orchestras are important sources of recruiting for the majors. 
 
E. Developmental Funds 
 
In the allocations, there is a fixed ratio of endowment to free funds – three-to-
one, four-to-one, or five-to-one. In addition, however, twenty-five orchestras (marked 
with an asterisk on the list in the Foundation news release) were allocated additional, 
“developmental” funds. 
The award of developmental funds reflects a variety of circumstances pointing 
to special potentialities or opportunities for qualitative advance. 
In the case of major orchestras, it is designed mainly to improve the situation 
of players in orchestras with the shortest seasons and the weakest financial resources. 
Nine of the major orchestras were each allocated an additional $250,000. These 
orchestras frequently lose personnel to the larger and more affluent orchestras. In 
some cases a player might prefer to remain with a small orchestra if his salary could 
be increased even modestly. Occasionally it will be possible to engage a good local 
musician for orchestra work if his salary is made sufficient to enable him to give up a 
public-school position or other job that now prevents him from attending daytime 
rehearsals. The developmental funds may also be used to pay the players for extra 
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rehearsal time, which in turn may make it possible for the orchestra to expand its 
repertory and perfect its performances of difficult works. 
Developmental funds for selected non-major orchestras reflect differences in 
the potentials of groups falling into roughly similar classes. Sixteen non-major 
orchestras were allocated developmental funds ranging from $50,000 to $250,000 
each. The awards were made mainly on the basis of ten-year plans for expansion that 
appeared to warrant additional funds. 
 
F. Total Needs 
 
The Foundations’ program, despite its size, will hardly solve all the problems 
of the orchestra. Nor does it mean anything like affluence to the orchestra musician. 
The sixty-one orchestras will be required to raise at least as much in the future 
as the $39,391,000 they spent in 1965–66. At an estimated 6 per cent rate of increase, 
total expenditures are expected to reach approximately $53 million within five years 
and $70 million within ten years. The income from endowment funds (estimated at 4 
per cent) will provide approximately $2,350,000 annually toward these goals, and the 
income from matching funds is expected to provide an additional $3,070,000, after 
the matching fund campaigns have been completed. (five years hence.) Thus the 
Foundation program would contribute annually after five years $5,420,000 toward 
total budgets of approximately $53 million, and the same amount after ten years 
toward total budgets of the order of $70 million. In short, the total annual income 
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provided by the Foundation program and the matching funds would be hardly more 
than 7 per cent of the projected figure for ten years hence. 
If all the income from the endowment funds were applied exclusively to the 
annual salaries of the players in the major orchestras, the average increase would 
amount to approximately $1,050, thus bringing their total salary to approximately 
$7,600, which is hardly an inflated salary for one of the most gifted groups in our 
society. If it were possible to think of providing every player in major orchestras with 
an average annual salary of $15,000 and every player in the metropolitan orchestras 
with an average salary of $5,000, the cost would amount to approximately $18.5 
million per year over and above the cost of present salaries. To endow this increase 
would require a capital sum of approximately $463 million – that is, nearly six times 
greater than the Foundation’s total orchestra program. And this would make no 
provision for such other operating expense of the orchestras as travel, programs, 
music, halls, and administration, to say nothing of conductors and soloists. 
 
G. Effects 
 
For the orchestras with largest budgets, the Foundation believes its program 
will provide a fair test of the principle of full employment. It is important that these 
orchestras be able to demonstrate successfully the possibility of full annual 
employment, not only for their own sakes but for the effect it will have on other 
orchestras. 
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For an intermediate group among the majors, the Foundation program can 
provide the practical means to enable them to raise their salaries within sign of 
competing with the top orchestras. They may hold top players who might otherwise 
be attracted to the Big Five. Furthermore, first-desk men from the Big Five who may 
not wish to play for forty-eight or fifty-two weeks may prefer to play with other 
orchestras; such a trend could bring these orchestras to new heights of artistry. 
For the few major orchestras that have been engaged in a battle for survival a 
respite provided by the program should enable them to solidify their present financial 
structure and to work toward artistic improvement. 
As for the other grant recipients, the majority can look forward only to a 
modest increase of salaries, but the attention focused upon the orchestras through the 
local campaigns to raise matching funds and through their selection to participate in 
the Foundation program might help to improve their local prestige and stability. 
On the basis of intimate explorations of the orchestras over the last several 
months, the Foundation anticipates the following other likely effects: 
• Increases in the salaries of orchestra members, though probably below 
expectation raised by announcement of the program. Increased income 
will reflect in part lengthened seasons among almost all orchestras. 
• Addition of players by many orchestras, particularly through use of the 
developmental funds. 
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• Increases in the budgets of orchestras. In the last three years 
respectively, the total budgets of the orchestras increased 7, 15, and 
9.4 per cent. The projected increase in 1966–67 is 16.8 per cent. 
• Dramatic increases in the volume of orchestral activity, particularly 
among smaller orchestras. Many of the metropolitan orchestras expect, 
over the next ten years, to join the ranks of the majors. All the non-
major orchestras plan at least to double present levels of activities. 
• Equally impressive changes in the quality and diversity of activity. 
One area will be expanded programs for children and young people, 
including the use of quartets, quintets, and chamber orchestras in 
school concerts. Many orchestras will diversify by increasing join 
ventures with ballet companies, choral groups, and opera companies. 
Many orchestras also plan to become more active in training 
musicians, not only through instruction but also by providing them 
with rehearsal and performance opportunities with the regular 
orchestra and with youth orchestras. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
American symphony orchestras are an established landmark on the American 
scene and are often the artistic leaders in their community. At this particular time, it is 
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especially important that standards of artistic quality be recognized. The symphony 
orchestra can give support to choral groups, opera companies, and dance companies. 
There is a dawning recognition that orchestras of artistic quality are not a 
monopoly of the Big Five or of the Eastern Seaboard. The New York reviews which 
orchestras from Cincinnati, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Indianapolis, Minneapolis, and 
New Orleans have received show that these orchestras measure up to high criteria. 
All this has been made possible largely through the devotion and self-sacrifice 
of players who have received less than a dignified wage for their talents. The present 
movement to upgrade the economic status of orchestra musicians is important not 
only for the well-being of the players concerned but for the health and quality of 
artistic activity throughout the United States. 
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